Coles v. Scion Steel, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-12606 |
| Parties | GAYLAND BRION COLES, Plaintiff, v. SCION STEEL, INC., ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
GAYLAND BRION COLES, Plaintiff,
v.
SCION STEEL, INC., ET AL., Defendants.
No. 20-12606
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
June 15, 2021
Linda V. Parker, District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
R. STEVEN WHALEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This is an employment case. On September 16, 2020, Plaintiff Gayland Brion Coles, an African-American male, 64, filed a pro se civil complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Scion Steel, Inc. (“Scion”), Micky Tschirhart (“Tschirhart”), Vice President of Scion, Tom McCall (“McCall”), General Plant Manger of Operations, and Jeff Michalski (“Michalski”), a supervisor, alleging a breach of a March 28, 2019 Confidential Settlement Agreement resolving all claims brought in a previous lawsuit. Case No. 18-13754. Plaintiff also alleges that subsequent to the resolution of the earlier lawsuit, Defendants retaliated against him for filing the prior lawsuit and gave non-African-Americans more favorable work positions and assignments.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 6) and Plaintiff's “motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment and response” (ECF No. 10), which have been referred for a Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Defendants' motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and that
Plaintiff's motion be DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Case No. 18-13754
On December 4, 2018 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his previous suit in this Court, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) under 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Case No. 18-13754, (ECF No. 1). On March 28, 2019, the parties entered into a “Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims” (“Agreement”). The Agreement, attached to the Complaint in the present case, guaranteed Plaintiff:
a. Increased job responsibilities to include saw operation more advanced gratings including jobs including coping notches, radius; and review of sketches and drawings to determine job requirements and the best way to complete a job, as available, and in cooperation with his supervisor
b. Appropriate training opportunities with respect to the increased job responsibilities as available.
c. A pay increase of $2.00 per hour.
(ECF No.1, PageID.74), ¶ 5. Plaintiff agreed that if he were “unable or unwilling to assume, or is unable to competently perform, the increased responsibilities as they become available, he [would] return to his responsibilities and pay rate that were in place as of the date he signed [the Agreement].” Id. In the event that Plaintiff was unable to assume or competently perform the increased responsibilities, he was nonetheless entitled to the $2.00 per hour pay increase for the first 30 days after signing the agreement. Id. In exchange, Plaintiff agreed to drop “all claims, grievances and causes of action” arising or accruing “prior to the execution” of the Agreement. (ECF No. 1, PageID.73) at ¶ 3. On April 9, 2019, the parties stipulated to dismissal of all claims with prejudice. Case No. 18-13754, (ECF No.
26, PageID.105). The next day, the District Court ordered the dismissal of all claims. Id. (ECF No. 7).
B. The Present Case
Plaintiff filed the present action on September 16, 2020 (ECF No. 1). He alleges that Defendants breached the Agreement by failing to promote him, and retaliated against him for asserting his constitutional/statutory rights by filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge and for having brought the previous lawsuit, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (ECF No. 1, PageID.5). He also alleges that Defendants' failure to promote him following the execution of the agreement was motivated by racial animus. Id.
The Complaint's allegations are summarized as follows. Following the execution of the Agreement, Plaintiff did not receive “increased job responsibilities” or “appropriate training opportunities” as guaranteed by paragraph 5 (a) and 5(b) of the Agreement. (ECF No. 1, PageID.13, ¶ 5)(See (ECF No. 1, PageID.73-74). He was not alerted to “appropriate training” opportunities or openings for the position of “Burney operator” (“operator.”) Id. He notes that since the prior lawsuit was resolved, two openings for the operator position were filled by two white males who were also given two weeks of training by Defendant Scion. Id. Defendants Tschirhart and McCall were aware of the Agreement at the time that the white males were placed in the operator positions, but kept the job openings “silent and secret” until they had been filled. (ECF No.1, PageID.15-16) at ¶ 9. Plaintiff points out that since 2016, Scion has interviewed seven white males for the operator position, hired five, promoted one, and fired three, one of whom was rehired. (ECF No. 1, PageID.24) at ¶ 22. Plaintiff has demonstrated “for months” to both Tschirhart and McCall that he is proficient in the operator position, and at least as early as 2016, both were aware he could perform the operator position. (ECF No. 1, PageID.19, 25) at ¶¶ 19, 24. Plaintiff not only remained in
his previous position (welder), but was given exclusively “heavy duty” work orders in contrast to his white coworkers who rotated between heavy and light duty assignments. (ECF No. 1, PageID.17, 22, 34-35, 37) at ¶ ¶ 8, 20, 36-37, 40. Plaintiff relates a March 20, 2020 exchange between himself and Defendant Michalski: Plaintiff stated that he was tired, to which Michalski responded that he thought he had put Plaintiff “out to pasture.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.16-17) at ¶ 9. When Plaintiff replied “no way, ” Michalski stated that Plaintiff was “still strong as a bull.” Id. Plaintiff interpreted Michalski's comment to mean that Plaintiff was “an animal, ” noting that Michalski disregarded Plaintiff's August 27, 2020 injury. Id., (ECF No. 1, PageID.23) at ¶ 21.
Following the execution of the Agreement, Plaintiff's requested training/advancement opportunities, to which McCall responded “these things take time, ” then at another point, asked Plaintiff how much longer he intended to work. (ECF No. 1, PageID.49) at ¶ 66. On July 22, 2020, McCall said “At a (sic) boy Gayland” in response to Plaintiff's statement that he was staying out of trouble. (ECF No. 1, PageID.40) at ¶ 46. Plaintiff alleges that the term “atta-boy” was used as a racial slur. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that his unrelentingly heavy workload as a welder was assigned in retaliation for his EEOC complaint leading to the first lawsuit, as well as racial animus. (ECF No. 1, PageID.48) at ¶ ¶ 63-64. He says that Defendants created a hostile work environment by paying him on Fridays rather than Thursdays in violation of the employer handbook, failing to respond to his grievance about having his work boots stolen, requiring him to take on the additional work responsibilities of a coworker who was “continuously drunk, ” and depriving him of overtime opportunities given to white employees (ECF No. 1, PageID.49-50, 59-60, 63-64) at ¶¶ 69, 92, 96, 108, 110. Plaintiff points out that Defendant Scion's own supervisory manual forbids retaliation in response to subordinate complaints.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.22, 39-41) at ¶¶ 18-19, 47. He alleges that the three individual Defendants colluded to deprive him of the Agreement's guarantees. (ECF No. 1, PageID.41-42) at ¶ 51. Plaintiff requests monetary damages.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction are brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The party opposing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion “bears the burden of proving jurisdiction.” EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2010). Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate where a plaintiff lacks standing. Ward v. Alternative Health Delivery Systems, Inc., 261 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2001).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint “for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, and asks whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2001).
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S 544 (2007), the Court, construing the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), held that although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id., at 555 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). Stated differently, a
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombley, at 570.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court explained and expanded on what it termed the “two-pronged approach” of Twombley. First, it must be determined whether a complaint contains factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678 (citing Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555). Second, the facts that are pled must show a “plausible” claim for relief,...
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