Coleman v. State

• Decision Date: 18 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 41A01-0505-CR-196.,41A01-0505-CR-196.
• Citation: 847 N.E.2d 259
• Parties: Jermaine COLEMAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

847 N.E.2d 259

Jermaine COLEMAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 41A01-0505-CR-196.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 18, 2006.

Kathleen M. Sweeney, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Matthew D. Fisher, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Jermaine Coleman (Coleman), appeals from the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress.

We reverse.

ISSUE

Coleman raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States' Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the police officers legally obtained evidence in a stop and search of Coleman.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July of 2004, officers from the Greenwood Police Department in Johnson County, Indiana were attempting to make drug-related arrests at an area shopping mall. In furtherance of this goal, Greenwood Police Sergeant Jeffrey McCorkle (Sergeant McCorkle) met with an incarcerated confidential informant (C.I.), who relayed that he had previously bought cocaine at the mall from a man named "J.C." On July 13, 2004, C.I. called "J.C." and arranged to meet him at the mall later that day in order to pay off a debt and buy some crack cocaine. Thereafter, the Greenwood Police Department transported C.I. to the pre-arranged buy in an unmarked police vehicle, while additional police vehicles followed.

From inside the unmarked vehicle, C.I. identified Coleman as "J.C.," who was waiting outside of a department store. Since C.I. was in custody on a theft charge, officers did not allow him to exit the vehicle and attempt a transaction with Coleman. Rather, after C.I. identified Coleman as the man he had previously bought crack cocaine from, Officer James Long (Officer Long), in uniform, stopped Coleman and asked if he was "J.C." Coleman indicated that he was "J.C.," and that he was there to meet a friend who owed him money. Officer Long then asked Coleman if he could conduct a pat-down search of his person. Coleman agreed, and as a result of the frisk, a digital scale, illegal drug residue, and parts of plastic baggies were found. Officer Long subsequently handcuffed Coleman and placed him in his police vehicle.

Next, Sergeant McCorkle and Johnson County Sheriff's Deputy James Drake (Deputy Drake) approached and asked Coleman what kind of vehicle he drove, and where it was located. Once Coleman's vehicle was located, a K-9 unit detected the presence of narcotics. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a gravel-like substance that tested positive for cocaine.

On July 16, 2004, the State filed an information charging Coleman with possession of cocaine, as a class D felony, Ind.Code § 35-48-4-6(a). On November 10, 2004, Coleman filed a Motion to Suppress. On February 16, 2005, a hearing was held on the motion, and on March 8, 2005, the trial court denied the motion. On April 6, 2005, Coleman filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. On August 30, 2005, we accepted jurisdiction of this case.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Coleman argues that the Greenwood Police Department did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop him outside of the mall and conduct a pat-down search. Specifically, Coleman asserts that the C.I.'s identification of him, alone, was not sufficient to support an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); thus, Coleman contends that the evidence recovered by frisking him and subsequently searching his car was illegally obtained.

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in a manner similar to claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Williams v. State, 745 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Thus, in reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine if there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. Id. When evaluating determinations of reasonable suspicion, we accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. However, the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. Id.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect the privacy and possessory interests of individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Burkett v. State, 785 N.E.2d 276, 278 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). Generally, a lawful search requires a judicially issued search warrant. Id. When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Id. The United States Supreme Court established one such exception in Terry v. Ohio, which announced the rule that a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause, if, based on specific and articulable facts together with reasonable inferences from those facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id; Parker v. State, 662 N.E.2d 994, 995 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Reasonable suspicion is determined on a case-by-case basis by looking at the totality of the circumstances, but is generally satisfied when the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, along with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. In addition to detainment, a police officer can conduct a limited search of the individual's outer clothing for weapons if the officer reasonably believes the individual is armed and dangerous. Parker, 662 N.E.2d at 995.

Since Terry, the Supreme Court has considered the use of an informant's tip as the basis for an investigatory stop. Id. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the Court upheld an investigatory stop where the informant "was known to [the officer] personally and had provided him with information in the past," and the informant "came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene." Parker, 662 N.E.2d at 996. Particularly, in that case, a well-known informant approached a police officer in a high-crime area and told him that someone in a nearby vehicle possessed narcotics and a weapon. Id. Then, in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the Court upheld the validity of a stop, based on a tip, although anonymous, because the tip was significantly corroborated by independent police work. Parker, 662 N.E.2d at 996. Specifically, the anonymous caller there was able to name White and inform the police that White would be leaving a particular apartment, at a particular time, in a particular vehicle, and would be heading to a particular motel with cocaine in her possession. Id. Prior to making the stop, a police officer went to the address given by the informant, and observed White leave in the described vehicle and head toward the named motel. Id. Holding that such corroborated tips are sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop, the Court focused on the premise that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and stressed that both the quantity and reliability of the information used as the basis for a stop should be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id.

In Parker, this court affirmed a denial of a motion to suppress where an informant provided information by telephone that Parker, an African American male, wearing shorts, a plaid shirt, and a cap, was carrying cocaine in a plastic bag, and planned to sell the cocaine at a particular liquor store. Id. at 995. In this case, the police were very familiar with the informant, as he had been on the police payroll for several years and provided information leading to the conviction of other suspected drug dealers. Id. Then, while en route to the liquor store, the officers saw the informant in person, and the informant verified the information he had previously given. Id. Thereafter, the police saw a man matching Parker's description near the liquor store and instigated an investigatory stop of him. Id. In applying the principles of Adams and White, we concluded that the informant's tip provided sufficient detail of corroborated facts, as well as a reliable prediction of Parker's future behavior. Id. at 997. Additionally, we noted that these facts combined included the strongest facts present in both Adams and White. While Adams involved a reliable informant, the informant's tip was not detailed; and while White involved a detailed tip, the informant was anonymous, and not well known to police.

Here, our review of the record indicates that in stopping Coleman, the police officers relied on the C.I.'s initial tip, his subsequent telephone conversation with "J.C." arranging the meeting, and then finally his identification of Coleman as "J.C." at the pre-determined meeting place. The record further reveals that the C.I. was not a well-known informant, but rather had only given the police one reliable tip in the past, on the very same day that he provided the tip about Coleman. Also, the record discloses that the officers were only able to hear the C.I.'s side of the telephone conversation in arranging the meeting with "J.C."; thus, the police officers relied entirely on the C.I.'s statement that "J.C." would be waiting at the mall and would have cocaine with him. While the C.I. did give a general description of "J.C." as a 5'10" African American male, approximately thirty (30) years old, the...