Coleson v. Blanton

• Decision Date: 31 December 1816
• Citation: 4 Tenn. 152
• Parties: COLESON v. BLANTON.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

4 Tenn. 152

COLESON

v.BLANTON.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

December Term, 1816.

The conveyance of personal property to a person, his executors and administrators, in trust for others, vests him with the absolute legal ownership, and that never ceases till the objects of the trust be accomplished, one of which is a recovery for the benefit of the cestui que trust, from any one who has the possession. (That a trust estate is commensurate with the purposes of the trust, is the settled law of this State. Smith v. Thompson, 2 Sw., 388; Belote v. White, 2 Head, 703;Aiken v. Smith, 1 Sn., 304;Ellis v. Fisher, 3 Sn., 231. And this without reference to the statute of uses, 2 Sw., 388.)

The statutes of limitation of the State in whose courts a suit is prosecuted, must prevail in all actions. (Acc. Pike v. Greene, 1 Y., 465; Gassaway v. Hopkins, 1 Head, 583; Estes v. Kyle, Meigs, 34.)

There may be equitable exceptions to the running of the statute. Thus, the removal of property to a distance and concealing it from the owner, so as to place it out of his power to sue, will excuse the owner from commencing his action within the prescribed time and the period of removal and concealment will not be counted. (Overruled by Cocke v. McGinnis, M. & Y., 366, citing this case, where it is said the point did not arise, and what is said upon the replication directed to be filed is a mere dictum. And see Hickman's Lessee v. Gaither, 2 Y., 206, where this case is commented on, and its final decision stated. Pike v. Greene, 1 Y., 468.)

The statute of limitations is as much to be favored as any other defense, and a repleader will be allowed by the Supreme Court to enable the defendant to plead the statute. (But see Cocke v. McGinnis, M. & Y., 366, where it is said that the Supreme Court afterwards rejected the practice of ordering a repleader as erroneous.

A right of property in chattels is not acquired by adverse possession for the time required to bar the remedy under the statute of limitations, nor does the running of the bar in favor of one possessor protect another claiming under him; and though the remedy by action be barred, the right of recaption exists. (Overruled by Kegler v. Miles, M. & Y., 428, where this case is commented on. See also Marshall v. Pennington, 8 Y., 430, citing this case; 4 Y., 174; 5 Y., 12; 1 Head, 346;2 Head, 496.)

The statute of limitations will not run between the trustee and cestui que trust, but will be between the trustee and a stranger. (Acc. King v. Travis, 4 Hay., 280.)

No one can plead the statute of limitations for another, and in personal actions, the statute must be pleaded.

[Cited in: M. & Y., 115, 366, 367, 428, 429; 1 Yer., 467, 468.]

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal in the nature of a writ of error from the Circuit Court of the county of Warren. Blanton sued Coleson in trover for a negro named Hagar, a child of one of the negroes named in the deed of trust from Richard Blanton and Philip Vaughan to Charles Blanton, the plaintiff, dated the 19th of August, 1791, by which deed said negroes were conveyed “to said Charles, his executors and administrators, in trust to and for the following uses; that is to say, to the use of the said Philip, until William (a son of Philip Vaughan, by a daughter of Richard Blanton, which daughter was then dead) shall attain the age of twenty-one years or marry, or in case of his death before either happens, then until the next youngest child shall attain to that age or marry. And upon the happening of one of these events, then to the use of Burnet, Lucy, Polly, and William” (the children of said Vaughan and his said deceased wife). The deed of trust was indorsed thus: “Carolina, April court, 1792, this deed was acknowledged by Richard Blanton, and ordered to be recorded; William Nelson. Truly recorded; John Pendleton. Carolina, April court 1794, proved by the oaths of the witnesses as to Vaughn, and ordered to be recorded; William Nelson.” On the 15th of December, 1815, John Pendleton certified that the foregoing deed of trust from said Richard Blanton and Philip Vaughan to Charles Blanton was duly proved and acknowledged and admitted to record in the court of said county, and that the certificates of proof and acknowledgment, signed by William Nelson, as clerk, are taken from the records in said office. Mr. Pendleton signed his name as clerk. There is also indorsed a certificate of the presiding justice as to the official characters of Nelson and Pendleton. William Tate was introduced for the plaintiff; his father had sold the negro in question to Coleson, the defendant, whether he warranted the title, he could not say, nor whether there was a bill of sale; he said he had heard his father say that he, the father, had sold Hagar 15 or 20 years ago; he understood his father got her from Logan. Evidence was introduced to identify the negro. It was admitted by the defendant that a demand was made of him of the negro in controversy a little before Christmas, 1813. Fry says that, 15 or 20 years ago, Philip Vaughan sold the negro in controversy to Logan, of Surry county, in North Carolina. William Vaughan's deposition was offered and rejected, he being a cestui que trust. His declaration made to Fry is not sufficient proof of the discharge of his interest. This brings us to the principal questions in this cause. The first is, had Charles Blanton, the trustee, such a property in the negro in question as enabled him to bring and sustain this action? The legal estate was in him, his executors, and administrators. This gave him the absolute legal ownership of the slave, and that never ceases till the objects of the trust be accomplished, one of which is a recovery, for the benefit of cestui que trust, from any one who has the possession. It does not appear when William Vaughan married or attained 21. This will be material to the solution of some of the questions made in this cause. Another question is, whether the deed to the trustee be void. It was dated the 19th of August, 1791, acknowledged by Richard Blanton, and recorded in due time. It was not proved and registered as to P. Vaughan until April, 1794, far beyond the ultimate period allowed by the law of Virginia. It was valid as between the parties, whether recorded or not. As to subsequent purchasers, a prior voluntary conveyance may not be good. But until such subsequent purchaser appear, it is legal evidence, and as such should be received and read to the jury. Another question is, whether any prior right was vested in Philip Vaughan by his marriage with Richard Blanton's daughter, and putting the negroes in his possession where they remained till after the birth of four children. There is no evidence of this but in the recital of the trust deed; and that recital negatives a prior right in Vaughan. Both Vaughan and Richard Blanton in this deed admit the right of Blanton. A subsequent purchaser can not say, after this, that Vaughan had an antecedent title, which still continued to exist after the acknowledgment and estoppel. The legal title then was by the deed in Charles Blanton, the trustee. Another question is, whether Logan, being a purchaser for value from Vaughan, is preferred in law to Charles Blanton, the trustee; surely he can not. Though a subsequent purchaser for value be preferred to a volunteer, it is because the prior conveyance is considered as a nullity, and the property to be still remaining in the grantor. Will this apply to the case where one, not having the legal estate at all, as Vaughan had not, conveys to a purchaser for a valuable consideration? Will that exclude Charles Blanton, who derived his legal title, not from Vaughan, but Richard Blanton? Surely not. The question here is only between Blanton and Logan, who had the better right, Richard Blanton or Philip Vaughan? Another question is, whether the statute of limitations will apply to this case so as to bar the action of Charles Blanton, the trustee, and plaintiff in this action? By the...