Collier v. Brent, CA
| Citation | 266 Ark. 1008,589 S.W.2d 198 |
| Decision Date | 24 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. CA,CA |
| Parties | Gaither White COLLIER et al., Appellants, v. Albert BRENT, Appellee. 79-129. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arkansas |
Hale, Fogleman & Rogers, West Memphis, for appellants.
Nance, Nance, Fleming & Wood, West Memphis, for appellee.
This case was appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court and was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 29(3).
The appeal is from a decree of the Crittenden County Chancery Court quieting title to 146.84 acres of land in Crittenden County in Albert Brent, appellee, against appellants who are the children or successive descendants of W. E. White, who died in 1962 and was survived by Arrenner White and seven children by a former marriage.
Mr. White left a will, which was duly probated, leaving all real estate, not specifically devised, to his widow and children as life cotenants with the remainder to his grandchildren and successive descendants living at the date of death of the various life tenants.
Arrenner White married appellee, Mr. Brent, in 1963 and died intestate in 1973 leaving him as her sole heir at law.
Appellee alleged in his complaint to quiet title that he acquired title from his wife, Arrenner White Brent, under the law of intestate succession. The deeds by which title to the land in dispute was acquired in 1939 conveyed title to the disputed land to W. E. White and Arrenner White, his wife, and title was so held at the time of the death of Mr. White.
Appellants urge three points for reversal of the decree quieting title in Mr. Brent and these will be separately discussed.
Appellants contend that the court erred in holding Mrs. Brent did not waive and abandon title.
Appellants cite Sirmon v. Roberts, 209 Ark. 586, 191 S.W.2d 824 (1946). The case as to waiver involves only a waiver of a right to receive written notice of intention to terminate a teacher's contract. We do not accept the case as authority for waiving or abandoning an interest in real estate.
Appellants also cite Helms v. Vaugn, 250 Ark. 828, 467 S.W.2d 399 (1971). The case holds that one cannot divest himself of title to land by abandonment alone and that for abandonment to be effective there must not only be an intent on the owners part to relinquish his claim, but the intent must be accompanied by circumstances of estoppel and limitation, if the abandonment is not by a legal instrument of conveyance.
There was evidence offered that Mrs. White had made statements before and after the death of Mr. White that she did not want the land in question and the record shows the executor failed to take the marital deduction credit for the value of the land in the estate tax return by showing that this land passed to the widow. The land was included in Mr. White's estate tax return at a valuation of $30,000.00 but the return failed to claim the land as being a part of the marital deduction. This resulted in additional estate taxes in the aggregate amount of $8,669.93. The tax was paid out of the assets of the estate before distribution to appellants and they contend the appellee, who now stands in the shoes of his predecessor, Arrenner White Brent, is estopped to claim the land because of disadvantages they say they suffered by reason of the larger estate taxes. We find and hold the evidence does not establish this extra tax burden was caused by Mrs. White. The estate tax return was the responsibility of Mr. Bird, the executor nominated in the will of Mr. White. Also, it is noted that Mrs. White did include the substantial rentals she received from this land during her eleven years of life after the death of Mr. White in the net distribution of rents she shared with appellants. They received seven-eighths of the net rentals from the land in dispute, along with other rents from estate lands, whereas Mrs. White as sole owner was entitled to receive all of the rent from the land in dispute. We are unable to say that appellants have in any way been disadvantaged by any actions of Mrs. White, even though they might be disappointed in that she never did execute any...
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...to one who has in good faith relied upon action, representations or conduct of another to his detriment. Collier v. Brent, 266 Ark. 1008, 589 S.W.2d 198 (Ark.App.1979); Hester v. Chambers, 264 Ark. 941, 576 S.W.2d 195 Defendants argue that, in any event, there was "good cause" for plaintiff......
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...of one party resulting from the conduct of another. Davidson v. Sanders, 235 Ark. 161, 357 S.W.2d 510 (1962); Collier v. Brent, 266 Ark. 1008, 589 S.W.2d 198 (Ark.App.1979). We cannot find, and appellant has not pointed out to us, an inequitable circumstance which resulted from delay on the......
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