Coleman v. Schwarzenegger

• Decision Date: 11 April 2013
• Docket Number: Nos. 2:90–cv–0520 LKK JFM P, C01–1351 TEH.,s. 2:90–cv–0520 LKK JFM P, C01–1351 TEH.
• Citation: 922 F.Supp.2d 1004
• Parties: Ralph COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edmund G. BROWN Jr., et al., Defendants. Marciano Plata, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edmund G. Brown Jr., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

922 F.Supp.2d 1004

Ralph COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Edmund G. BROWN Jr., et al., Defendants.

Marciano Plata, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Edmund G. Brown Jr., et al., Defendants.

Nos. 2:90–cv–0520 LKK JFM P, C01–1351 TEH.

United States District Court,

E.D. California,

N.D. California.

April 11, 2013.

Edward P. Sangster, Raymond E. Loughrey, Jeffrey L. Bornstein, K & L Gates, LLP, Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Lisa Adrienne Ells, Aaron Joseph Fischer, Blake Thompson, Ernest Galvan, Jane E. Kahn, Kenneth M. Walczak, Laura Barbara Boysen–Aragon, Lori Rifkin, Michael Bien, Michael Louis Freedman, Thomas Bengt Nolan, Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld LLP, Claudia B. Center, Legal Aid Society, Amy Whelan, San Francisco, CA, Fred D. Heather, Glaser Weil Fink Jacobs Howard Avchen & Shapiro LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Donald Specter, Rebekah B. Evenson, Berkeley, CA, Kimberly Hall Barlow, Jones & Mayer, Fullerton, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Danielle Felice O'Bannon, Department of Justice, Rochelle C. East, Attorney General's Office for the State of California, San Francisco, CA, Paul B. Mello, Hanson Bridgett LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, for Defendants.

STEPHEN REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, LAWRENCE K. KARLTON and THELTON E. HENDERSON, Senior District Judges.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY POPULATION REDUCTION ORDER

On January 7, 2013, defendants filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order. Defs.' Mot. to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order (ECF No. 2506/4280) (“Three–Judge Motion”).¹ Defendants contend that a significant and unanticipated change in facts renders inequitable our June 30, 2011 Population Reduction Order (amended as of January 29, 2013) (“Order”). They request a complete vacatur of our Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). On January 29, 2013, this Court stayed consideration of the Three–Judge Motion. This Court now lifts that stay and DENIES defendants' Three–Judge Motion. On February 12, 2013, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion requesting this Court to order defendants to develop institution-specific population caps. Pls.' Opp'n to Three–Judge Mot. and Cross–Mot. for Additional Relief (ECF No. 2528/4331) (“Pls.' Opp'n” and/or “Cross–Mot.”). This Court DENIES plaintiffs' Cross–Motion. Defendants must immediately take all steps necessary to comply with this Court's June 30, 2011 Order, as amended by its January 29, 2013 Order, requiring defendants to reduce overall prison population to 137.5% design capacity by December 31, 2013. We issue a separate order to that effect concurrently herewith.²

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Given the lengthy history of this case, a brief (or not-so-brief) synopsis is in order. Defendants seek vacatur of a population reduction order that this Court issued in order to provide remedial relief for Eighth Amendment violations found in two independent legal proceedings. Aug. 4, 2009 Op. & Order, 922 F.Supp.2d 882, 919, 2009 WL 2430820 (ECF No. 2197/3641). The first, Coleman v. Brown, began in 1990 and concerns California's failure to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care to its mentally ill prison population. The second, Plata v. Brown, began in 2001 and concerns the state's failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical health care to its prison population. In both cases, the district courts found constitutional violations and ordered injunctive relief. As time passed, however, it became clear that no relief could be effective in either case absent a reduction in the prison population.³

Congress restricted the ability of federal courts to enter a population reduction order in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified in relevant parts at 18 U.S.C. § 3626); Aug. 4, 2009 Op. & Order, 922 F.Supp.2d at 917–18, (ECF No. 2197/3641) (explaining why a population reduction order is a “prisoner release order,” as defined by the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4)). Such relief can be provided only by a specially convened three-judge court after it has made specific findings. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).

In 2006, the plaintiffs in Coleman and Plata independently filed motions to convene a three-judge court to enter a population reduction order. Both courts granted plaintiffs' motions and recommended that the cases be assigned to the same three-judge court “[f]or purposes of judicial economy and avoiding the risk of inconsistent judgments.” July 23, 2007 Order in Plata, 2007 WL 2122657, at *6;July 23, 2007 Order in Coleman, 2007 WL 2122636, at *8;see also Brown v. Plata, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1922, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (“Because the two cases are interrelated, their limited consolidation for this purpose has a certain utility in avoiding conflicting decrees and aiding judicial consideration and enforcement.”). The Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and, on July 26, 2007, convened the instant three-judge district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.⁴

A. This Court's August 2009 Opinion & Order

In August 2009, after a fourteen-day trial, this Court issued an Opinion & Order designed to remedy the ongoing constitutional violations with respect to both medical and mental health care in the California prison system. The order directed defendants, including the Governor, then Arnold Schwarzenegger, and the Secretary of the California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“CDCR”), then Matthew Cate, to reduce the institutional prison population to 137.5% design capacity within two years. This Court made extensive findings, as set forth in our 184–page opinion. We repeat here only those findings that are necessary or relevant to the determination of the motions pending before us.

First, based on the testimony of seven expert witnesses (including Jeffrey Beard ⁵), the defendants' own admissions, and the extensive data on prison crowding in the record, this Court found that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i). ⁶ Indeed, we devoted approximately 25% of our Opinion—46 out of 184 pages—to demonstrating how “crowding creates numerous barriers to the provision of medical and mental health care that result in the constitutional violations....” Aug. 4, 2009 Op. & Order, 922 F.Supp.2d at 921, (ECF No. 2197/3641); see id. at 920–51. Two barriers were particularly important. First, a lack of treatment space “prevent[ed] inmates from receiving the care they require.” Id. at 921. Second, “[c]rowding also render[ed] the state incapable of maintaining an adequate staff.” Id. In short, because California had too many prisoners, it lacked the staff and space to provide constitutionally adequate medical health care and mental health care.

Second, after finding that “no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii), Aug. 4, 2009 Op. & Order, 922 F.Supp.2d at 918, (ECF No. 2197/3641), this Court faced the challenging question of designing an order that was “narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [was] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). In this context, this meant determining the population level at which defendants could begin to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care. It was a predictive judgment that, as we acknowledged, was “not an exact science.” Aug. 4, 2009 Op. & Order, 922 F.Supp.2d at 965, (ECF No. 2197/3641) (quoting plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Craig Haney). Accordingly, this Court considered the testimony of various experts. Many of these experts believed that a prison population at 100% design capacity ⁷ was required. Plaintiffs' experts, however, sought a population cap at 130% design capacity, believing that constitutional care could be provided at that population level. Defendants, meanwhile, suggested that if ordered, a population cap at 145% design capacity was the most acceptable, citing a single analysis by the Corrections Independent Review Panel in 2004. The Panel's analysis, however, suffered from a “potentially fatal flaw,” id. at 968, in that it failed to account for the ability to provide medical and mental health care. As this was the critical question, this Court found that “the Panel's 145% estimate clearly exceeds the maximum level at which the state could provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care in its prisons.” Id. at 968. Evaluating the expert evidence in light of the caution demanded by the PLRA, this Court decided to impose a population cap of 137.5% design capacity. Id. at 967.

Third, this Court gave “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). In fact, we devoted 10 days out of the 14–day trial to the issue of public safety; we also devoted approximately 25% of our Opinion—49 out of 184 pages—to it. We concluded that the evidence clearly established that “the state could comply with our population reduction order without a significant adverse impact upon public safety or the criminal justice system's operation.” Aug. 4, 2009 Op. & Order, 922 F.Supp.2d at 969, (ECF No. 2197/3641). Specifically, we identified a variety of measures to reduce prison population: (1) early release through the expansion of good time credits; (2) diversion of technical parole violators; (3) diversionof low-risk offenders with short sentences; (4) expansion of evidence-based rehabilitative programming in prisons or communities; and (5) sentencing reform and other potential population reduction measures. Id. at 974–87. After evaluating the testimony and evidence—including the fact that many of the identified measures had been successfully implemented in other jurisdictions without any meaningful harm—we found that all of these measures could be...