Coleman v. Lodge

• Decision Date: 02 June 1885
• Citation: 18 Mo.App. 189
• Parties: J. R. COLEMAN ET AL., Respondent, v. SUPREME LODGE, KNIGHTS OF HONOR, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

18 Mo.App. 189

J. R. COLEMAN ET AL., Respondent,

v.SUPREME LODGE, KNIGHTS OF HONOR, Appellant.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Jun. 2, 1885.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, BARCLAY, J.

Reversed and judgment.

JAMES O. PIERCE, for the appellant: The members of a mutual life insurance company are conclusively presumed to have knowledge of the rules established by its charter, constitution, and by-laws. Walsh v. Insurance Co., 30 Iowa 145. The by-laws and rules of any of these mutual benefit societies are a law unto the members. Red Men v. Schmidt, 57 Md. 98; Knights' Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436; 17 C. L. J. 413; Toram v. Benev. Asso., 4 Pa. St. 519; Beneficial Soc. v. Mc Vey, 92 Pa. St. 510; Ballou v. Gile, 50 Wis. 614; McMurry v. Sup. Lodge, 18 Cent. L. J. 372; 20 Fed. Rep. 107; Karcher v. Sup. Lodge (Mass.) 19 C. L. J. 152; Supreme Lodge v. Grace, 60 Tex. 569. In such cases as this, the change of beneficiary can be made by the member only in the prescribed form. Where the privilege is granted sub modo, it must always be exercised sub modo. Vollman's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 50 (1879); Aid Asso. v. Lupold, 101 Pa. St. 111 (1882); Hellenberg v. I. O. B. B., 94 N. Y. 580 (1884); Greeno v. Greeno, 23 Hun. 478 (1881); Splawn v. Chew, 60 Tex. 532 (1883); Highland v. Highland (Ill.) 16 Chi. Leg. News 272.

M. KINEALY and JAMES R. KINEALY, for the respondents: The by-law prescribing the method of changing a benefit certificate is merely for the society's protection. Expressmen's Aid v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 412; Splawn v. Chew, 60 Texas 532.

ROMBAUER, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant corporation is a benevolent association, and the plaintiffs, claiming to be the assignees of a benefit of $2,000, to which a deceased member was entitled under the charter, constitution, and by-laws of the association, sued the corporation for that amount, and recovered judgment in the court below.

The provisions of defendant's charter, constitution, and by-laws, as far as they affect the merits of this controversy, are as follows:

The charter provides that the corporation may establish a widows' and orphans' benefit fund, from which, on the satisfactory evidence of the death of a member of the corporation, who has complied with its lawful requirements, a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars shall be paid to his family, or as he may direct. The constitution adopted under this charter provides that out of the widows' and orphans' benefit fund, on the satisfactory evidence of the death of a member of this corporation, who has complied with all its lawful requirements, a sum not exceeding two thousand dollars shall be paid to his family, or as he may direct.

The by-laws provide: Each applicant shall direct in his application to whom he desires his death benefit paid, which shall be subject to such future disposal of the benefit as the member may thereafter direct, in accordance with the laws of this order, and such direction shall be entered in the benefit certificate.

A member may, at any time, while in good standing, surrender his benefit certificate, which, together with a fee of fifty cents, shall be forwarded by the reporter of his lodge under seal to the supreme reporter, who shall thereupon cancel the old certificate, and issue a new one in lieu thereof to such member, payable as he shall have directed.

The supreme reporter shall return to the reporter of the subordinate lodge a benefit certificate signed by the supreme dictator, and himself, and made payable as the member shall have directed in his application. And the subordinate lodge shall enter on record the number thereof, provided no benefit certificate shall be re-issued, except as herein provided, unless satisfactory proof of loss of the former benefit certificate is furnished the supreme reporter. When a second certificate is issued the first one shall be void.

In this case the deceased member took out a benefit certificate payable to his wife, and delivered it to his wife. Shortly prior to his death, desiring to change the disposition made of his benefit, he gave written notice to the officers of the subordinate lodge, of which he was a member. In that notice he stated that he surrendered the former certificate, and requested that a new one be made out and delivered to him, payable to plaintiffs. The old benefit certificate remained in possession of his wife, he never demanded it of her, his offer to surrender was not accompanied with the certificate itself, and there is no pretense that it was lost. The defendant paid to the widow who held such certificate, prior to the institution of the suit, the $2,000.00, whereupon the widow surrendered the certificate to the corporation.

Upon these facts appearing, the trial court declared that plaintiffs could not recover, unless the deceased, in accordance with the laws of the corporation, rescinded his direction to defendant to pay the fund accruing on his death to his wife, and directed payment thereof to plaintiffs.

As the court found for plaintiffs, notwithstanding this declaration, its finding can be justified only on one of the following grounds:

1. That the by-laws of the corporation providing in what manner a member shall direct to whom his benefit is to paid are invalid.

2. That it was not the intention of the corporation to prevent by its by-laws other methods of disposition than those therein provided for.

The charter of the corporation provides that the benefit should be paid upon the member's decease, provided he has complied with the lawful requirements of the corporation, to his family, or as he may direct.

It does not purport to prescribe what are lawful requirements, nor does it purport to prescribe in what manner the direction shall be given. The corporation was left at liberty, as long as it did not violate the objects of its charter in so doing, to make any reasonable requirements as a condition precedent to paying the benefit fund to any one, and was furthermore authorized to declare in what manner the members should direct the payment to be made, provided such manner was not unreasonable, and not designed to defeat the manifest objects of the corporation.

In the whole range of the adjudged law nothing can be found to contravene this...