Coleman v. Seldin
| Decision Date | 08 March 1999 |
| Citation | 687 N.Y.S.2d 240,181 Misc.2d 219 |
| Parties | DIANA COLEMAN et al., Plaintiffs,<BR>v.<BR>ABE SELDIN, as Chairman of Board of Assessors of Nassau County, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Farrell Fritz, P. C., Uniondale, and Parnon & Pratt, L. L. P., Huntington, for defendants.
New York Civil Liberties Foundation, New York City (Leon Friedman of counsel), Nassau Chapter of New York Civil Liberties Union, Mineola (Donald Shaffer of counsel), Reilly, Like, Tenety, Ambrosino & Vetri, Babylon, Koppel, Martone, Leistman & Herman, Mineola, and William D. Siegel, Garden City, for plaintiffs.
Defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 for an order dismissing the complaint is granted in part and denied in part as determined hereafter.
In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Chairman and members of the Board of Assessors of Nassau County and Nassau County, the plaintiffs, who are homeowners, contend that the County maintains a racially discriminatory residential assessment system that impacts minority homeowners in Nassau County.
Three causes of action are alleged: the first two address violations of Federal law, the third is predicated upon a violation of the Nassau County Government Law (otherwise known as the Nassau County Charter). The first cause of action alleges violations of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000d) and its implementing regulations affecting housing (24 CFR 1.4). The second cause of action alleges violations of title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 USC § 3601 et seq. [Fair Housing Act]). The third cause of action alleges violations of section 603 of the Nassau County Government Law (L 1936, ch 879, as amended by L 1946, ch 708, § 1, eff July 1, 1946). Each cause of action is addressed seriatim.
Initially, the court notes that the defendants have a heavy burden to show that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action. The allegations are accepted as true and consideration "is limited to ascertaining whether the pleading states any cause of action, and not whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint" (LoPinto v J. W. Mays, Inc., 170 AD2d 582, 583).
Consequently, the court will consider the claims as being true and the contentions in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs (LoPinto v J. W. Mays, Inc., supra).
The first cause of action alleges violations of title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits recipients of Federal financial assistance from discriminating on a racial basis.
42 USC § 2000d provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
The defendants contend that the County's real property tax assessment system is not racially discriminatory in intent or effect, but rather results in reasonably fair and equitable assessments. In support of this contention the defendants rely, inter alia, on prior case law (see, Matter of Board of Mgrs. v Board of Assessors, 197 AD2d 620; Matter of Chasalow v Board of Assessors, 202 AD2d 499). The court finds that neither of these cases is determinative. In Matter of Board of Mgrs. the Court held that the County system of assessment as applied to the petitioner's property was not constitutionally infirm. In that case the petitioner's property was reclassified from class I property to class II property and was reassessed based upon this new classification at a higher burden. The Court concluded, based upon the record presented, that insofar as the cost method of assessment was applied in a consistent manner with respect to all class I property in Nassau County, that similarly situated taxpayers were treated uniformly and the reassessment of the petitioner's property did not result in disparate tax treatment of a constitutional dimension. In the case at bar no constitutional infirmities are alleged, nor were title VI claims asserted in Matter of Board of Mgrs.
Matter of Chasalow (supra) is similarly inapplicable to the case at bar. In that proceeding, brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, the appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the method of assessment employed by the Board of Assessors of Nassau County was illegal and unconstitutional. Although the method of assessment remains the same, the challenge presented in the instant action is not predicated upon constitutional violations and accordingly, of necessity, must be evaluated by different standards rendering the determination in Matter of Chasalow distinguishable.
The defendants raise two points regarding the plaintiffs' title VI claims. The first is that title VI does not apply to the County's real property tax assessment system because the complaint does not allege that the system is a Federally assisted program. In support of this position the defendants rely on Grove City Coll. v Bell (465 US 555 [1984]), Hodges v Public Bldg. Commn. (864 F Supp 1493 [ND Ill 1994]), and Schroeder v City of Chicago (927 F2d 957 [7th Cir 1991]). Following the Grove City Coll. v Bell case (supra), the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (Pub L 100-259, 102 US Stat 28 [CRRA]) was enacted which broadened the definition of "program or activity" defined in title VI (see, 42 USC § 2000d-4a), which, as relevant here, provides as follows:
In Hodges (supra), a suit considering the proposed expansion of a Chicago high school, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants, including the City of Chicago, blocked the expansion based on intentional racial discrimination. The Hodges court, although recognizing the expansion of Grove City's (supra) narrow reading of title VI by the CRRA, rejected the plaintiffs' trickle-down theory of Federal financial assistance, holding that the City was "not an `operation' of `a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government,' or of `the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance'" (Hodges v Public Bldg. Commn., supra, at 1505). That court concluded that the City is a municipality and, as such, did not fit within the definition of "program or activity" for purposes of title VI. As noted by the court in Hodges (supra), Schroeder v City of Chicago (supra) also held that the City of Chicago did not fit the statutory definition of "program or activity" and was not a department or instrumentality of a local government, but rather, as a full-blown municipality, was an entire local government (Hodges v Public Bldg. Commn., supra, at 1506).
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Innovative Health Sys. v City of White Plains (117 F3d 37 [2d Cir 1997]) has concluded that a broad interpretation of the terms "program or activity" made the discrimination claims asserted pursuant to title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 USC § 12131 et seq. [ADA]) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 794 [a]) applicable to the City defendant. In that case the court noted that both title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Pub L 93-112, 87 US Stat 355) prohibit discrimination by a public entity based on a disability. The ADA provides "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity" (42 USC § 12132). The Rehabilitation Act is similarly worded: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability * * * shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (29 USC § 794 [a]).
The Rehabilitation Act defines "program or activity" as "all of the operations" of specific entities, including "a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government" (29 USC § 794 [b] [1] [A]). The court determined that the plain meaning of "activity" is a "`natural or normal function or operation'" and that both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act clearly encompass zoning decisions by the City (Innovative Health Sys. v City of White Plains, supra, at 44). The court further noted that the language of title II's anti-discrimination provisions does not limit the ADA's coverage to conduct that occurs in the "`programs, services, or activities'" of the City, but rather is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context (supra, at 45).
Innovative Health Sys. (supra) is both applicable and instructive in the instant matter. Most significantly, title VI employs the same phraseology as does the Rehabilitation Act and a "program or activity" applicable under that statute provides persuasive insight into the application of the identical phrase in the instant matter. Nor is it uncommon for courts in considering claims under analogous title VI regulations to look to title VII (Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964) disparate impact cases for guidance (see, e.g., New York Urban League v State of New York, 71 F3d 1031; Elston v Talladega County Bd. of Educ., ...
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