Coley v. Gonzales
| Decision Date | 02 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 91-380-TUC-WDB.,CIV 91-380-TUC-WDB. |
| Citation | 813 F. Supp. 705 |
| Parties | Melvin Bernard COLEY, Plaintiff, v. David GONZALES, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Melvin B. Coley, Florence, AZ, for plaintiff.
Eric J. Olsson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, AZ, for defendant.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). For the following reasons the Court will deny the Petition.
In 1987, the State charged Petitioner with having committed first-degree murder. The jury, however, convicted Petitioner of three other crimes stemming from the death of Karl Martin: (1) conspiracy to commit a first-degree felony (first-degree murder); (2) conspiracy to hinder prosecution; and (3) hindering prosecution. The Petitioner also has a prior conviction for second-degree murder. The trial court, therefore, sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence of imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the conspiracy to commit murder conviction, and two concurrent, presumptive two-year prison terms for the hindering prosecution convictions.
After Petitioner was convicted, he moved for a new trial on several grounds: (1) improper joinder of the charges1; (2) juror misconduct2; (3) trial court error in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder-conspiracy charge; (4) insufficient proof of prior felony conviction for sentencing purposes; (5) newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. Subsequent to the trial court's ruling, Petitioner moved unsuccessfully for reconsideration of the motion for directed verdict and the motion for a new trial.
On November 17, 1987, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the Arizona Supreme Court.3 He raised three issues on direct appeal: (1) improper joinder of the charges; (2) trial court error in denying the motion for directed verdict of acquittal; and (3) trial court error in refusing to suppress evidence found in the storage shed. However, on March 9, 1988, prior to the resolution of his appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief pursuant to Ariz. R.Crim.P. 32. On June 13, 1988, the Supreme Court stayed the direct appeal until completion of the Rule 32 proceedings in the trial court.
In his Rule 32 petition, Petitioner raised the claim that "newly discovered evidence existed that the state had made certain promises to witness Homer Payne ... and that the prosecutor had stood mute while Payne lied about those promises at trial." Answer, at 9. On September 23, 1988, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the Rule 32 petition. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing in the trial court.4 On July 13, 1989, the trial court denied the motion for a rehearing. Petitioner timely sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. On August 4, 1989, the Arizona Court of Appeals transferred Petitioner's appeal of the trial court's denial of the Rule 32 petition to the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 12-120.22(B). On August 30, 1989, the Arizona Supreme Court consolidated Petitioner's direct appeal and petition for review on the petition for post conviction relief.
In 1989, pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-120.21(A)(1),5 the Arizona Court of Appeals obtained jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's appeals. On November 13, 1990, in a consolidated memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions on direct appeal and the trial court's denial of post conviction relief. On December 31, 1990, the Court of Appeals issued its mandate because Petitioner failed to seek review from the Arizona Supreme Court.
On July 23, 1991, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court. The Court dismissed the petition as a mixed petition under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). On July 30, 1991, Petitioner filed the instant, Amended Petition. Petitioner alleges three grounds for relief: (1) that the prosecution failed to disclose to defense counsel evidence that was favorable to Petitioner6; (2) that fundamental error occurred through jury misconduct; and (3) that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the counts of first-degree murder and conspiracy from the counts of hindering prosecution and conspiracy to hinder prosecution.
Respondents contend that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on three of his grounds for relief.
If Petitioner did not properly exhaust his claims, he must demonstrate "cause" and "prejudice" for his procedural default. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.1991). Both exhaustion and procedural default are doctrines based on principles of comity and federalism. Coleman v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). They are related to the independent and adequate state ground doctrine that ensures that the state's interest in correcting its own mistakes is respected in federal habeas cases.7 Id.
The exhaustion requirement, now codified at 28 U.S.C. 2254(b), (c), requires federal habeas petitioners to exhaust available state remedies. Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.1982). There are two ways for a petitioner to meet the exhaustion requirements: (1) by providing the highest state court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of his claim; or (2) by showing that, at the time petitioner filed his habeas petition in federal court, no state remedies remained available to him. Id. (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1570 n. 28, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). See also Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212, 103 S.Ct. 3547, 77 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1983).
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes a federal court from addressing the merits of federal habeas petition filed by a state prisoner when the state courts refused to entertain the prisoner's claims on state procedural grounds. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1122. Thus, where the last reasoned state court judgment rejecting the state prisoner's federal claims rests on the basis of a state procedural default, the petitioner's claims have not been fairly presented to the state's highest court and the claims are not properly exhausted. Coleman, ___ U.S. at ___ - ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2558-59; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2594, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). See also Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1122 (). In these cases, because the state courts have refused to entertain the petitioner's claims on state procedural grounds, he had no state remedies left available to him. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1988).
If the petitioner alleges that Section 2254(b) is satisfied because no state remedies remain available, however, the Court must test the petitioner's reasons for the unavailability of state remedies. Jackson, 693 F.2d at 869. "A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer `available' to him." Coleman, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted). However, if exhaustion exists solely because no state remedies remain available to petitioner, the Court may decline to reach the merits if the reason for unavailability is a state procedural default that amounts to a waiver. Jackson, 693 F.2d at 869.
Under the procedural default doctrine, if the federal habeas petitioner has failed to follow reasonable state procedures for presenting his claims to the state courts, he is procedurally barred from federal review unless he shows both cause and prejudice regarding his default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). "`Cause' is a legitimate excuse for the default, and `prejudice' is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.1984)).
Here, Petitioner raised his first ground for relief in his "Motion for Leave to Amend, Supplement and Expand the Issues and Record" that he filed in conjunction with the Rule 32 petition. Petitioner, however, defaulted on his first ground for relief by failing to seek appellate review. Petitioner raised his second ground for relief in state court in his unsuccessful motion for a new trial. However, he failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and in his Rule 32 petition. Moreover, he would be foreclosed from raising the ground now because of his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal and in his Rule 32 petition.8 Petitioner raised his third ground for relief on direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Petitioner did not, however, seek review from the Arizona Supreme Court.
The Court finds that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust the above claims.9 Petitioner still meets the technical exhaustion requirements, however, because he had no available state remedies when he filed the instant habeas petition.10 Nonetheless, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on these claims.
Where direct review is available in the state's highest court, failure to seek such review constitutes a procedural default even if review was afforded in the state's lower courts. See McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231-32 (9th Cir.1988). Petitioner, therefore, is procedurally barred from bringing these claims unless he can demonstrate "cause" for the default, and "prejudice" resulting therefrom. Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1380.
In the instant...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- US v. Carroll
-
Coley v. Gonzales
...Sec. 2253. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. I Although the history of this case is described in Coley v. Gonzales, 813 F.Supp. 705 (D.Ariz.1992) (Coley ), a brief review of the proceedings will serve to put this appeal in In 1975, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 was ame......