Coleman v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 47394
| Decision Date | 11 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 47394,47394 |
| Citation | 289 So.2d 918 |
| Parties | Forrest COLEMAN et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. MISSISSIPPI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Cumbest & Cumbest, P. A. John L. Hunter, Pascagoula, for respondents-appellants.
William J. Palmer, Pascagoula for petitioner-appellee.
This is an appeal by Forrest Coleman and others from a judgment of the County Court of Jackson County. There a default judgment of $1075 was entered in an eminent domain proceeding for .55 acres of the appellant's land.
The issues presented are whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the landwners a continuance by which they sought greater time to file pleading directed to the value of the land permitted by the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-27-7 (1972), and whether the court erred in basing its judgment upon the petitioner's statement of values required by the above code section rather than upon evidence by way of a writ of inquiry.
On July 19, 1972, the petitioner, Mississippi State Highway Commission, filed its application for a special court of eminent domain to consider the condemnation of .55 acres of land owned by the appellants. The petition was presented to a judge of the county court who set the hearing by fiat for 9:00 a.m. on October 3, 1972, in the Jackson County Courthouse and directed a venire facias to the sheriff commanding him to summon fifty jurors to appear at that place and time.
On August 9, 1972, the petitioner filed a statement of $750 which was later amended to $1075 as the total compensation and damages determined by it to be due the respondents.
No statement of values required by Section 11-27-7 having been filed by the respondents, the petitioner moved for a default judgment on October 2, 1972. This motion requested the amount of the judgment to be $1075, the sum set forth in the amended statement of values filed by the petitioner.
On October 3, 1972, the day of trial, the respondents had still not filed their statement of values. Instead they filed a motion to continue and thus enlarge the time for filing such statement. The basis therefor was that the court had sustained a motion for a default judgment the previous day in a similar case in which the movants had an interest. The motion was overruled and a default judgment was entered in the sum of the petitioner's valuation of the property without evidence being adduced. Thereafter a motion to set aside the judgment was refused and this appeal was taken by the respondents.
While it is undoubtedly true that a trial judge has the aughority to increase or decrease the time for pleading by the parties under Section 11-27-7, nevertheless the exercise of this prerogative is motivated only 'for good cause shown' by its terms, thus placing the invocation of the prerogative within the discretion of the trial judge. The present determination that good cause did not exist for an enlargement of time to plead does not indicate an abuse of judicial discretion since it appears that the respondents had notice and ample time to meet that statutory requirements, but did not plead or give any reason for not doing so. Ponder v. O'Neal Electric Co., 214 So.2d 453 (Miiss.1968), and Parker v. State, 201 Miss. 579, 29 So.2d 910 (1947). We conclude there was no error in denying appellants' motion for a continuance.
We do think, however, that the court erred in not submitting the question of value to a jury for its resolution from competent evidence. This issue is in essence the 'due compensation' requirement of Article 3, Section 17, Mississippi Constitution (1890) which can only be satisfied in a manner prescribed by law. The constitutional 'manner to be prescribed by law' has been announced heretofore. In Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 198 So. 565 (1940), we stated that the burden of establishing damages, due compensation, in eminent domain proceedings in upon the petitioner. The measure of damages was specified as the difference between the fair market value of the whole tract immediately before the taking and the fair market value of that remaining immediately after the taking. Mississippi State Highwat Comm'n v. Hillman, supra, and the more recent cases of Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Rogers, 271 So.2d 731 (Miss.1973), and ...
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Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Blackwell, 49586
...or delay, was not reversible error. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Amos, 319 So.2d 231 (Miss.1975); Coleman v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 289 So.2d 918 (Miss.1974). III. The question of excessiveness of the jury verdict need not be discussed because retrial of the case will be r......
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Mississippi State Highway Com'n v. Viverette, 57824
...by and large lies before January 1, 1982, and the advent of the new view of pleadings. For example, in Coleman v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 289 So.2d 918 (Miss.1974), the Court noted that prior to the enactment of Section 11-27-7, the pleadings were few in eminent domain cases. ......
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State Highway Com'n of Mississippi v. Hyman, 07-CC-59272
...of values because Hyman was not prejudiced by the omission. Hyman argues that this case is controlled by Coleman v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n., 289 So.2d 918 (Miss.1974). There, this Court found that it was not an abuse of discretion for the lower court to enter a default judgment ag......
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Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Amos, 48323
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