Coleman v. Levkoff
| Decision Date | 14 May 1924 |
| Docket Number | 11513. |
| Citation | 122 S.E. 875,128 S.C. 487 |
| Parties | COLEMAN v. LEVKOFF. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Richland County Court; M. S. Whaley, Judge.
Action by J. Bruce Coleman against Mrs. Laz Levkoff. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Frank G. Tompkins, of Columbia, for appellant.
T. H Moffatt, of Columbia, for respondent.
Action for damages in the sum of $600, on account of injury to his automobile, alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff as result of a collision with defendant's car on Saluda avenue in the city of Columbia. The plaintiff ran his car into the car of the defendant about 9 o'clock at night February 8, 1923, and alleges that the collision and consequent injury to his automobile were caused by the unlawful and negligent acts of the defendant in improperly parking her automobile in the street "contrary to the rules of prudence and the ordinances of the city of Columbia." Defendant denied plaintiff's allegations of negligence, and set up as defenses (1) the sole negligence of the plaintiff, and (2) the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Plaintiff recovered verdict for $250, and from judgment thereon the defendant appeals.
The first exception assigns error in the ruling of the trial judge "permitting in evidence," over defendant's objection, an estimate as to cost of repairing plaintiff's car cooper, a witness for plaintiff, stated that he had made such estimate. He was then asked what the estimate was. Defendant's counsel objected "to the estimate," but stated no ground. Thereafter the witness read an estimate made by him as an employee of the Roddey Motor Company, at plaintiff's request, as to cost of repairing plaintiff's machine. In any view of the measure of damages, the cost of repairing the injured machine was directly relevant. The condition of the machine after the injury from the viewpoint of what would be required to repair it was a matter clearly within the scope of the inquiry. Defendant's counsel suggests in argument that the estimate was "incompetent as being merely a statement to support testimony of the witness as to what he found actually wrong with the car, and was grossly in excess of the repairs which were proven to have been made." It does not appear that the memorandum was not such a writing as the witness was entitled to use to refresh his memory, nor does it appear that the writing itself was introduced in evidence. See Gwathmey v. Foor Hotel Co., 121 S.C. 237, 113 S.E. 688. The exception must be overruled.
Appellant's second contention (exceptions 6 and 7) is that the presiding judge erred in charging the jury as to contributory negligence. It is complained that the language of the judge not only failed to enlighten, but was so worded as to give, the jury an erroneous view. The exceptions fail to point out any specific error, and an examination of the charge complained of fails to disclose any ground for valid criticism.
Appellant's third contention (exceptions 5 and 9) is that the presiding judge erroneously instructed the jury as to the measure of damages. The charge complained of is as follows:
"The proper measure would be to take the reasonable market value of the automobile just before the occurrence, and the reasonable market value just after the occurrence, and the difference between those two values in the eyes of the law would make that party whole; that much money figured with what he has left of the property and added to that would make him whole, and in this case, provided it is proven, he would be entitled to reasonable compensation for being out of the use of the car, for the time it woud have reasonably taken to fix it and only during that time, and he would be entitled to the reasonable rental value of a like car of this make, or if that could not be gotten, then one as near like it as possible."
Defendant made no specific request to charge, and at the conclusion of the judge's charge, in response to an inquiry from the court as to whether counsel desired any further charge, defendant's counsel answered in the negative.
The general rule is that the owner of personal property, injured by the negligence of another, is entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the property immediately before the injury and its market value immediately after the injury. 17 C.J. 877, § 183; Sullivan v. City of Anderson, 81 S.C. 478, 62 S.E 862. But it is the duty of the owner of property, injured by the negligence of another, to use all reasonable effort to minimize the damage. Sullivan v. City of Anderson, supra; Willis v. Tel. Co., 69 S.C. 539, 48 S.E. 538, 104 Am. St. Rep. 828, 2 Ann. Cas. 52; Jones v. Tel. Co., 75 S.C. 208, 55 S.E. 318. If in the discharge of that duty the owner has the property repaired and restored to a condition in which its market value equals or exceeds the market value before the injury, the measure of damages in that case is the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its previous condition, together with the value of the use of the property during the time reasonably required to repair it. As bearing on the question of the value of the use of the property of which the owner was deprived, the rental value or expense of hiring a substitute for that of which he was deprived is a pertinent consideration. See 17 C.J. 877, 878,§§ 183, 184, and cases cited. If as a result of the repairs the property is not restored to a condition in which its market value is equal to the market value before the injury, then the measure of damages is the difference in the market value of the property immediately before the injury and its market value immediately thereafter, in its condition...
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Bowers v. Carolina Public Service Co.
...were negligent, and whether the negligence of each contributed as a proximate cause to the injury complained of." In Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff was in driving his own automobile at a rate of speed in violation of a city o......
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Mci Commc'n Servs., Inc. v. Ertel Constr., Inc.
...together with loss of use during the period of the repairs." (Id. at 15 (citing Newman , 90 S.E.2d at 653 ; Coleman v. Levkoff , 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, 875 (1924) ).) Plaintiff further argues that it "is entitled to recover for loss of use of the Cable regardless of whether it actually......
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Carolina Division
...speed, the collision would not have occurred? We think the evidence affords no adequate basis for that conclusion." Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, 877. the signal statute there is but one statutory duty imposed on the railroad. That duty is to give the required signals. The......
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Kohl v. Arp
... ... all such other expenses as the owner himself would have to ... bear in the operation of his own car.' See also Coleman ... v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, 876; 25 C.J.S., ... Damages, § 83, subsec. c ... The errors ... pointed out affect ... ...