Coleman v. Jaggers

• Decision Date: 28 February 1906
• Citation: 85 P. 894,12 Idaho 125
• Parties: B. H. COLEMAN et al., Respondents, v. L. A. JAGGERS, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

85 P. 894

12 Idaho 125

B. H. COLEMAN et al., Respondents, v. L. A. JAGGERS, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 28, 1906

ACTION TO DETERMINE ADVERSE CLAIM - TITLE TO REAL ESTATE-SEPARATE PROPERTY OF WIFE-EXEMPTIONS-EXECUTION SALE.

1. Under the provisions of section 4538 of the Revised Statutes an action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property adverse to him for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.

2. Under the jurisdiction and practice in equity, independent of statute, a bill to quiet title cannot be maintained unless the possession and legal title are in the complainant, but that rule of equity practice has been greatly modified by the provisions of section 4538 in this state, and an action may be maintained although the plaintiff have neither the possession nor the legal title thereto.

3. Under the provisions of said section 4538, a suit may be brought by anyone claiming some right or interest in land to determine any adverse claim thereto.

4. By the provisions of section 1, article 5 of the constitution of Idaho, the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity and the forms of all such actions and suits are prohibited, and there is but one form of action in this state for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs.

5. By the provisions of section 20, article 5 of the constitution the district court is given original jurisdiction in all cases both at law and in equity, as well as certain appellate jurisdiction.

6. Under the provisions of section 4168 of the Revised Statutes the complaint is only required to contain the title of the court and cause, a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language, and the demand for relief, and the district court is authorized to grant such relief, whether in equity or at law, as the parties are entitled to under their allegations and proof.

7. Under the provisions of our constitution and statute, the district court has equitable, jurisdiction, and is authorized to exercise it in all cases where the remedy at law is not adequate, complete and certain so as to meet all the requirements of justice in the case.

8. Held, under the evidence in this case that the trial court was justified in finding that the premises in dispute were not the separate property of the appellant.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Boise County. Hon. George H. Stewart, Judge.

Action to determine adverse claim to real property. Judgment for the plaintiffs. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs in favor of respondents.

H. L. Fisher, for Appellant.

An action to quiet title cannot be maintained against the holder of the legal title by the holder of an equitable title. (Von Drachenfels v. Doolittle, 77 Cal. 295, 19 P. 518; Nidever v. Ayers, 83 Cal. 39, 23 P. 192; Harrigann v. Mowry, 84 Cal. 458, 22 P. 658, 24 P. 48; Brewer v Houston, 58 Cal. 345; Shanahan v. Crampton, 92 Cal. 13, 28 P. 50; Learned v. Welton, 40 Cal. 349; Chase v. Cameron, 133 Cal. 231, 65 P. 460; City and County of San Francisco v. Ellis, 54 Cal. 72, 65 P. 460; Castro v. Barry, 79 Cal. 448, 21 P. 946; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U.S. 552, 30 L.Ed. 1010, 7 S.Ct. 1129; Moores v. Townshend, 102 N.Y. 387, 7 N.E. 401.)

As against a stranger to the judgment, plaintiff must show that defendant had title. (Reilly v. Wright, 117 Cal. 80, 48 P. 970.)

An estate cannot be conveyed on an execution sale on a judgment, in an action to which the wife was not a party. (Svetinich v. Sheean, 124 Cal. 216, 71 Am. St. Rep. 50, 56 P. 1028.)

Karl Paine, for Respondents.

Section 4538 of the Revised Statutes authorizes an action to be maintained to determine any adverse claim. (Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 454, 79 P. 393; Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Idaho 308, 77 P. 784; Fry v. Summers, 4 Idaho 424, 39 P. 1118.)

The foregoing decisions of this court have interpreted section 4538 to mean that every estate or interest known to the law, whether legal or equitable, may be determined and adjudicated in an action of this kind.

The action (to quiet title) has been greatly extended by statute, and in many states is the ordinary mode of trying disputed titles. (3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1395.)

The borrowed money with which the hotel was purchased was community property. (Northwestern etc. Bank v. Rauch, 7 Idaho 153, 154, 61 P. 516; Schuyler v. Broughton, 70 Cal. 282, 11 P. 719.)

The common property of the marital community might be sold upon execution for the debts of the husband. (Law v. Spence, 5 Idaho 251, 48 P. 282.)

SULLIVAN, J. Stockslager, C. J., AILSHIE, J., concurring.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, J.

This action was brought by the respondents to quiet the title to certain premises situated in Centerville, Boise county. The action was originally brought against Joseph A. Jaggers and L. A. Jaggers, husband and wife, and H. C. Granger and Belle Granger, husband and wife. It appears from the record that Joseph Jaggers and H. C. Granger were engaged in the saloon business in Centerville and became indebted to the respondents; that respondents recovered judgment against them, and the premises in controversy were sold at sheriff's sale and purchased by the respondents; they thereafter procured a sheriff's deed to said premises, and base their claim of ownership on said sheriff's deed. Granger and his wife and Joseph Jaggers filed a disclaimer in this suit, and Mrs. Jaggers filed her separate answer denying the allegations of the complaint as to the ownership of said premises by the respondents and their right to the possession thereof. She averred that she was the owner and entitled to the possession of the premises, having paid the entire purchase price therefor out of her separate means and property, and that the same was acquired by her as her separate property and estate, and that she had never conveyed the same to anyone. The cause was tried by the court without a jury and judgment entered in favor of the respondents. The first five errors assigned were considered on the argument of this case together. It is contended by counsel for appellant that the undisputed evidence shows that neither the respondents nor the judgment debtors through whom they claim ever had the legal title to the premises in question, and that the legal title now stands in the appellant; that being true, it is contended that an action to quiet title cannot be maintained against the holder of the legal title by the holder of the equitable title. In support of that contention counsel cites the following authorities: Von Drachenfels v. Doolittle, 77 Cal. 295, 19 P. 518; Nidever v. Ayers, 83 Cal. 39, 23 P. 192; Harrigann v. Mowry, 84 Cal. 458, 22 P. 658, 24 P. 48; Shanahan v. Crampton, 92 Cal. 9, 28 P. 50; Chase v. Cameron, 133 Cal. 231, 65 P. 460; Castro v. Barry, 79 Cal. 443, 21 P. 946; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U.S. 552, 30 L.Ed. 1010, 7 S.Ct. 1129; Moores v. Townshend, 102 N.Y. 387, 7 N.E. 401. The case of Drachenfels v. Doolittle, supra, was decided by the supreme court of California in 1888, and it is there held that an action to quiet title cannot be maintained by the owner of an equitable interest as against the holder of the legal title, and cites in support of that proposition only one case--that of Frost v. Spitley, 121 U.S. 552, 30 L.Ed. 1010, 7 S.Ct. 1129.

The California court seems to have held strictly to the general principles of equity jurisprudence as administered by the chancery courts of England, regardless of the provisions of section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure of that state. That section is identically the same as section 4538 of the Revised Statutes, and is as follows: "An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim."

In Tuffree v. Polhemus, 108 Cal. 670, 41 P. 806, the court apparently took a little broader view of the provisions of that section than it had in some previous cases and said: "But as this court in the past has had occasion to remark, section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure is broad in its terms; it possesses no limitations or restrictions; and we see no reason why it does not vest in the holder of an equitable title the right to come before the court and have their equities declared superior to any and all opposing equities." The court also said: "There are cases in this state holding that the possessor of an equitable title cannot bring an action to quiet such title against the holder of the legal title," and cites in support of that proposition the authorities above cited. Under the jurisdiction and practice in equity, both in English and in the courts of the United States, independent of any statute, a bill to quiet title cannot be maintained without clear proof of both possession and legal title in the complainant, hence one holding the equitable title could not sustain an action against one holding the legal.

In Frost v. Spitley, supra, which was an appeal from the United States circuit court of the district of Nebraska the statute of that state authorized an action to quiet title to be brought by any person or persons whether in actual possession or not, and in that case the supreme court of the United States held that the requisite of the plaintiff's possession was dispensed with by statute. That statute, however, did not dispense with the requisite, that the plaintiff must have the legal title, as required by the ancient equity jurisdiction and practice in such cases. That is the only case cited in support of the rule laid down in Drachenfels v. Doolittle, supra, which case seems to...