Colleton v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:08-cr-00581-DCN,No. 2:12-cv-03081-DCN,2:08-cr-00581-DCN,2:12-cv-03081-DCN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | NATHANIEL COLLETON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
This matter is before the court on petitioner Nathaniel Colleton's ("Colleton") motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Colleton's request for relief.
On June 22, 2009, Colleton pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and to distribution of heroin resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of another person in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. While on bond for these charges, Colleton was arrested again for distributing heroin and charged in a separate indictment. On October 13, 2010, he pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin while released pending sentencing in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 3147.
On May 3, 2011, the court sentenced Colleton to 324 months imprisonment and four years supervised release. Judgment was entered on May 10, 2012. Colleton appealed his sentence on May 17, 2011, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed his sentence on March 8, 2012. On October 24, 2012, Colleton filed the current § 2255 Petition alleging that his attorney, Dale Thomas Cobb, Jr. ("Cobb"), rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The government moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on May 21, 2013. Colleton filed a response on July 24, 2013. On February 1, 2016, Colleton filed a supplemental motion to set aside his sentence. On February 19, 2016, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing to address the merits of Colleton's petition.1 The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the court's review.
Colleton proceeds under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
The government filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. If, on a motion to dismiss, the court considers matters outside of the pleadings, such as a party's supporting memoranda and attachments, the court treats the motion as one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly precludethe entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. Because, in this case, the court considers matters outside the pleadings, it treats the government's motion as one for summary judgment.
Colleton's petition asserts the following three grounds for relief, all of which allege ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) Colleton's attorney failed to properly advise him that he could suppress his pre-Miranda statements, failed to advise him regarding plausible defenses, and failed to properly investigate; (2) Colleton's attorney failed to move to suppress the pre-Miranda statements; and (3) Colleton's attorney failed to advise him on alternatives other than pleading guilty. In his memorandum in support of his petition, Colleton alleges additional incidents of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that his counsel failed to: explain that the government carried the burden proof; give him an opportunity to review the discovery materials; and advise him of the facts uncovered during the underlying investigation. The court will address these claims below, in a consolidated fashion.
Colleton contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that had he received effective assistance, he would not have pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), announced a two-part test fordetermining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. "To establish cause for [a] default based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, [petitioner] must show that [his] attorney['s] performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that [he] suffered prejudice as a result." United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
Under the performance prong, a lawyer's performance is deficient when his representation falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness," as measured against "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. "[T]he reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct" is judged "on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 690. "To guard against hindsight bias and unfair 'second-guess[ing],' a defendant must overcome 'a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The order in which the court addresses the performance or prejudice prong is inconsequential, and the court need not address both prongs if the defendant fails to sufficiently show either. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
However, the relevant inquiry regarding prejudice for Colleton's claims is not whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could convict Colleton, but rather whether he would have pleaded guilty had he received effective assistance. Colleton must demonstrate that, but for Cobb's alleged errors, there is a reasonableprobability that he would not have pleaded guilty. See Rowsey v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 3d 585, 597 (E.D. Va. 2014) . "The Supreme Court has specified, furthermore, that such an individual 'must convince the court' that such a decision 'would have been rational under the circumstances.'" United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485). "The challenger's subjective preferences, therefore, are not dispositive; what matters is whether proceeding to trial would have been objectively reasonable in light of all of the facts." Id. (emphasis added).
As a practical matter, it is difficult for a petitioner to prove that he would not have pleaded guilty had he received effective assistance. Courts addressing the issue usually analyze the petitioner's own statements and stipulations in pleading guilty, for example statements and other evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Rowsey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 600 ().
Colleton first argues that he received ineffective assistance because Cobb did not afford him the opportunity to review the government's discovery materials or notify himof the underlying facts of the investigation and failed to offer "any advice of a plausible defense." Pet'r's Pet. 5, 10. Colleton asserts that Cobb's actions deprived him of a "plausible defense" to his charges. Id. at 10. Specifically, Colleton asserts that the government's discovery materials revealed that the victim's friend and the friend's brother decided to abandon the victim in his vehicle after he had overdosed rather than seek medical attention. Id. at 11. Thus, Colleton argues, other people were actually responsible for the victim's death. Id. He contends that this information would have provided him a defense to the charge to which he pleaded guilty—the distribution of heroin resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of another person in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Id. Colleton's violation of this statute subjected him to a twenty-year minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) ().
Contrary to Colleton's assertions, his counsel avers that he and Colleton "met multiple times to discuss and review discovery as it became available." Cobb Aff. ¶ 6. Cobb also testified during the evidentiary hearing that he...
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