Colin v. Altman
| Decision Date | 20 June 1972 |
| Citation | 333 N.Y.S.2d 432,39 A.D.2d 200 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Application of Henri COLIN, Petitioner-Respondent, for a Judgment under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, v. Benjamin ALTMAN, Commissioner, Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Abraham A. Katz, New York City, of counsel (Katz & Katz, New York City, attorneys), for petitioner-respondent.
Morton Fried, New York City, of counsel (Harry Michelson, New York City, on the brief; Daniel W. Joy, New York City, attorney), for respondent-appellant.
Before STEVENS, P.J., and MURPHY, STEUER, EAGER and CAPOZZOLI, JJ.
The petitioner herein sought a certificate of eviction for the tenant of an apartment in the building located at 130 West 112th Street. Respondent Rent Commissioner denied the request. This action to review that determination in an article 78 proceeding followed. Special Term granted the petition.
The building is owned by 130 West 112th Street Corp., all the stock of which is owned by the petitioner. Petitioner claimed he desired the apartment for his own use. Respondent denied the application on the ground that petitioner had no standing to obtain a certificate of eviction. We believe the respondent to be correct in that ruling. No other question is involved.
The right to evict a statutory tenant is governed by Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations section 55.a, which in pertinent part reads as follows: 'A certificate shall be issued where the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of a housing accommodation because of immediate and compelling necessity for his own personal use and occupancy, or for the use and occupancy of his immediate family . . .' Petitioner directs attention to other sections of the Regulations where the word 'landlord' is used or defined to include a corporate landlord. Such sections have no relevance. It must be obvious that the landlord referred to above is an individual owner as distinct from other legal entities. A corporation has no compelling necessity to occupy housing accommodations, nor does it have a family, immediate or otherwise. The section is limited to individual landlords (Reconstruction Syndicate, Inc. v. Sharpe, 186 Misc. 897, 61 N.Y.S.2d 176). The same interpretation is given to owner occupancy as a requisite for decontrol (Matter of Borcha, Inc. v. Weaver, 6 A.D.2d 835, 175 N.Y.S.2d 932).
A distinction is sought to be made because the petitioner is the sole stockholder. In this...
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Gregory v. Garrett Corp.
... ... Compare, e.g., Colin v. Altman, 39 A.D.2d 200, 202, 333 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (1st Dep't 1972) ("The corporate veil is never pierced for the benefit of the corporation or ... ...
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Bank of America Corp. v. Lemgruber
... ... See, e.g., Colin v. Altman, 39 A.D.2d 200, 202, 333 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (1st Dep't 1972) ("The corporate veil is never pierced for the benefit of the corporation or ... ...
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Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc.
... ... While the defendants assert that a corporation may never pierce its own veil in this state (see, Colin v. Altman, 39 A.D.2d 200, 201, 333 N.Y.S.2d 432), there is an obvious difference between an "alter ego" action brought by a Liquidator or Receiver ... ...
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Musico v. Champion Credit Corp.
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