Coleman v. Wilmington, C. & A. R. Co.
| Citation | 25 S.C. 446 |
| Parties | COLEMAN v. WILMINGTON, COLUMBIA & AUGUSTA RAILROAD COMPANY. |
| Decision Date | 03 August 1886 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
1. The conductor of a material train, even in the matter of readjusting a switch, is not a fellow-servant with a laborer on his train, but is a representative of the master.
2. A railroad company is not liable to one of its servants for the consequences of an isolated act of a third person over whom the company has no control; but where the company had ground for believing that a switch had been previously opened with a false key, and a train thrown off its proper track, the Circuit Judge properly submitted to the jury whether the company had been guilty of negligence in failing to take proper precautions to prevent a repetition of this act.
3. In action for injury to an employee resulting from a misplaced switch, the judge did not err in charging the jury that the railroad company was guilty of negligence if it failed to supply and maintain safe and suitable machinery and appliances, for keeping a switch properly connected is maintaining the track as a proper appliance.
Before ALDRICH, J., Sumter, October, 1885.
The opinion fully states the case.
Mr. J. H. Rion , for appellant.
Messrs. Bowman & Harby , contra.
Paul Coleman, a laborer in the service of the defendant company brought this action against said company for damages on account of personal injuries received by him in the discharge of his duty, on April 23, 1885, at Eastover, in Richland County. It appeared that Coleman was a laborer on a material train, of which J. W. Griffin was the conductor; that after their day's work on the day stated, the train was run to the station at Eastover, and arriving there a little after sundown, the conductor, Griffin, had the switch turned so as to connect with a side track at that place, and ran the train on said track in order to spend the night. The laborers remained in the shanty of the material train, and about two hours after the regular passenger train, in passing, ran on the side track and into collision with the material train, by which one man was killed, and Coleman, the plaintiff, had his left foot and leg crushed. The negligence alleged was in allowing the switch to remain in connection with the turn-out instead of the main line.
The defendant company denied negligence, and for a second defence, stated specifically, that at Eastover they had a side track connected with the main line by a railroad switch, and that said switch was in good order and condition; that on the day mentioned they moved a train of cars upon the side track and caused it to stop thereon; that they disconnected the said side track from the main line and carefully locked the switch, and that thereafter said switch was unfastened by some evil disposed person to them unknown, and the main line was thereby broken, and a train running on the main line was turned into the side track and unavoidably collided with the material train standing thereon, without any fault or negligence on their part, & c.
The conductor, Griffin, testified positively that after going in upon the side track he turned the switch and restored the connection with main line and locked it. There was proof. however, tending to show that a collision on the same side track, very much in the same way, had occurred in August of the preceding year; and that the result of an investigation, ordered on that occasion, was to acquit the officials and to restore them to their places, there being grounds to believe that the lock of the switch, found unbroken, must have been tampered with, picked, or unlocked with a false key, in the possession of some malicious person, unknown to and beyond the control of the officers of the company; that notwithstanding this incident, the company had never changed the lock, but continued to use the same until after the last collision, in which the plaintiff was injured. The change of one lock would have made it necessary to change all on the road of the same pattern.
Upon the close of the plaintiff's testimony the counsel of the defendant company moved for a non-suit on two grounds: first, that the testimony for the plaintiff disclosed the fact that the injury to him resulted from an accident, caused either by the malicious act of some third person, over whom the defendant had no control; or second, from the negligence of a fellow-servant of the plaintiff. The motion was refused and the trial proceeded. Both parties made requests to charge. Some were charged as presented and others modified and some refused. The matters complained of appear in the exceptions. Upon the charge of the judge the jury found a verdict of $1,500 for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals upon the following exceptions:
I. " For that his honor allowed the plaintiff's first request to charge, ‘ If from the evidence the jury believe that the defendant failed to supply the plaintiff with safe and suitable machinery and appliances with which to discharge his duties, or that, having originally supplied the same, afterwards failed to maintain and keep in good repair such machinery and appliances, and that, by reason of its failure so to do, the plaintiff was injured as alleged, then the defendant is guilty of negligence, and the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.’ Such request, even if sound as an abstract proposition of law, not being pertinent to the facts proved in this case.
2. " For that his honor refused the defendant's second request to charge: ‘ If the jury believe that the defendant's side tracks and machinery were properly constructed and in good repair, and that the defendants exercised due care in the employment of competent, skilled, and prudent servants in the conduct of their business, and that the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, in neglecting to disconnect the side track from the main line of the railroad, then the defendants are not liable in this action,’ on the ground that it was not involved in the decision in this case.
3. " For that his honor refused the defendant's third request to charge: ‘ That under the facts as proved in this case, the servant who was charged with the duty of attending to the switch, in disconnecting said side track from the main line, was a fellow-servant of the plaintiff,’ on the ground that it is a question of fact for the jury.
4. " For that his honor refused the defendant's fourth request to charge: ‘ That the plaintiff cannot recover damages in this case for any injury that may have resulted to him from the negligence of a fellow-servant,’ on the ground that such request cannot be allowed if negligence be proved.
5. " For that his honor refused the defendant's fifth request to charge: ‘ That the...
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