Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., Civil No. 95-1091 (DRD).

• Citation: 957 F.Supp. 349
• Decision Date: 31 January 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. 95-1091 (DRD).
• Parties: Diana COLLAZO-SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 349

957 F.Supp. 349

Diana COLLAZO-SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil No. 95-1091 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 31, 1997.

Jorge M. Suro-Ballester, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.

Antonio Gnocchi-Franco, Hato Rey, PR, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

After a short trial, on August 2, 1996, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant Toyota Motor Corporation strictly liable, under the risk/utility balancing test, for plaintiff Diana Collazo-Santiago's injuries. Damages were set at thirty thousand dollars ($30,000). The Court entered judgment for Ms. Collazo on August 14, 1996.

Soon afterwards, Toyota filed a motion, characterized as both a renewed motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law and as a motion to alter and/or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, setting forth seven different arguments as grounds to reopen the earlier judgment and direct the entry of judgment in its favor as a matter of law (Docket No. 40).¹ Toyota contends first, that "the plaintiff's action is preempted by the comprehensive federal regulations governing the design feature she alleges to be `defective;'" second, that "the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of causation under the risk-utility balancing test"; third, that "the verdict in this case is contrary to the weight of the evidence due to the fact that defendant proved on the risk-utility balancing test that the benefits of the design outweigh, by far, any possible risks"; fourth, that "this court's ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on spoliation of evidence crippled [Toyota's] defense in this case"; fifth, that "the ruling of the court allowing the use of the second prong of the Barker² test in this case is contrary to the law of Puerto Rico and highly prejudicial to defendant"; sixth, that "the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction"; and seventh, that "the judgment should be amended pursuant to Rule 59(e) to include the deductions established by Law Number 138 known as the Automobile Accident Compensation Act of Puerto Rico (ACAA)."

I. Standard for Entering Judgment as a Matter of Law

The rule applicable to this motion is Rule 50, which provides, in pertinent part, that:

[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). As a general matter, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1991 amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 state that "[a]ction taken under [Rule 50] is not an intrusion on any responsibility for factual determinations conferred on the jury by the Seventh Amendment," and that the amendments "[aim] to facilitate the exercise by the court of its responsibility to assure the fidelity of its judgment to the controlling law, a responsibility imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Fed. R.Civ.P. 50 advisory committee notes.

Correspondingly, in evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, "[t]he evidence and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant.... A verdict may be directed only if the evidence, viewed from this perspective, `would not permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the plaintiff[ ] on any permissible claim or theory.'" Andrade v. Jamestown Housing Authority, 82 F.3d 1179, 1186 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Murray v. Ross-Dove Co., 5 F.3d 573, 576 (1st Cir.1993)). The Court notes that even though "[i]f there is conflicting testimony on a material issue, the court may not grant judgment as a matter of law," nevertheless "the jury is required to believe, and the judge may therefore accept as true on a motion, uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence from disinterested witnesses." 9A Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2527 at 282-83, 286 (1995) (emphasis added). Similarly, a reasonable jury may not base a finding of fact on a mere scintilla of evidence; something more is required. Id. § 2524, at 252-53.

II. Analysis

As noted above, Toyota has challenged a number of the Court's decisions in this case, from the Court's ruling requiring the application of the Barker risk-utility test, to the Court's particular application of that test, to the Court's statements regarding the probability of finding a causal link between the air bag and Ms. Collazo's injuries. The Court will evaluate these arguments seriatim.

A. First Objection: Preemption of Plaintiff's Tort Cause of Action by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards

Defendant Toyota Motor Co. reiterates its argument that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 preempts any possible Puerto Rico tort law actions based on the allegedly defective design of the air bag. Toyota's arguments have already been considered and rejected, and therefore require at this point little more than a recapitulation of the reasons for their rejection.

The preemption provision at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:

(b) Preemption. — (1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle ... only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.

49 U.S.C.A. § 30103(b)(1) (1997) (boldface in original).³ The Court notes that the preemption provision refers to standards of performance and not to the specific design of vehicle protection systems. "A performance standard establishes a test for a certain aspect of a vehicle's performance, without mandating how the vehicle should be designed to comply with the test." Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 416 (1st Cir. 1988). By requiring compliance with safety standards rather than imposing particular designs, Congress intended to give the manufacturers of motor vehicles free rein to design better safety systems. Id. at 416 n. 22 ("Congress preferred performance standards rather than design standards because `performance standards are ... not intended or likely to stifle innovation in automotive design.'") (Citations omitted).

That Congress allowed manufacturers leeway to come up with their own air bag designs does not mean, however, that Congress intended to exempt manufacturers from tort liability in all cases arising from faulty air bag designs, as evidenced by the "savings" clause at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e):

(e) Common law liability. — Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.

49 U.S.C.A. § 30103(e) (1997) (boldface in original).⁴ See Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.1985) (compliance with federal minimum safety standards does not exempt manufacturers from common law strict liability); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (same); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957-58 (3d Cir.1980) (same).

Admittedly, as a general matter "state damages awards based on tort liability can have a regulatory effect," and be impliedly preempted by Section 30103(b), when they conflict with federal laws and regulations. Perry v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412-14 (1st Cir.1988). Thus, when federal law gave manufacturers the choice whether or not to install air bag systems, a number of courts held that Section 208 implicitly preempted any state tort liability for a manufacturer's failure to install air bags. See Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir.1996); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826-28 (11th Cir.1989); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412-14.

However, as noted above, compliance with performance criteria does not immunize manufacturers from common law liability arising from any defects in the production or design of their passive restraint systems. Indeed, as one Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "it would not conflict with Congress' objectives and methods if [Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc.] were found liable in tort for failing to design its air bags to perform in a manner that effectively exceeds the federal minimum standards," because such liability does not conflict with federal law insofar as it "[does] not remove or require any particular choice, or otherwise frustrate `flexibility' that the federal scheme provides." Perry v. Mercedes Benz, 957 F.2d at 1264-65 (emphasis in original). Cf. Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d at 402 n. 10 ("We, of course, do not imply that section 1392(d)'s prohibition immunizes the manufacturer from liability for defective design of an air bag.") (emphasis added). Thus, to sum up, federal law preempts state tort liability only where such liability would be premised on the very performance standards mandated by federal law; conversely, where federal law allows a choice of design, any defects in the chosen design will be subject to state tort liability.

An air bag was installed in the 1994 Toyota Corolla that is the subject of this case. An air bag is defined by regulation as an inflatable restraint system that is activated in a crash. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.5.1(b). Pursuant to S4.1.4.1, passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, but before September 1, 1996, must comply with S4.1.2.1, which requires that the...