Coleman v. State, 90-KA-0664
| Decision Date | 18 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-KA-0664,90-KA-0664 |
| Citation | 592 So.2d 517 |
| Parties | Johnny L. COLEMAN v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Thomas D. Lee, Lee & Lee, Forest, for appellant.
Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Ellen Y. Dale, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.
Defendant Johnny L. Coleman was convicted of rape, burglary and kidnapping in the Circuit Court of Scott County. At issue in this appeal is the admissibility of his confession while in custody following an illegal arrest and absent a waiver of his right to an "initial appearance" before a judicial officer under Rule 1.04, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, and procedural errors during trial. This Court addresses only the Rule 1.04 violation, and reverses and remands for a new trial.
On the night of October 25, 1989, HS, an adult female, fell asleep on the living room couch in her residence. As she awoke at approximately 1:00 a.m. and walked toward her bedroom, she saw a man standing in the kitchen. No lights were on; she screamed. The man grabbed her, placed his hand over her mouth, took her T-shirt off and tied it around her face. She was carried to the bedroom and raped. She could not see the man's face, but she was able to see that he had black hands.
After the attack, the man placed her in her automobile and drove around the countryside for more than an hour before exiting the vehicle. The victim waited a few minutes, removed the shirt from her face, and drove to the Morton police station to report the crime.
On the morning of October 27, 1989, Johnny Coleman was a passenger in and sitting on the back seat of an automobile driven by Deborah Williams, and also occupied by her mother, Lee Gurtha Williams, who was seated on the right front seat of the vehicle. They were passing through Morton en route to Forest.
While travelling through Morton, they were signaled to stop by a police car which turned on its blue lights. Ms. Williams promptly pulled over and stopped her vehicle. She had violated no traffic law.
There were two officers in the car, and one exited the passenger side, approached Williams' vehicle and asked "to talk to Johnny." Coleman exited the right side of the vehicle, was taken to the police car and promptly frisked by the policeman. Although the automobile occupants stated unequivocally that the search revealed no weapon, both officers stated that they confiscated a pocket knife with a blade in excess of three inches from Coleman. Coleman denied having a weapon. Coleman was transported to the police station and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Upon arriving at the city jail, Coleman was taken to the interrogation room and questioned about the recent rape of HS. He denied knowledge of the crime. He was requested to submit to medical tests and samplings of his blood, saliva, and hair to "clear things up." Coleman agreed, and for this purpose signed a waiver of rights. After the tests were performed, Coleman was returned to the Morton jail where he was held until November 8, 1989, without being taken before a judicial officer or given an initial appearance as required by Rule 1.04 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice.
On November 7, 1989, the test results were reported to the policeman. Coleman was apprised by them that "it didn't look too good right now, and would he like to get it off his chest?" The officers, after further interrogation, obtained an oral confession which was reduced to writing on November 8th. Coleman executed a form waiver of rights on both dates.
On November 29, 1989, Coleman was indicted for burglary, rape, kidnapping and recidivism.
An attorney was appointed to defend Coleman, who promptly filed a motion to suppress any confessions, statements and evidence obtained from his client by the law enforcement officers because they violated Rule 1.04 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Several hearings were held before the trial judge on the motion. Relevant parts of the findings made by the trial court state as follows:
Now, here is what we find, and I think I should state my findings as of now, so that it doesn't get cold, and we have to go over it again.
I find that, obviously, there was no initial appearance. There was no reason that there should not have been. It would have been very convenient and very easy to have had an initial appearance, and it doesn't just apply to felonies. The rule reads "every person arrested." ...
I also find that the misdemeanor incarceration was, in reality, for the purpose of holding him for the other charge, because that's what the testimony is....
I will say this. You put in jeopardy a very serious case when you hold someone without taking them to a Magistrate promptly. Also, you put doubt into a case when you basically hold someone on a misdemeanor charge, when you would not have held them were it not for the fact that you have an on-going felony charge ....
I will also find as a fact there was no reason that law enforcement could not have taken this individual before a Magistrate the next day ....
* * * * * *
It's a very close case, as far as I am concerned as to whether this statement should be suppressed from the standpoint of the fact that the police had this individual at a place where a Magistrate was available for an initial appearance, not to be confused with the preliminary hearing, an initial appearance under the rule....
At the initial appearance, the judicial officer is to ascertain the identity of the defendant, informing him of the charges, informing him of his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, his right not to be held incommunicado and his right to a preliminary hearing....
Well, it's easy enough to say these same rights were given him by the police officers. I think there is a difference because of who gives it to the person, especially when that is available. (emphasis added).
The trial judge ultimately overruled the motion to suppress, holding that the illegal detention in violation of Rule 1.04 was not sufficient grounds for suppression of the confession.
Trial ensued, the confession was received in evidence over objection of Coleman, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts of the indictment except the recidivism charge which the State did not pursue. The trial judge sentenced Coleman to thirty (30) years for the rape conviction, fifteen (15) years for the burglary conviction, to run concurrently with the rape sentence, and twenty (20) years for the kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively to the rape and burglary sentences.
Coleman appeals.
This Court finds dispositive Coleman's allegation of error regarding the violation of Rule 1.04. The evidence adduced during the hearing of the motion to suppress established:
(a) The officers possessed no evidence linking Coleman to the felony charges prior to his arrest on October 27, 1989;
(b) The driver of the vehicle occupied by Coleman immediately prior to his arrest was not stopped because of a law violation;
(c) The policemen had no probable cause to arrest Coleman prior to searching him;
(d) Coleman was charged with carrying a concealed weapon after a pocket knife was found on his person as a result of their search;
(e) Although Coleman was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, the real reason Coleman was held by the law enforcement officers was to allow for the completion of hair, saliva and blood tests, as well as interrogation;
(f) Coleman was held in the Morton jail from October 27th to November 8th, a total of at least twelve (12) days, without being taken before a judicial officer pursuant to Rule 1.04, although a judicial officer was available;
(g) The policemen interrogated and obtained an oral confession from Coleman on November 7th after telling him the test results "didn't look too good";
(h) The policemen took Coleman before a judicial officer after they obtained a written confession on November 8th.
Rule 1.04 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice provides:
Every arrested person shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.
Upon the defendant's initial appearance, the judicial officer shall ascertain the defendant's true name and address, and amend the formal charge if necessary to reflect this information. The defendant shall be informed of the charges against him and provided with a copy of the complaint. The judicial officer shall also advise the defendant of the following:
(1) That the defendant is not required to speak and that any statements he makes may be used against him;
(2) If the defendant is unrepresented, that he has the right to assistance of counsel, and that if he is unable to afford counsel, an attorney will be appointed to represent him (3) That the defendant has the right to communicate with counsel, family or friends, and that reasonable means will be provided to enable him to do so.
The judicial officer shall inform the defendant of his right to a preliminary hearing, and a date for such hearing shall be set within a reasonable time.
In Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68 (Miss.1988), in a concurring opinion by Justice Robertson which was joined by four other justices, this Court gave meaning to Rule 1.04 in plain and sensible language:
As a matter of the law of this state, the right to counsel attaches once the accused is in custody (a fact generating the legal conclusion that the individual is under arrest) and all reasonable security measures (of evidence and persons) have been completed. At all critical stages thereafter, the accused is of right entitled to access to counsel, absent a specific knowing and intelligent waiver tied to that stage. These general premises, which I will explain below, derive from the most coherent and principled combined reading that may be given Miss. Const....
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