Coleman v. State, 71001

Decision Date13 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 71001,71001
Citation881 S.W.2d 344
PartiesClydell COLEMAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals
OPINION

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted by a jury in McLennan County of capital murder. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.03(a)(2). After the jury answered the special issues in the affirmative, the trial court imposed the death penalty as required by Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. In an automatic, direct appeal to this Court, appellant's counsel raises twenty-six points of error in an original brief and two points of error in two supplemental briefs. We will affirm.

Because appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's affirmative answer to special issue two, we summarize the facts relevant to this issue. Article 37.071(b)(2), V.A.C.C.P. The record reflects on February 24, 1989, in Waco, the eighty-seven year old victim was murdered in her home by strangulation. Fingerprints at the scene connected Yolanda Phillips to the murder. Phillips eventually implicated appellant in the murder and testified against appellant pursuant to a plea bargain with the State.

Phillips testified she and appellant forcibly entered the victim's residence to obtain money and property to buy drugs. Appellant confronted the victim, threw a blanket over her head, struck her in the head with a hammer, and then strangled her with one of her stockings. Phillips described property she and appellant removed from the victim's home and sold to various buyers for minor sums. Several witnesses testified appellant sold them property belonging to the victim. Appellant's defensive theory was that Phillips committed the murder.

At the punishment phase, the State presented evidence of appellant's burglary convictions in 1957, 1966, and 1984, and a forgery conviction in 1974. The State also introduced evidence that while serving time in prison appellant had a bad reputation among the other inmates for being dangerous. The State also introduced evidence that while burglarizing the home of an eighty-eight year old lady in August of 1988, appellant threw a blanket over her head and held a can opener to her throat.

In point of error six, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to special issue two which asked the jury to determine whether there is a probability appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. See Article 37.071(b)(2). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we must determine whether any rational finder of fact could have affirmatively found the second special issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see Burns v. State, 761 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). The jury may consider the evidence from the guilt-innocence phase and the punishment phase in arriving at an answer to the second special issue. O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 480 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 354 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).

The evidence reflects appellant committed a deliberate and brutal murder and his conduct displayed a total disregard for human life, personal dignity of others, and the ownership of property. See Barney v. State, 698 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 82 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). In the instant offense, appellant threw a blanket over the eighty-seven year old victim's head, hit her in the head with a hammer and strangled her with her own stocking. Appellant committed a similar offense against an eighty-eight year old victim only seven months before this offense. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to special issue two. See Barney v. State, 698 S.W.2d at 117-119; Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d at 82. Point of error six is overruled.

In supplemental point of error one, appellant contends Phillips' accomplice-witness testimony was not corroborated by other evidence tending to connect appellant to the offense. See Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P. The State presented evidence, independent of Phillips' testimony, that appellant sold some of the victim's property shortly after the murder. Appellant told one witness in August of 1988 he robbed the victim before and planned to do it again. Appellant told another witness about two weeks before the murder he intended to rob the victim again and kill her, if necessary, because she knew appellant. Appellant admitted to another witness, after the murder, he had been inside the victim's home and had taken some of her property. Appellant ran when the police came to question him about the murder. There is evidence, independent of Phillips' testimony, connecting appellant to the offense. See Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 631 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Moore v. State, 700 S.W.2d 193, 203 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Supplemental point of error one is overruled.

Appellant's eighth point of error asserts the trial court erred in sustaining the State's challenge for cause to veniremember Laws based on his attitude regarding the death penalty. The State claims the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the challenge for cause because the veniremember's attitude about the death penalty would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his oath and the instructions of the court. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Knox v. State, 744 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Cordova v. State, 733 S.W.2d 175, 186 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). We apply a deferential standard of review of a trial court's ruling granting a state's challenge for cause. Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 886 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). The initial exchange between Laws and the prosecutor reflected that based on his opposition to the death penalty, the veniremember could not affirmatively answer the special issues:

"Q. (by State) Okay. And is this both because you are personally opposed to the death penalty and because you know him, is that right?

"A. No.

"Q. Okay.

"A. I just don't believe in it.

"Q. Okay.

"A. I just don't believe in taking, you know, taking no man's life.

"Q. All right, sir. You just don't feel that that's proper, do you?

"A. No.

"Q. Okay. And let me ask you, under any set of facts, do you think you could ever return a death penalty?

"A. No.

"Q. Okay. Even if it was a real bad murder or something, could you--do you always think you ought to return a life sentence or less?

"A. The way I feel that's left up to--Well, I'm a Baptist.

"Q. Yeah.

"A. I believe the Baptist way.

"Q. All right. Is it like my mother, she didn't believe in it religiously because of her religious beliefs?

"A. Yeah, I just believe in what the Bible says.

"Q. Okay. That's the way my mom felt. She said--felt the Bible say you shouldn't take a life, you know.

"A. That's true.

"Q. That's the way she believed and she could never, regardless of what the evidence was she could never have answered those questions yes to return a death penalty. You know, do you feel the same way?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And even think of the worse [sic] crime that a person could commit, would you always think that the special issues ought to be answered no so that he would get a life sentence rather than a death sentence?

"A. Yes.

"Q. All right, sir.

"Mr. Long: At this time, Your Honor, we'll challenge this witness for cause on the inability to follow the death penalty.

"The Court: All right, sir."

Appellant attempted to rehabilitate veniremember Laws:

"Q. (by appellant's attorney) But let's say that the State has presented their evidence and you have no reasonable doubt that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. If you had no reasonable doubt that that was true, would you answer--could you answer this special issue yes?

"A. Well, I couldn't answer yes because I wouldn't know.

"Q. Well, after you heard all the evidence, okay?'

"A. Uh-huh.

"Q. You heard all the evidence.

"A. Uh-huh.

"Q. You would have to answer this special issue either yes or no.

"A. Oh, yeah, I could.

"Q. Okay. If you have a reasonable doubt you would answer it no.

"A. Uh-huh. Yeah.

"Q. Because that is what the law would tell you to do.

"A. Uh-huh.

"Q. If you had no reasonable doubt, if the State had proved it to you beyond a reasonable doubt, the law would say that you would have to answer it yes. Could you follow the law and do that?

"A. Follow the law and do that?

"Q. Yes, sir.

"A. Well, I have to go by the law.

"Q. And you--So do you feel if the State proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt that you could answer special issue number two yes?

"A. (no response)

"Q. See, Mr. Laws, the real question is you know, both the State and the Defense are entitled to a juror who can be fair to both sides.

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Do you understand that?

"A. Uh-huh.

"Q. That's the reason I said at first no matter what your personal feelings or your personal beliefs are, can you set those beliefs aside and can you follow the law?

"A. I don't--are you talking about the way I feel? Like you say, like could follow the law leaving what I think about the case.

"Q. And you can follow the law and do what the Court directs you to do. You feel like you can follow the law.

"A. I will try.

* * * * * *

"Q. Could you answer those special issues yes? Could you follow the law and answer those yes?

"A. If it's right.

"Q. Do what, sir?

"A. If it's what is right, yeah. I can answer them yes or no. Yes, I can...

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