Coleman v. State
| Citation | 253 Ind. 627,256 N.E.2d 389 |
| Decision Date | 20 March 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 269S29,269S29 |
| Parties | Rodney COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Clarence D. Bolden, Bolden & Mann, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Aaron T. Jahr, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal brought by appellant, Rodney Coleman, from a conviction in the Marion Criminal Court, Division One, of the crime of rape, to-wit: having carnal knowledge of a woman who is an inmate of the Indiana School for Girls. Appellant was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury and upon a finding of guilty, was sentenced to the Indiana Reformatory for not less than two (2) nor more than twenty-one (21) years. The indictment, under which the defendant was charged, omitting the caption, reads af follows:
'The Grand Jury for the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, upon their oath do present that Rodney Coleman on or about the 25th day of March, A.D. 1967, at and in the county of Marion and in the State of Indiana, he being then and there over the age of Eighteen (18) years, to-wit: of the age of Twenty-eight (28) years, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Lorena Sue Sargeant, a woman, inmate of the Indiana School for Girls, and having then and there escaped from the Custody of the the said Indiana School for Girls, said Lorena Sue Sargeant then and there not being the wife of the said Rodney Coleman, then and there being contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
/s/ Noble R. Pearcy
Prosecuting Attorney
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit.'
The indictment is based on the criminal offense of rape which is found in Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10--4201 (1956 Repl.) as follows:
(our emphasis)
Appellant is appealing the overruling by the trial court of his motion for a new trial, which appeal raises a single question of law. That question is as follows: Was Lorena Sue Sargeant an inmate of the Indiana Girls School at the time the carnal knowledge occurred, when, as stipulated by both parties, the victim had escaped or had otherwise left the Girls School without authorization and was in downtown Indianapolis at the time of the alleged offense? Appellant properly raised the question by filing a motion to quash the indictment before the trial began, and again by making a motion to discharge after the appellee, State of Indiana, had rested its case. Both of these motions were overruled by the trial court.
Essentially appellant argues that for the purposes of the rape statute, § 10--4201, supra, an inmate is a person who is then confined or otherwise under the regulation of an institution subject to punishment by its authorities. It is the physical rather than the administrative status, according to appellant, which creates the danger which the Indiana General Assembly sought to abate. The position taken by appellant is that the inmates of the Girls School are particularly at the mercy of the institution's personnel and such other individuals with whom they are likely to come into contact with by virtue of their inmate status. The evil involved derives from the fact that it would be quite easy for any one of them, by threat of punishment or other feigned exercise of authority to induce such inmates to submit to their advances. Appellant argues that in the case at bar, the alleged victim was neither confined, actually or constructively, nor under the regulatory authority of the Girls School, and to characterize her as an inmate under the circumstances of this case, would be a harsh misapplication of the statute.
The interpretation of the word 'inmate' for the purpose of § 10--4201, supra, is, from the standpoint of the appellant, no mere technicality. An examination of the language of the statute reveals that the state's task in securing a conviction of appellant for rape is much less burdensome under the 'inmate provision' than it is under the 'general provision' therein. Under the 'inmate provision' the only elements which the state must prove are:
(1) The defendant had carnal knowledge of
(2) an inmate of the Indiana School for Girls.
Such carnal knowledge need not occur forcibly against her will, nor need the perpetrator of the act have knowledge that the victim is an inmate.
Under the 'general provision' of the statute which reads 'Whoever has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her will * * *' § 10--4201, supra, the state must assume the often difficult task, in addition to proving the carnal knowledge, of proving that the act took place forcibly against the will of the victim. Thomas et al. v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 42, 83 N.E.2d 788; Kelley v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 148, 78 N.E.2d 547; Ritter v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 426, 67 N.E.2d 530; Shephard v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 356, 67 N.E.2d 534. This is frequently an insurmountable obstacle to conviction, especially where the alleged victim is of ill-repute or otherwise engaged in professional sexual activities. The desirability of indicting the appellant under the 'inmate provision' of the rape statute from the standpoint of the prosecutor is therefore apparent.
Turning to the question of what is an 'inmate' under § 10--4201 supra, this court in its determination mut be guided by the well-settled...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Calvin v. State
...have consistently applied since the early days of our 1851 Constitution. See, e.g., Morgan, 22 N.E.3d at 576 ; Coleman v. State, 253 Ind. 627, 632–33, 256 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1970) ; Helms v. Am. Sec. Co. of Ind., 216 Ind. 1, 8–9, 22 N.E.2d 822, 825 (1939) ; State v. Sopher, 157 Ind. 360, 372,......
-
Cook v. State
...ambiguities therein are to be resolved in favor of the accused. Utley v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 443, 281 N.E.2d 888; Coleman v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 627, 256 N.E.2d 389; Zwick v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 302, 236 N.E.2d 26; State v. Gilbert (1966), 247 Ind. 544, 219 N.E.2d 892; Hutcherson v......
-
Pennington v. State
...ambiguities therein are to be resolved in favor of the accused. Utley v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 443, 281 N.E.2d 888; Coleman v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 627, 256 N.E.2d 389; Zwick v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 302, 236 N.E.2d 26; State v. Gilbert, (1966) 247 Ind. 544, 219 N.E.2d 892; Hutcherson v......
-
Chubb v. State
...statutes must be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Utley v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 443, 446, 281 N.E.2d 888, 890; Coleman v. State (1990), 253 Ind. 627, 631, 256 N.E.2d 389, 391. The defendant's genital nudity in the closed stall did not constitute public indecency. To hold otherwise would eff......