Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 41722,41722
• Citation: 265 So.2d 18
• Parties: Georgia COLHOUN, Petitioner, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a corporation, and Edward C. Castle, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 18

265 So.2d 18

Georgia COLHOUN, Petitioner, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a corporation, and Edward C. Castle, Respondents.

No. 41722.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 17, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 21, 1972.

David A. Maney and Richard Mulholland, Tampa, for petitioner.

Stephen F. Myers and Vernon W. Evans, Jr., of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, for respondents.

ERVIN, Justice.

In December 1967, Petitioner Georgia Colhoun, a Florida resident, purchased a bus ticket in this state from Respondent Greyhound Lines, Inc., a common carrier doing business in Florida. While using the ticket on December 21, 1967, and traveling on a Greyhound bus driven by Respondent Edward Castle, she was injured in Tennessee when the bus was involved in an accident. Twenty months later, on August 27, 1969, she filed a three-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County against Respondents alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of contract and warranty. Respondents answered admitting the plaintiff was a passenger on the bus which was involved in the accident, but generally denying all other allegations contained in the complaint. In addition Respondents contended the one-year statute of limitations of Tennessee was controlling, barring the suit. They moved for summary judgment.

Respondents' motion was granted and the District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed. Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Fla.App.1971, 253 So.2d 176. We granted certiorari because that decision conflicts with Fincher Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern Bank & Trust Co., Fla.App.1964, 166 So.2d 717, where the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held:

'Florida follows the general rule that the nature, validity and interpretation of contracts are governed by the laws of the state or country where the contracts are made or to be performed. Matters of procedure and remedy in the enforcement of contracts depend upon the forum or the place where suit is brought. See Castorri v. Milbrand, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 563, and cases cited therein.' Fincher Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern Bank & Trust Co., supra at 719.

The only issue before this Court in this case is whether Florida law requires Florida courts to apply Tennessee's statute of limitations.

Statutes of limitations traditionally have been considered procedural matters; as such, the limitation of action law of the forum is applicable. R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 127 (1968); A. Ehrenzweig, Conflicts In a Nutshell § 21 (1965); G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 147--152 (1951); Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 142 (1971).

Because Florida is the forum in this case, the appropriate statute of limitation will be found in Chapter 95, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., entitled 'Limitations of Actions; Adverse Possession.' The chapter contains two possibly applicable provisions, Sections 95.11 and 95.10. The former provides in pertinent part:

'Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows:

'(4) Within four years.--Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter.

'(5) Within three years.--

'(e) . . . (A)n action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing, including an action for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered, and on store accounts.'

Under this section, the complaint was timely; Petitioner had four years in which to commence the tort action and three in which to bring the action sounding in contract. Her complaint was filed less than two years after the accident.

According to F.S. Section 95.10, F.S.A., however, there are times when Florida courts will not apply a Florida statute of limitation, but instead will 'borrow' the statute of limitation of another jurisdiction. That section provides:

'When the cause of action has arisen in another state or territory of the United States, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, no action thereon shall be maintained against him in this state.'

We must determine, then, (1) whether the cause of action arose somewhere other than in Florida and, if so, (2) whether it is barred where it arose. An affirmative answer to both questions will mean the lower courts properly concluded Petitioner's cause of action could not be maintained in this state.

The action arose in one of two states: Florida, where the ticket was purchased and the trip commenced, or Tennessee, where the accident occurred. If it arose in Florida, F.S. Section 95.10, F.S.A., is not applicable and Petitioner's cause can be maintained since it was begun within the period set forth in F.S. Section 95.11, F.S.A. If it arose in Tennessee, however, it is barred since the complaint was not timely filed under that state's statute of limitations, which provides:

'Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, criminal conversation, seduction, breach of marriage promise, and statutory penalties, shall be commenced within one (1) year after cause of action accrued.' Tenn.Code Ann. § 28--304 (1955).

While Tennessee has a six-year statute of limitations governing contract...