Coleman v. Tennessee Valley Trades & Labor Coun.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 3-74-342.
• Citation: 396 F. Supp. 671
• Parties: Douglass S. COLEMAN et al. v. TENNESSEE VALLEY TRADES AND LABOR COUNCIL and Tennessee Valley Authority.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

396 F. Supp. 671

Douglass S. COLEMAN et al. v. TENNESSEE VALLEY TRADES AND LABOR COUNCIL and Tennessee Valley Authority.

Civ. No. 3-74-342.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, N. D.

March 5, 1975.

W. P. Boone Dougherty, Bernstein, Dougherty & Susano, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Joseph Jacobs, James T. Langford, Jacobs, Jacobs & Davis, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

This is an action by twenty "trades and labor" employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who are members of seven different international unions.¹ Plaintiffs seek a declaration of their rights under a collective bargaining agreement (the General Agreement) that exists between TVA and the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council (the Council). Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. The nature and scope of the relief sought will be more fully described below.

Before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The Court has heard oral argument on the motions and all parties have filed supplemental briefs.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have acted independently or in concert to deprive them of certain rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution.²

A brief background with regard to TVA labor-management relations is necessary for an understanding of the contentions that plaintiffs have set forth. TVA was created in 1933 by Act of Congress (16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq.). The TVA Board of Directors was authorized to appoint employees, define their duties, fix their compensation, and "provide a system of organization to fix responsibility and promote efficiency." 16 U.S. C. § 831b. This responsibility was to be carried out "without regard to the provisions of Civil Service laws ..." Id.

Shortly after the inception of TVA, the Board passed a resolution granting its employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. Initially, TVA bargained with individual unions, but, in 1937, fourteen unions joined together and formed the Council for the purpose of centralized and unified bargaining with TVA. At present, sixteen international unions have representatives on the Council. Plaintiffs are members of seven of these unions.

The first collective bargaining agreement between the Council and TVA was entered into in 1940. Exhibit B to affidavit of William E. Black, Jr. This General Agreement, as amended, together with its Supplementary Schedules, has been in effect since that time. In 1951 the Council was vested with "authority to make ... revisions in the agreement." Article XV, Exhibit C to affidavit of William E. Black, Jr.³

Plaintiffs admit that they are "subject to the provisions of ... the General Agreement." Complaint 4. The General Agreement, as amended, provides that the sixteen member unions will bargain and contract with TVA through the Council.

"This is an agreement between the Tennessee Valley Authority and employees of TVA in the trades and labor classification as represented by the sixteen unions listed below. These unions, acting through the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council, are recognized as the accredited representatives of these employees.

This agreement shall apply to all TVA employees in the trades and labor classifications who are members ... of the following sixteen unions ..." (emphasis added)

Article 1, General Agreement, as revised. Exhibit A to affidavit of William E. Black, Jr.

Historically, at least, the bargaining relationship between TVA and the Council has been praised. See Labor Management Relations in TVA, S. Report No. 372, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1949). Plaintiffs' position, however, is that the Council no longer adequately represents their interests.

The thrust of plaintiffs' argument is that the Council has assumed the role of a "principal" in conducting labor negotiations with TVA and is no longer functioning as a collective body of sixteen representatives of the international unions; that the Council has become a "labor organization" in and of itself; and, that "TVA is working hand in glove with the Labor Council to effect an iron hand over labor relations in total derogation of the rights and interests of plaintiffs and others."

As an example of the alleged conduct described above, plaintiffs state that they are "violently and adamantly" opposed to the "mixed-crew concept" which was agreed to by the Council and TVA in the General Agreement, as revised in 1974. Article VI provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Use of Mixed Crews to Perform Maintenance Work

"1. Maintenance work is performed by mixed-crews. The mixed crew concept utilizes basic skills of all crafts in order to efficiently and effectively promote harmony of effort and increase proof these objectives, work assignductivity of the total work force.

Consistent with the achievement ments are made on the basis of skills required for the work to be done. Journeymen of one craft, in addition to work ordinarily performed by their craft, may be assigned to work that is normally done by other crafts.

The use of laborers in mixed crews will be restricted to work such as: loading and unloading of materials by hand, cleaning parts, general cleanup work, and other work normally performed by laborers."

Plaintiffs charge that the Council's lack of authority to represent them is evidenced by a petition (not before the Court) signed by some 3100 trades and labor employees stating that the Council is not their duly authorized representative. Plaintiffs further charge that the "Council is operating in direct opposition to democratic principles and the concepts of equal representation and one-man one-vote;" that the 1974 Revision to the General Agreement was entered into without ratification by individual employees; and, that the Council has no adequate internal procedures, by-laws, rules or regulations to insure democratic representation.

Plaintiffs further charge that this is not a "mere" labor dispute. Jurisdiction is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. § 1349, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and Tenn.Code Anno. § 23-1101 et seq. In their amended complaint plaintiffs assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.⁴

The following relief is sought:

(1) Declaration of plaintiffs' rights under the General Agreement;

(2) damages;

(3) an injunction ordering the Council to employ "more democratic procedures and practices" or, alternatively, "setting aside" the Council and requiring TVA to deal directly with the Unions;

(4) an order requiring TVA to cease and desist from further "collusive" activity with the Council; and

(5) reasonable attorney's fees.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Although the question is debatable, the Court may have jurisdiction over TVA in this action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1349⁵ which confers federal-question jurisdiction on the district courts without regard to the amount in controversy. Latch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 312 F.Supp. 1069, 1073 (N. D.Miss.1970); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 32 (2d Ed. 1970). Our investigation reveals that the Government does not own more than one-half of the capital stock of TVA because no stock has been authorized or issued by TVA (notwithstanding words to the contrary in Latch).

Assuming, arguendo, that the Court has jurisdiction with respect to TVA due to the fact that it is a federal governmental agency, the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the Council presents far more serious problems. In their complaint plaintiffs asserted that the Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs abandoned this claim during oral argument.

Plaintiffs also assert that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (Declaratory Judgment Act). These statutes are procedural in nature and do not serve as an independent basis of jurisdiction. Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362 F.Supp. 360, 368 (W.D.Ky.1973) aff'd 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974); 6A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 57.23 (2d Ed. 1974).⁶

The final basis of jurisdiction which plaintiffs assert is 28 U.S.C. § 1331.⁷ In their amended complaint plaintiffs state that this action presents

"substantial federal questions, namely, the deprivation of certain rights and privileges secured by the Constitution of the United States and specifically, equal protection of the law and due process of law and, further, in that each of the plaintiffs has sustained and will sustain damages in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs."

In their supplemental brief, plaintiffs assert that the Council "is not properly representing the plaintiffs and others as is required by its statutory duty of fair representation." Thus, plaintiffs by conclusory allegations charge, although somewhat ambiguously, that jurisdiction exists under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

In support of their argument that the case arises under the laws of the United States, plaintiffs cite Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Company, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. den. 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 137, 27 L.Ed.2d 151 (1970). Under plaintiffs' argument, as best the Court can discern it, since the Council has assumed the status of a separate "labor organization" a premise of plaintiffs, discussed previously, it has a statutory duty of fair representation. This argument is novel, but, in the Court's opinion, without legal foundation. Plaintiffs rely, at least in part, on the following language from Waters:

"The origin of the duty of fair representation is statutory, first recognized in cases involving racial discrimination by unions certified as exclusive bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1943); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 120, 65 S.Ct.

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