Coleman v. State, 88-01259

• Decision Date: 09 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-01259,88-01259
• Citation: 569 So.2d 870
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D2755 Lorenzo Ray COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 870

569 So.2d 870

15 Fla. L. Weekly D2755

Lorenzo Ray COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-01259.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

Nov. 9, 1990.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PARKER, Judge.

Lorenzo Coleman appeals his convictions and sentences for the offenses of battery, possession of cocaine, and three counts of resisting arrest with violence. The only issue in this appeal which merits reversal is the assessment of costs against the appellant.

However, another issue Coleman raises requires elaboration. In a pretrial motion to dismiss, Coleman alleged that he should not be charged with three counts of resisting arrest with violence when he was arrested only once. Coleman argued that to try him on three counts would place him thrice in jeopardy for the same offense. ¹ He raised this issue again in his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal as well as in his motion for new trial.

The charging information alleged that Coleman resisted, obstructed, or opposed a different deputy in each of the three counts for resisting arrest with violence. The deputies' version of the facts produced at trial, which varied substantially from Coleman's version, reflects that Coleman ran from the scene of a street drug transaction. Deputy Strickland reached Coleman, identified himself, and advised Coleman he was under arrest. As Strickland tried to subdue Coleman, Coleman continued to struggle, grabbed Strickland's hands attempting to break free, and swung his elbows striking Strickland. Eventually, Coleman was subdued after Deputy Dennison took control of one of Coleman's arms, Deputy Ortiz sat on top of Coleman, and Deputy Jones held Coleman down by placing Jones' knee on Coleman's neck and shoulder area. After Coleman was handcuffed, it required three deputies to place Coleman in the deputy's vehicle, with Coleman stopping and planting his feet, kicking, shouting, and spitting. Coleman kicked Dennison in the upper arm and chest and continued to kick after the door of the deputy's vehicle was shut, bending the top portion of the door out four inches away from the frame of the car.

Coleman's position in this appeal is that he was engaged in a single continuous episode of struggling with the officers and should be subject to only one adjudication and sentence for resisting arrest with violence. This precise issue appears to be one of first impression in Florida. The statute under which Coleman was charged and convicted provides:

Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ..., by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, ...

§ 843.01, Fla.Stat. (1987) (emphasis added).

In State v. Crumley, 512 So.2d 183 (Fla.1987), Justice Barkett restated the analysis in Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987), and held that the offenses of battery of a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery of that same officer arising from a single act addressed the same...