Coleman v. St. Thomas Hosp..
| Decision Date | 26 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. M2009–02526–COA–R10–CV.,M2009–02526–COA–R10–CV. |
| Parties | Mary COLEMAN, et al.v.ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Denied by Supreme Court
Nov. 15, 2010.
Mary Martin Schaffner, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, St. Thomas Hospital.
John P. Williams, T. Chad White, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mary Coleman, Chloe Nguyen and Cassandra Dixon.
Plaintiffs filed suit against their employer, alleging common law negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress due to their exposure to carbon monoxide in the workplace. The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiffs' tort claims were barred by Tennessee's workers' compensation law. The trial court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs' injuries did not “arise out of” their employment. The employer's application for an extraordinary appeal was granted. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the employer.
Mary Coleman, Chloe Nguyen, and Cassandra Dixon (“Plaintiffs”) were employed by St. Thomas Hospital and worked at the St. Thomas Hospital Employees Credit Union on a daily basis. The credit union's offices were located on the first floor of a building owned and operated by St. Thomas Hospital. In the spring and summer of 2003, Plaintiffs allegedly began to experience a wide range of symptoms including fatigue, headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, seizure, and loss of consciousness. In August of 2003, it was discovered that the gas-powered hot water heater in the basement of the building had become improperly vented and was producing carbon monoxide that was entering the credit union. The level of carbon monoxide present in the credit union was at times of such high concentrations that exposure to the gas was extremely hazardous and potentially lethal.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court of Davidson County against their employer, St. Thomas Hospital, alleging common law negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. St. Thomas Hospital filed an answer in which it asserted that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy against it was pursuant to Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Law. St. Thomas Hospital also filed a motion for summary judgment, again contending that Plaintiffs' tort claims were barred due to the exclusive remedy provided by the Workers' Compensation Law. Plaintiffs filed a response, arguing that their claims should be governed by premises liability law. Plaintiffs conceded that they were full-time employees of St. Thomas Hospital, and that St. Thomas Hospital was an employer subject to the Workers' Compensation Law.1 However, Plaintiffs contended that their injuries did not “arise out of” their employment, so that they were not limited to the remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Law.
The trial court denied St. Thomas Hospital's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs' injuries did not arise out of their employment. St. Thomas Hospital sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court denied. St. Thomas Hospital then filed an application for an extraordinary appeal, which was granted by the Middle Section of this Court.
On appeal, St. Thomas Hospital contends that Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred by the Workers' Compensation Law because their injuries arose out of their employment, and as a result, the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. “The party seeking the summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine disputes of material fact exist and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Green v. Green, 293 S.W.3d 493, 513 (Tenn.2009) (citing Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn.2008); Amos v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 259 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tenn.2008)). “If reasonable minds could justifiably reach different conclusions based on the evidence at hand, then a genuine question of fact exists.” Id. at 514 (citing Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84; Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Austin Co., 868 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993)). “If, on the other hand, the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence would permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion, then no material factual dispute exists, and the question can be disposed of as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn.2002); Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, 9 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tenn.1999)).
The resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84. However, “we are required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn.2000)). Summary judgment is appropriate “when the undisputed facts, as well as the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support only one conclusion—that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Green, 293 S.W.3d at 513 (citing Griffis v. Davidson County Metro. Gov't, 164 S.W.3d 267, 283–84 (Tenn.2005); Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn.2002)).
The primary purpose of Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Law is “to afford workers compensation for job-related injuries regardless of fault.” Woods v. Harry B. Woods Plumbing Co., Inc., 967 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tenn.1998). The Workers' Compensation Law is “a legislatively created quid pro quo system where an injured worker forfeits any potential common law rights for recovery against his or her employer in return for a system that provides compensation completely independent of any fault on the part of the employer.” Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois, 240 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tenn.2007) (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–6–108(a); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 212 Tenn. 178, 368 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1963)). The Workers' Compensation Law provides that “[t]he rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to this chapter, on account of personal injury or death by accident, ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of the injury or death.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–6–108(a).
In order to qualify as a compensable workers' compensation claim, the employee's injury must both “arise out of” and occur “in the course of” employment. Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co., 274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn.2008). If the employee's injury did not “arise out of” and occur “in the course of” employment, the injury is not compensable, and the employee does not have the option of accepting the remedies of the Workers' Compensation Law. Clawson v. Burrow, 250 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007). If, however, the injury did “arise out of” and occur “in the course of” employment, the employee must accept the remedies of the Workers' Compensation Law to the exclusion of any other right or remedy. Id.; see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–6–103(a) ().
“ Court and others over the years have attempted, with little success, to wring more certainty and specificity from the terse words ‘arising out of and in the course of employment.’ ” Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 733–34 (Tenn.1980).
The statutory requirements that a compensable injury arise out of and occur in the course of the employment have been the subject of extensive litigation in Tennessee and elsewhere. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–6–102(13) (2005) (). Our state is by no means unique in having adopted these two requirements, for nearly all states require that the injury arise out of and occur in the course of the employment. 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 3.01 (2004). “Indeed, the bulk of workers' compensation litigation [nationwide] centers on these two requirements.” Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance Sys., 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn.2005). As one commentator has observed, “ ‘[f]ew groups of statutory words in the history of law have had to bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon this slender foundation.’ ” Id. (quoting 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 3.01 (2004)).
Anderson v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Tenn.2008). Various judicial “tests” and “doctrines” have emerged for determining when an injury arises out of and occurs in the course of employment, such as the “positional doctrine,” the “peculiar hazard doctrine,” the “foreseeability test,” the “street-risk doctrine,” and others. See Bell, 597 S.W.2d at 734. However, our Supreme Court has “consistently abstained from adopting any particular judicial test, doctrine,...
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