Coleman v. Lappin
| Decision Date | 29 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil no. 6:10-CV-186-GFVT |
| Parties | MONROE L. COLEMAN Plaintiff, v. HARLEY LAPPIN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Monroe L. Coleman, confined in the United States Penitentiary-McCreary, in Pine Knot, Kentucky, ("USP-McCreary"),1 has filed a pro se civil rights action asserting various constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to the doctrine announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
As Coleman has been granted in forma pauperis status and is asserting claims against government officials, the Court now screens his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Both of these sections require a district court to dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. Id.; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court will also address the following four motions which Coleman filed:
(1) motion to amend/correct his original Complaint to assert "tort claims," [R. 22]; (2) motion for clarification of the Order entered on March 17, 2011, [R. 29];
(3) motion to set aside the Orders entered on February 26, 2011, and March 29, 2011, [R. 31];and
(4) motion for leave to amend the Complaint to assert additional claims, [R. 36].
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will transfer some of Coleman's claims to a federal court in Indiana, dismiss without prejudice some of his claims for lack venue and/or personal jurisdiction, dismiss the remainder of his claims either for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or as unauthorized filings. Additionally, the Court will deny the four pending motions listed above.
On July 6, 2010, Coleman filed his original Bivens Complaint , and attached over 100 pages of attachments, . He named fourteen defendants, consisting of six administrative officials from the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), five officials from USP-Terre Haute; one official from USP-Big Sandy; one official from USP-McCreary, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, a member of Congress representing the District of Columbia.
Thereafter, Coleman amended his original Complaint several times by filing documents identified as "Amended Complaints." He did this by filing motions seeking leave of Court to amend or simply by filing documents labeled as "Affidavit" or other names which appear to be de facto amended complaints. Some of Coleman's amendments were authorized either by Order or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but many were not authorized. As a result of his numerous amendments, other individuals were later added asdefendants.
Coleman challenged numerous conditions of not only his past confinement at both USP-Terre Haute and USP-Big Sandy, but also numerous conditions of his current confinement at USP-McCreary. He alleged that all of the defendants have, jointly and severally, violated his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution in both their individual and official capacities. In particular, Coleman alleges that officials at USP-Terre Haute and USP-McCreary have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, by refusing to authorize surgery to correct his hernia condition.
In his original Complaint, [R. 2], Coleman alleged that when he was previously confined at USP-Terre Haute,2 various officials there violated his First, Fifth, and EighthAmendment rights by: (1) failing or refusing to provide him with proper medical care; (2) causing a false disciplinary report to be filed against him which resulted in the imposition of sanctions; (3) denying him the right to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing; (4) discriminating against him because of his African American race; (5) removing him from a rehabilitative prison program, identified as the "Challenge Program," by falsely accusing him of possessing sexually explicit material; (6) refusing to transfer him to a lower security prison; and (7) placing him in segregation without justification.
On July 23, 2010, Coleman filed two motions seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint. [R. 7; R. 9]. Coleman asked to assert additional claims of racial discrimination against the existing USP-Terre Haute defendants, and to add as defendants other USP-Terre-Haute officials. He alleged that the new defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances complaining about various conditions of his confinement, denied him visitation privileges in violation of the First Amendment, racially discriminated against him, and denied him necessary medical treatment for his hernia condition. [Id.]. Coleman also asked to amend his Complaint to reflect that he was asserting claims against all USP-Terre Haute defendants, old and new, in both their individual and official capacities. [See R. 7].
On March 18, 2011, the Court granted both of Coleman's motions to amend, [R. 7; R. 9], and directed the Clerk of the Court to docket Coleman's tendered Amended Complaint, [R. 13], as an Amended Complaint filed retroactively to August 31, 2010. [See R. 25].3 On April 29, 2011, Coleman filed three lengthy "Affidavits," in which he reiterated his prior claims, and asserted new claims against the USP-Terre Haute Defendants and otherdefendants named in this action. [R. 33-35]. Coleman's new claims included, but were not limited to, allegations that some of the USP-Terre Haute Defendants should have told him not to eat prior to undergoing hernia surgery, and that Warden Marberry conspired with another federal Warden to transfer him to USP-McCreary to prevent him from filing further grievances. [R. 35].
On September 8, 2010, Coleman filed a motion to transfer his claims against the USP-Terre Haute Defendants to the federal judicial district in Indiana where USP-Terre Haute is located. [R. 14]. The Court denied that motion without prejudice on March 29, 2011, noting that consideration of Coleman's transfer motion was premature until all of his claims were screened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and 1915(e). [See R. 30, 3, 5].
Having now fully screened Coleman's original Complaint, Amended Complaints, and would-be amended Complaints, the Court now determines that Coleman has improperly joined the USP-Terre Haute Defendants to this action and that the claims against them should be severed and transferred to the proper federal court in Indiana for all further disposition.
Proper venue in civil rights claims is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Section 1391(e) provides a special venue provision for any action in which at least one of the defendants is an officer or employee of the United States or its agencies acting in his or her official capacity or under color of legal authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). But even where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits a district court to transfer a case to another district where it might have been brought when doing so would serve theconvenience of the parties or the interests of justice. "[A]s the permissive language of the transfer statute suggests, district courts have 'broad discretion' to determine when party 'convenience' or 'the interest of justice' makes a transfer appropriate." Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009).
In determining what would serve the convenience of the parties or the interests of justice, a district court should consider the private interests of the parties, including their convenience and the convenience of potential witnesses, as well as other public interest concerns, "such as systemic integrity and fairness, which come under the rubric of 'interests of justice.'" Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988)).
Here, all of Coleman's constitutional claims against the USP-Terre Haute Defendants arose in Terre Haute, Indiana, which is located in the judicial district of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ("the Southern District of Indiana"). Potential witnesses presumably reside or could be located in that district, and relevant documents, if any, are presumably located in the Southern District of Indiana. To the extent that Coleman asserts claims against the USP-Terre Haute Defendants in their individual capacities, allowing this action to proceed here based solely upon venue considerations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) becomes even less attractive. If this action remains in this district, the USP-Terre Haute Defendants would most likely argue with good reason that any individual capacity claims against them should be dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
A defendant must have purposefully established minimum contacts within the forumstate before personal jurisdiction will be found to be reasonable and fair. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945). In order to establish minimum contacts, a plaintiff must show that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court in the forum state because he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities there. Id.; Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 1968). Put another way, "the relevant inquiry is whether the facts of the case demonstrate that the non-resident defendant possesses such minimum contacts with the forum state that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459-50 (6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
None of the Indiana-domiciled USP-Terre Haute Defendants have such minimum contacts with the ...
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