Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 27362.,27362.
• Citation: 755 S.E.2d 450,407 S.C. 346
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Ann COLEMAN, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Brinson, Respondent, v. MARINER HEALTH CARE, INC., f/k/a Mariner Post Acute Network, LLC, Mariner Health Care Management Company, Mariner Health Central, Inc., Mariner Health Group, Inc., MHC Holding Company, MHC Florida Holding Company, MHC Gulf Coast Holding Company, MHC MidAmerica Holding Company, MHC Rocky Mountain Holding Company, MHC Northeast Holding Company, MHC West Holding Company, MHC Texas Holding Company, MHC MidAtlantic Holding Company, Living Centers–Southeast, Inc., Grancare South Carolina, Inc., Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, SavaSeniorCare Management, LLC, SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, Inc., National Senior Care, Inc., Palmetto Health Care, LLC, Palmetto Faith Operating, LLC, Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, Ask Holdings, LLC, Leonard Grunstein, an Individual, Murray Forman, an Individual, Boyd P. Gentry, an Individual, Abraham Shaulson, a/k/a Abraham Shavlson, a/k/a A. Shawson, a/k/a Abraham Shawson, an Individual, Avi Klein, an Individual, SC Property Holdings, LLC, SC Faith, LLC, and John Does 1–26, Defendants, Of whom Mariner Health Care, Inc., f/k/a Mariner Post Acute Network, LLC, Mariner Health Care Management Company, Mariner Health Central, Inc., Mariner Health Group, Inc., MHC Holding Company, MHC Florida Holding Company, MHC Gulf Coast Holding Company, MHC MidAmerica Holding Company, MHC Rocky Mountain Holding Company, MHC Northeast Holding Company, MHC West Holding Company, MHC Texas Holding Company, MHC MidAtlantic Holding Company, Living Centers–Southeast, Inc., Grancare South Carolina, Inc., Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, Inc., National Senior Care, Inc., Palmetto Faith Operating, LLC, Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, Leonard Grunstein, an Individual, Murray Forman, an Individual, and Boyd P. Gentry, an Individual, are Appellants. Appellate Case No. 2011–194946.

407 S.C. 346

755 S.E.2d 450

Ann COLEMAN, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Brinson, Respondent,

v.MARINER HEALTH CARE, INC., f/k/a Mariner Post Acute Network, LLC, Mariner Health Care Management Company, Mariner Health Central, Inc., Mariner Health Group, Inc., MHC Holding Company, MHC Florida Holding Company, MHC Gulf Coast Holding Company, MHC MidAmerica Holding Company, MHC Rocky Mountain Holding Company, MHC Northeast Holding Company, MHC West Holding Company, MHC Texas Holding Company, MHC MidAtlantic Holding Company, Living Centers–Southeast, Inc., Grancare South Carolina, Inc., Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, SavaSeniorCare Management, LLC, SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, Inc., National Senior Care, Inc., Palmetto Health Care, LLC, Palmetto Faith Operating, LLC, Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, Ask Holdings, LLC, Leonard Grunstein, an Individual, Murray Forman, an Individual, Boyd P. Gentry, an Individual, Abraham Shaulson, a/k/a Abraham Shavlson, a/k/a A. Shawson, a/k/a Abraham Shawson, an Individual, Avi Klein, an Individual, SC Property Holdings, LLC, SC Faith, LLC, and John Does 1–26, Defendants,Of whom Mariner Health Care, Inc., f/k/a Mariner Post Acute Network, LLC, Mariner Health Care Management Company, Mariner Health Central, Inc., Mariner Health Group, Inc., MHC Holding Company, MHC Florida Holding Company, MHC Gulf Coast Holding Company, MHC MidAmerica Holding Company, MHC Rocky Mountain Holding Company, MHC Northeast Holding Company, MHC West Holding Company, MHC Texas Holding Company, MHC MidAtlantic Holding Company, Living Centers–Southeast, Inc., Grancare South Carolina, Inc., Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, LLC, SavaSeniorCare, Inc., National Senior Care, Inc., Palmetto Faith Operating, LLC, Individually and d/b/a Faith Health Care Center, Leonard Grunstein, an Individual, Murray Forman, an Individual, and Boyd P. Gentry, an Individual, are Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2011–194946.

No. 27362.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 18, 2013.

Decided March 12, 2014.

Certiorari Denied Nov. 10, 2014.

Sandra L.W. Miller, of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, of Greenville, Perry D. Boulier and W. McElhaney White, both of Holcombe Bomar, P.A., of Spartanburg, D. Jay Davis, Jr., William L. Howard and Russell G. Hines, all of Young Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, Carmelo Barone Sammataro and Robert Gerald Chambers, Jr., both of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, P.A., of Columbia, Malcolm J. Harkins, III, of Proskauer Rose, LLP, of Washington, DC, and Lori D. Proctor, of Serpe, Jones, Andrews, Callender & Bell, PLLC, of Houston, Texas, for Appellants.

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of Columbia, Matthew W. Christian, of Christian and Davis, LLC, of Greenville, Marion S. Fowler, III, of Fowler Law Firm, of Lake City, for Respondent. Kenneth W. Zeller, of Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae, AARP Foundation Litigation.

Justice PLEICONES.

This is an appeal from orders in a wrongful death suit and a survival action denying appellants' motions to compel arbitration.¹ We affirm, finding as did the circuit court that respondent lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreements (AA), and that she is not equitably estopped to deny their enforceability.

FACTS

Respondent Ann Coleman (Sister) signed a number of documents in June 2006 following which her sister Mary Brinson, now deceased (Decedent), was admitted to appellant Faith Health Care Center (Facility). Decedent was readmitted to Facility after Sister again signed documents in December 2006. Decedent died on April 30, 2007, and Sister subsequently brought these wrongful death and survival actions against numerous defendants, some of which are appellants.

ISSUES

I. Does an individual exercising authority to consent to decisions concerning a patient's health care under the Adult Health Care Consent Act have the capacity

to execute a voluntary arbitration agreement?

II. If there is no such authority under the Act, is Sister equitably estopped to deny the validity of the arbitration agreements she executed when Decedent was admitted to the Facility?

I. Capacity

The question of Sister's authority to execute a voluntary AA is one of statutory interpretation requiring us to determine the nature and scope of authority granted a surrogate by the Adult Health Care Consent Act (Act), S.C.Code Ann. § 44–66–10 et seq. (2002 and Supp.2012). We therefore turn to the Act itself. See e.g. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cnty., 368 S.C. 388, 629 S.E.2d 624 (2006) (when construing statutory term, all sections of the same general statutory law should be read together).

At the time of Decedent's two admissions to Facility she was unable to consent within the meaning of § 44–66–20(6) of the Act. The Act applies to adults ² who are “unable to appreciate the nature and implications of [their] condition and proposed health care, to make a reasoned decision concerning the proposed health care, or to communicate that decision in an unambiguous manner.” Id. The Act creates a priority list to determine the persons able to consent on behalf of an incapacitated patient:

(1) probate court guardian if decision is within the scope of the guardianship;

(2) attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney executed by the patient pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 62–5–501 if within the scope of the attorney-in-fact's power;

(3) an individual given priority pursuant to another statutory provision;

(4) spouse, subject to certain qualifications;

(5) patient's parent or adult child;

(6) patient's adult sibling, grandparent, or adult grandchild;

(7) another blood relative the health care professional reasonably believes to have a close relationship with the patient; or

(8) a person given authority to make health care decisions for the patient by a different statutory provision.

§ 44–66–30(A).

Here, Sister was authorized to make health care decisions for Decedent only because Decedent had no guardian or attorney-in-fact, no other individual had statutory priority, and she had neither a spouse, a parent, nor an adult child.

As the individual with priority under § 44–66–30(A), Sister was authorized to make “decisions concerning [Decedent's] health care....” Id. The definitional section of the Act provides:

“Health care” means a procedure to diagnose or treat a human disease, ailment, defect, abnormality, or complaint, whether of physical or mental origin. It also includes the provision of intermediate or skilled nursing care; services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick persons; and the placement in or removal from a facility that provides these forms of care.

§ 44–66–20(1).³

In effect, the Act gives Sister two types of authority. First, she could consent, on behalf of Decedent, to the provision or withholding of medical care including placement in a facility which provides such care. Second, the Act authorized Sister to make certain financial decisions on behalf of Decedent, decisions that obligated Decedent to pay for services rendered.

The decision to place an incapacitated adult in a nursing facility or a rehabilitative institution is delegated to the surrogate under the Act. Once the decision is made that such placement is appropriate, the surrogate must decide which institution will provide the best care. In making this critical decision, the surrogate must also bear in mind the financial resources of the patient. Thus, the decision to place Decedent in Facility required Sister to use both powers given her by the Act, the medical and the financial, and to make these decisions as the Decedent wished or, if her wishes could not be determined, then in Decedent's best interest. § 44–66–30(H).

In reviewing nursing home options, the surrogate must consider what services the home offers and the cost for such services. For example, some homes might offer laundry services or field trips for a fee, while others include these services as part of the comprehensive charge. The contract terms offered as part of an admission agreement will often require the surrogate to weigh questions that do not directly involve medical treatment or procedures, but are a necessary part of the decision regarding which institution the patient should be placed in.

That the Act contemplates that the surrogate's authority extends primarily to traditional health care decisions, and only secondarily to the financial decisions necessitated by those decisions, is illustrated by other provisions of the Act. These sections illustrate that the purpose of the Act is to insure that the patient's wishes concerning her medical treatment are honored whenever possible, and that decision making by the surrogate is a last resort. For example, § 44–66–30(E) states that no one may consent to “health care decisions” if the responsible medical provider determines that the patient's inability to consent is temporary and that waiting for the patient to regain competency will not result in significant detriment to the patient's health. Further, if the health care professional knows the patient's wishes to be contrary to those expressed by the surrogate, the professional must honor the patient's wishes. S.C.Code Ann. § 44–66–60 (2002); Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 566 S.E.2d 529 (2002). Finally, the Act separates health care from finances in S.C.Code Ann. § 44–66–70 (2002). Subsection (A) provides the surrogate who makes a good faith health care decision “is not subject to civil or criminal liability on account of the substance of the decision.” Section 44–66–70(B) provides “A person who consents to health care as provided in Section 44–66–30 does not by virtue of that consent become liable for the costs of the care provided to the patient.”

Here, Sister was presented with...