Coleman v. Metrish
| Decision Date | 05 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-10246.,03-10246. |
| Parties | Daniel COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. Linda METRISH, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Daniel Coleman, Kincheloe, MI, Pro se.
Brenda E. Turner, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
The petitioner, Daniel Coleman, presently confined at the Kinross Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is custody in violation of the Constitution. Following a 1998 bench trial in the Wayne County, Michigan circuit court, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.321, and felonious driving, Mich. Comp. Laws § 752.191. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of six to fifteen years imprisonment on each of the manslaughter convictions and one to two years imprisonment on the felonious driving conviction. In his pleadings, the petitioner contends that his convictions are unconstitutional because insufficient evidence was presented to support them, and there was an intervening cause that negated his gross negligence. The respondent maintains that the petitioner's first claim is unexhausted and lacks merit, and the second claim is procedurally defaulted and lacks merit. The Court finds that the first claim lacks merit and the second claim is procedurally defaulted. The petition will therefore be denied.
The petitioner's convictions arise from the deaths of Desiree Parnell and Chlora Britton, both of whom were killed after the vehicle driven by the petitioner collided with their car on July 28, 1997. The accident occurred at the intersection of Harrison and Eureka Roads in Romulus, Michigan
Gregory Parnall testified that on July 28, 1997, at approximately 4:50 p.m., he was driving his vehicle southbound on Harrison Road. Among the passengers in his vehicle were his daughters, Raven, Latrice and Desiree Parnell, and his girlfriend, Chlora Britton. He testified that when he reached Eureka Road, he entered the left-hand turn lane intending to turn eastbound. After the vehicle in front of him turned left, he determined that the light Was still green, checked to see that no cars were headed toward him, and proceeded to turn left. He said that the traffic light turned yellow as he commenced his turn and had just turned red as he was completing the turn. As he neared the end of his turn, his vehicle was struck on the passenger side. He testified that Desiree Parnell and Chlora Britton died in the crash, and his daughter, Latrice, spent approximately one month in the hospital because of injuries she received in the accident.
Tina Alongi testified that she was traveling eastbound on Eureka Road on the day of the accident. The petitioner's vehicle passed her vehicle and others on the shoulder of the road, so that she was then following him down Eureka Road. She testified that the traffic light at the intersection of Eureka and Harrison Roads turned red before the petitioner entered the intersection. She further testified that the petitioner had time to stop for the red light, but she never saw his brake lights illuminate.
Jesse Redding testified that he was also driving eastbound on Eureka Road and witnessed the collision. He testified that the petitioner entered the intersection after the light had turned red, the petitioner would have had time to stop before entering the intersection, and the petitioner appeared to accelerate before entering the intersection.
The petitioner testified in his own defense. He stated that he was driving on Eureka Road at approximately 45 miles per hour and was about 75 to 100 feet away from the intersection when the light turned yellow. He believed he was too close to the intersection to safely stop, so he chose to go through the light. He testified that he attempted to avoid the collision by swerving to the left.
Following a bench trial, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle and felonious driving. On March 25, 1998, he was sentenced to the prison terms noted above. Thereafter, he appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals presenting the following claim only:
The trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict and by reaching a verdict against the great weight of the evidence and thereby committing reversible error.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on the merits, holding that, from the evidence presented, a reasonable fact finder could properly infer that the petitioner acted with gross negligence. People v. Coleman, 2000 WL 33534070 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 11, 2000).
The petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court presenting the same claim presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Coleman, 463 Mich. 861, 617 N.W.2d 335 (Mich.2000) (table).
On October 26, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court presenting the following claims:
I. Whether Mr. Coleman was denied his fundamental rights to counsel during trial and on appeal, when counsel was acting outside the scope of objective reasonable assistance, and when these errors resulted in outcome determinative factors being used to determine the manslaughter verdicts.
II. Whether Mr. Coleman's "waiver" of a jury trial should be considered involuntary when the Honorable Townsend used erroneous facts in determining gross negligence and manslaughter.
III. As a matter of first impression, should this court determine (in the interest of justice) whether an intervening cause established at trial is sufficient as an affirmative defense to negate culpability in the element of gross negligence.
IV. Whether Mr. Coleman's conviction should be reversed under the miscarriage of justice exception when overcharging denied the defendant fundamental fairness during the previous proceedings.
The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment. People v. Coleman, No. 97-502868 (Third Judicial Circuit Court June 25, 2002).
The petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims:
I. Whether the actual innocent doctrine should be applied to the appellant's intervening cause argument where he continues to be confined without sufficient culpability.
II. Whether the appellant's conviction should be reversed, under the doctrine of an error so offensive to the sound maintenance of the judicial process, where the waiver trial findings were based on erroneous assumptions.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Coleman, No. 243872 (Mich.Ct.App. March 27, 2003).
The petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claims presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Coleman, 469 Mich. 879, 668 N.W.2d 149 (2003) (table).
The petitioner then timely filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus presenting the following claims:
I. The prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner's guilt of gross negligence.
II. Whether the actual innocent doctrine should be applied to the appellant's intervening cause argument where he continues to be confined without sufficient culpability.
The provisions the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (internal quotes omitted)). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (); see also West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1996) ().
The Supreme Court has explained the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Garcia–dorantes v. Warren
...that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel and is not entitled to relief on his fifth claim. See Coleman v. Metrish, 476 F.Supp.2d 721, 733 (E.D.Mich.2007).IV. The Court concludes that the majority of the petitioner's claims do not support his request for habeas corpus rel......
-
Williams v. Rivard
...was deficient, and thus fails to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. See Coleman v. Metrist, 476 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733 (E.D. Mich. 2007).IV. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealab......
-
Riley v. Buchanan, Case No. 2:14-cv-02522
...have made counsel's task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was 'available' at all." Coleman v. Metrish, 476 F.Supp.2d 721, 731 (E.D. Mich. 2007)(quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)). Finally, and for the reasons detailed in the Magistrate Judge's Report ......