Coleman v. State, CR

• Citation: 869 S.W.2d 713,315 Ark. 610
• Decision Date: 31 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Parties: Maurice COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 93-676.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

Page 713

869 S.W.2d 713

315 Ark. 610

Maurice COLEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 93-676.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 31, 1994.

Bill E. Ross, Mikke Connealy Bracey, Blytheville, for appellant.

Kent G. Holt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

HOLT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a criminal conviction on the charge of first-degree murder in the slaying of nineteen-year-old Stephen Jerome Woodard. The appellant, Maurice Coleman, was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he raises three arguments for reversal: (1) his custodial statement should have been suppressed, (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant Coleman's directed verdict motion, and (3) evidence of his prior convictions should not have been admissible. We affirm.

I. Failure to grant motion for directed verdict--

Sufficiency of the evidence

We address Coleman's directed verdict contention first because it involves a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence which must be considered prior to a review of trial errors. See Owens v. State, 313 Ark. 520, 856 S.W.2d 288 (1993). The directed verdict motions were properly made and preserved.

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Friar v. State, 313 Ark. 253, 854 S.W.2d 318 (1993). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Ricketts v. State, 292 Ark. 256, 729 S.W.2d 400 (1987). On appeal we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and sustain the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Abdullah v. State, 301 Ark. 235, 783 S.W.2d 58 (1990). Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Friar, supra; Hodge v. State, 303 Ark. 375, 797 S.W.2d 432 (1990). A defendant's intent to commit murder may be inferred from the type of weapon used, and the nature, extent, and location of the wounds. Allen v. State, 310 Ark. 384, 838 S.W.2d 346 (1992).

Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl.1993) provides that a person commits murder in the first degree if, "With a purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of another person." Coleman claims that the evidence was insufficient, stressing that "there was no plausible connection between the death of Steven Jerome Woodard and Maurice Coleman." This contention is not true.

The strongest evidence supporting Coleman's conviction is his custodial statement to the police in which he admitted the following: He, Shawn "Too Short" Jefferson, and the victim travelled to Williams Park in Blytheville, Arkansas, after having consumed crack cocaine. The three men were in a white car driven by Woodard--he was in the backseat and Jefferson in the front--and Woodard and Jefferson were quarreling over a statement Woodard had made to the police regarding a murder that had occurred in Cherokee Court a few days earlier, when he produced a chrome semi-automatic .25 handgun, fired at Woodard from the backseat, striking him in the back of the head. Jefferson dragged Woodard out of the car, intending to put him in the trunk, when Woodard ran a short distance yelling, "I'm dead." Woodard fell, and he and "Too Short" obtained a tire tool and took turns repeatedly beating him on the head. Nevertheless, Woodard refused to die, and they "drove over him and back" with the car "trying to make sure he was dead." Believing Woodard was still alive, they placed him in the trunk, drove to "Senior Citizens Pond" and partially submerged the car in the water.

In his statement, Coleman also referred to one of Woodard's shoes that Jefferson had thrown away from Woodard's body. A shoe was discovered by Detective Hill at Williams Park. He identified to the officers and to the jury a shirt worn by him on the night of the murder that was submitted to the crime lab for tests. Although stains on the shirt were identified as human blood, there was not enough present to positively identify it as the victim's blood.

Other witnesses testimony corroborates parts of Coleman's statement to the police. Lucretia Jones, Woodard's girlfriend, testified that Woodard had access to her car, a 1981 white Ford, and that she discovered it missing the morning of July 21, 1992. She later identified the car the police officers pulled from a pond which contained Woodard's body in its trunk as her car.

Kim Smith, Woodard's sister, testified that she saw her brother, Coleman, Jefferson, Margaret James, and others, at her apartment the night before Woodard disappeared. According to her testimony, at one point she looked outside and saw her brother and Jefferson "fixing to charge each other." Later, she saw Woodard leave in the white Ford automobile and saw Coleman and Jefferson leave on foot in the same direction as Woodard was driving. Minutes later, she saw the car come "flying out of the project." She tentatively identified the driver as her brother, the backseat passenger as Coleman and Jefferson as sitting in front.

Margaret James testified that Coleman and Jefferson arrived at Ms. Smith's apartment together and Woodard arrived by himself, having driven in his girlfriend's car. When Woodard left and got in the car, she saw Coleman and Jefferson leave on foot. About five minutes later, she saw the car drive by. She assumed the three male occupants were Woodard, Coleman, and Jefferson.

Floyd Moran testified that he often picked up cans at local parks, and on July 21, 1992, he went to Williams Park in Blytheville. He reported to the police that there was an area of pavement near a shelter that appeared to be marked by a large amount of fresh blood and shirt buttons. During Detective Hill's investigation of the park, he discovered body tissue, an earring, shirt buttons, and a shoe. The shoe was later matched to its mate on Woodard's body.

The gun, a chrome .25 semi-automatic pistol, was discovered, due to a lead from Jefferson, buried in a bean field located about two miles from Williams Park. A bullet recovered from the dash on the driver's side of the Ford matched the recovered firearm. Ron Andrejack, a firearms examiner with the State Crime Lab, testified that the bullet fragments recovered from Woodard's body were .25 caliber but were so mutilated that identification with a specific .25 caliber firearm was impossible.

Dr. William Sturner, Chief Medical Examiner with the State Crime Lab, testified regarding the results of his autopsy of Woodard. He discovered gunshot wounds on three locations on the victim: three on the right side of his head, three to his back and a "through and through" superficial wound on the right shoulder. Sturner also described abrasions on various parts of the deceased--on his head, chest, shoulders, elbow, knuckles--consistent with having been dragged or scraped across pavement. These witnesses' testimony is corroborative and consistent with Coleman's statement to the police. This evidence, together with Coleman's statement, is more than sufficient to support the verdict of first-degree murder.

Coleman argues that there was not sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony of Jefferson. Due to the facts that Jefferson neither testified nor was he charged as an accomplice, and the jury was not instructed as to accomplice liability, this argument is without basis.

II. Voluntariness of custodial statement

Coleman next contends that the police coerced him into making his taped confession and, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his custodial statement.

Custodial statements are presumed involuntary, and the State has the burden of proving otherwise. Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992). In considering a motion to suppress a custodial statement, we make an independent determination of the voluntariness of the confession but do not set aside the trial judge's finding unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Henderson v. State, 311 Ark. 398, 844 S.W.2d 360 (1993).

Typically, the question of whether the trial court erred in admitting a confession into evidence is two pronged: (1) whether the trial court erred in holding that the proof showed that the waiver and confession were voluntarily given; and (2) whether the trial court erred in holding that the proof showed that the waiver and confession were knowingly and intelligently given. See Weger v. State, 315 Ark. 555, 869 S.W.2d 688 (1994). In his brief, Coleman addresses both the issue of voluntariness and whether or not the proof showed his waiver and confession were knowingly and intelligently given. However, in Coleman's motion to suppress, as abstracted, he questions only the voluntariness of his confession and notes that the court's ruling on suppression of...