Coleman v. Governor Of State Of Mich.

• Decision Date: 16 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09-1139,09-1139
• Parties: ANDRE COLEMAN, RALEEM-X, LEON PERCIVAL, and JEFFERY CARNEY, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. GOVERNOR OF STATE OF MICHIGAN, PATRICIA CARUSO, Warden SANDRA SCHULTZ MENGEL, KIMBERLY S. HAUSER, HANNAH WATSON, JUDGE RICHARD BANDSTRA, CHIEF JUDGE HOWARD C. WHITBECK, MIKE BRYANTON, DAVID BERGH, and BARBARA BOUCHARD, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ANDRE COLEMAN, RALEEM-X, LEON PERCIVAL, and JEFFERY CARNEY, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. GOVERNOR OF STATE OF MICHIGAN, PATRICIA CARUSO, Warden SANDRA SCHULTZ MENGEL, KIMBERLY S. HAUSER, HANNAH WATSON, JUDGE RICHARD BANDSTRA, CHIEF JUDGE HOWARD C. WHITBECK, MIKE BRYANTON, DAVID BERGH, and BARBARA BOUCHARD, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-1139

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED March 16, 2011

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: KEITH, KENNEDY, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellants are five prose indigent prisoners who attempted to file civil claims in state court, but were denied the opportunity to do so pursuant to Michigan Complied Laws § 600.2963, which requires prisoners to pay full or partial court fees prior to filing civil claims. As a result, Plaintiffs brought suit against numerous state government officials in federal district court. Plaintiffs made three claims. First, they challenged the constitutionality of § 600.2963(8) on its face and as-applied to Plaintiffs; second, they challenged enforcement of the statute by state officials and Ingham County Circuit Court judges pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and third, theycontested the conditions of their state prison confinement. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a genuine issue of material fact. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

Plaintiffs Andre Coleman, Raleem-X, Leon Percival, Jeffrey Carney and Ron Denham (collectively "Plaintiffs") are pro se indigent state prisoners from the following Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") prisons: the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility ("LMF"); the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility; and the Marquette Branch Prison. Between 2001 and 2004, Plaintiffs attempted to file judicial review claims and petitions for writ of habeas corpus in Ingham County Circuit Court and were denied the opportunity to file because of outstanding fees pursuant to § 600.2963(8). Plaintiffs filed appeals from the Circuit Court's denial of their claims with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which upheld the Circuit Court's decision. Plaintiffs did not file an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.

Section 600.2963 of the Michigan Compiled Laws governs filing fees for indigent prisoners bringing civil actions or civil appeals in state court. It states, in pertinent part:

(1) If a prisoner under jurisdiction of the department of corrections submits for filing a civil action as plaintiff in a court of this state or submits for filing an appeal in a civil action in a court of this state and states that he or she is indigent and therefore is unable to pay the filing fee and costs required by law, the prisoner making the claim of indigency shall submit to the court a certified copy of his or her institutional account, showing the current balance in the account and a 12-month history of deposits and withdrawals for the account. The court then shall order the prisoner to pay fees and costs as provided in this section. The court shall suspend the filing of the civil action or appeal until the filing fee or initial partial filing fee ordered under subsection (2) or (3) is received by the court....

(7) For purposes of this section, the fact of a prisoner's incarceration cannot be the sole basis for a determination of indigency. However, this section shall not prohibit a prisoner from commencing a civil action or filing an appeal in a civil action if the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee. If the court, pursuant to court rule, waives or suspends the payment of fees and costs in an action described in subsection (1) because the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee, the court shall order the fees and costs to be paid by the prisoner in the manner provided in this section when the reason for the waiver or suspension no longer exists.

(8) A prisoner who has failed to pay outstanding fees and costs as required under this section shall not commence a new civil action or appeal until the outstanding fees and costs have been paid.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2963. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of§ 600.2983(8) on its face and as applied in their cases. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the unlawful application of § 600.2963(8) violates their First Amendment right to access the courts and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. Moreover, Plaintiffs' allege that § 600.2963(8) is unconstitutional because it bars the filing of a combined action by prisoners.

Plaintiffs also filed a § 1983 suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief against Ingham County, Ingham County Circuit Judge William Collette, Ingham County Circuit Judge Peter Houk, Ingham County Circuit Court administrator David Easterday, Ingham County Circuit Court clerk Mike Brayton and law clerk Damian Fisher (collectively, "Ingham County Defendants") and Sandra Schultz Mengel, Kim Hauser, Hannah Watson, Angela Dissessa, Judge Richard Bandstra and Judge William C. Whitbeck¹ (collectively, "Court of Appeals Defendants") for their enforcement of § 600.2963(8) against Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' conditions of confinement claims arise out of their placement in administrative segregation. They allege constitutional violations relating to the denial of appliances, uncomfortable shoes, inadequate dental products, use of bright lights in cells up to and exceeding 18 hours a day, infringement on their right to free exercise of religion and denial of access to court contrary to their First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. These claims were filed against MDOC Director Patricia Caruso, LMF Warden David Bergh, former LMF Warden Barbara Bouchard and Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility Warden Willie O. Smith (collectively, the "MDOC Defendants") only.

Plaintiffs filed their suit with the district court on or around January 16, 2007. Having accepted and adopted the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court granted summary judgment to the MDOC Defendants on April 2, 2008. On August 14, 2008, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation to grant Ingham County Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Over Plaintiffs' objections, the district court adopted the recommendation and granted the Ingham County Defendants' motion. The district court denied Plaintiffs' counter-motion for summary judgment as to the remaining Court of Appeals Defendants on December 15, 2008, instead dismissing the claims against Court of Appeals Defendants as well. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court.

II.

A.

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to § 600.2963(8) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The initial question in this case, then, is whether the district court andthis Court have authority to review the substance of this matter pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This Court reviews de novo a district court's ruling that theRooker-Feldman doctrine precludes subject matter jurisdiction. Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008).

B.

The Supreme Court first held that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, lower district courts lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to directly review state court decisions inRooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Accordingly, only the Supreme Court of the United States has the jurisdiction to review state court decisions. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416. Sixty years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). There, the plaintiff challenged the District of Columbia's rule for bar admission in the district court after being denied permission to sit for examination by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 468-69. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's dismissal of the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that "[i]f the constitutional claims presented to a United States District Court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial [of a claim] in a judicial proceeding... then the District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision. This the District Court may not do." Id. at 482 n.16. Together, the Rooker and Feldman decisions have combined to make the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits district courts from conducting appellate review of state court decisions.

In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., the Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting districtcourt review and rejection of those judgments." 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Nevertheless, where an individual makes a claim concurrently with or independent from the state court proceeding, the Supreme Court emphasized that the district court has jurisdiction to review that claim. Id. at 293. As the Court notes, "[i]f a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

The Sixth Circuit explains the inquiry to whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies after Exxon as follows:

The inquiry then is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then theRooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a

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