Collier v. Buckner

• Citation: 303 F.Supp.3d 1232
• Decision Date: 27 March 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:15-CV-256-WKW
• Parties: Tonya COLLIER, Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, R.L.P., a minor who sues by his mother and next friend, L.S.M., Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders, Plaintiffs, v. Nancy BUCKNER, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Kim Mashego, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as Director of the Shelby Department of Human Resources Corrine Matt, in her individual capacity, Leslie Henderson, in her individual capacity, Sara Haag, in her individual capacity, Katie Walter, in her individual capacity, and Toni Dollar, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as a supervisor for the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

303 F.Supp.3d 1232

Tonya COLLIER, Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, R.L.P., a minor who sues by his mother and next friend, L.S.M., Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders, Plaintiffs,

v.Nancy BUCKNER, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Kim Mashego, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as Director of the Shelby Department of Human Resources Corrine Matt, in her individual capacity, Leslie Henderson, in her individual capacity, Sara Haag, in her individual capacity, Katie Walter, in her individual capacity, and Toni Dollar, in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as a supervisor for the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:15-CV-256-WKW

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed March 27, 2018

James V. Green, Jr., James V. Green, Jr., PC, Alabaster, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Larry Allen Lynn, Jr., Alabama Dept. of Human Resources, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. Keith Watkins, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Tonya Collier, Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, R.L.P., Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders allege that Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") officials deprived them of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed several state law torts. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of DHR placing their names on a Central Registry that catalogues the outcome of child abuse allegations, disclosing information from the Central Registry to third parties, and failing to provide Plaintiffs with due process hearings to challenge the information on the Central Registry. Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. # 31), which is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

II. INDEX

This Memorandum Opinion is necessarily lengthy for three reasons: less than stellar pleading, less than stellar briefing by all parties on the motion to dismiss, and unduly complicated applicable law. The last reason is likely a partial cause of the first two.

The claims of the six Plaintiffs share some legal and factual issues and concern some of the same Defendants. However, not all Plaintiffs assert claims that arise out of the same transactions and occurrences, and, in many instances, not all Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the same legal standards. Not all of the seven Defendants are implicated in every claim of every Plaintiff. Some defenses apply to multiple counts in the amended complaint; some counts in the amended complaint are the target of multiple defenses; and some defenses are pertinent to only some Defendants.

To avoid the impossible exponential burden of considering each defense in the context of each relevant claim by each relevant Plaintiff against each relevant Defendant, the court limited its analysis by first determining which claims survive the most broadly applicable defenses, then considering more narrowly applicable defenses only with respect to claims that survived the broader analysis. Further, the court considered only defenses to claims that had not already been eliminated at an earlier point in the analysis. As a result, many of Defendants' numerous defenses are not discussed in this Memorandum Opinion because they pertain to claims that are due to be dismissed on other grounds.

To aid the reader, the following index is provided:

I. INTRODUCTION...1238

II. INDEX...1239

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE...1240

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW...1240

A. Rules 8(a) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...1240

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim...1241

V. LEGAL CONTEXT...1241

III. FACTS...1244

A. Plaintiff Tonya Collier, a Teacher and Day Care Worker...1244

B. Plaintiffs Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, and R.L.P.: Non-educator Plaintiffs With "Indicated" Dispositions...1245

1. Plaintiff Alexander's "Indicated" Disposition ...1246

2. Plaintiff Lowrey's "Indicated" Disposition ...1246

3. Plaintiff R.L.P.'s "Indicated" Disposition ...1247

C. Plaintiffs Alexander, Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders: Non-educator Plaintiffs With "Not Indicated" Dispositions...1247

IV. DISCUSSION...1248

A. The Amended Complaint...1248

B. Jurisdictional Considerations: Mootness, Standing, and Ripeness...1249

1. Mootness: Plaintiff Collier ...1249

2. Jurisdictional Issues Concerning Claims Arising From "Indicated" Dispositions of Non-educator Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. ...1249

i. Claims for Monetary Damages Connected with "Indicated" Dispositions of

Non-educator Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. ...1249

ii. Claims for Prospective Relief of Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey Against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar With Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions ...1250

iii. Claims for Prospective Relief Against Defendants Buckner and Mashego with Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions of Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P.—Constitutional (Article III) Standing ...1251

iv. Claims for Prospective Relief Against Defendants Buckner and Mashego with Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions of Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P.—Prudential Standing ...1255

3. Standing as to Plaintiffs with "Not Indicated" Statuses: Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders ...1257

C. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel: Plaintiff Lowrey's Remaining Claims...1257

D. Statute of Limitations: Plaintiff Collier's Claims for Monetary Relief and Plaintiff R.L.P.'s Claim for Prospective Relief...1259

1. Plaintiff Collier's Claims for Monetary Relief ...1259

2. Plaintiff R.L.P. ...1260

E. Count I...1261

F. Count II...1262

G. Count III...1263

1. Policy of Refusal to Schedule Hearings Upon Request; Policy Resulting in Failure to Forward Hearing Requests to the Office of Administrative Hearings ...1263

a. Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. ...1263

i. What Process is Due ...1263

ii. Whether Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. Allege Injury to a Constitutionally Protected Interest ...1265

b. Plaintiff Collier ...1267

i. What Process is Due ...1267

ii. Supervisor Liability of Defendants Buckner and Mashego ...1268

2. Policy of Informing Those Requesting Hearings that They Are Only Entitled to a Record Review; Policy of Failing to Provide Information Regarding Methods For Challenging DHR Findings ...1269

3. Introduction of Evidence of Dispositions in Juvenile and Family Courts ...1270

4. Failure to Establish Adequate Expungement Procedures ...1270

5. Failure to Provide Adequate Training and Supervision in Investigation and Initial Dispositions of Child Abuse Reports ...1270

6. Failure of DHR Social Workers to Forward Hearing Requests ...1271

H. Count IV...1271

I. Qualified Immunity and Plaintiff Collier's § 1983 Claims for Monetary Relief...1272

J. Count V—State Law Negligence and Wantonness Claims...1274

K. Count VI...1277

L. Count VII...1277

M. Counts VIII and IX...1279

N. Count X...1279

V. CONCLUSION...1280

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are not contested.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rules 8(a) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

"[T]he district court's inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits ... in some circumstances includes the power to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). In exercising that discretion, the court is mindful of the overarching principle that "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).

Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 10(b) requires the following:

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must be stated in a separate count or defense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Rules 8(a) and 10(b) are not intended to serve as a difficult hurdle requiring pleading perfection. Instead, they impose a minimum, common sense drafting requirement. A complaint must simply be sufficiently

"discrete[ ] and succinct[ ] so that [the defendant] can discern what [the plaintiff] is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not."

Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1320 (quoting T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. , 760 F.2d 1520, 1544 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. , 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

V. LEGAL CONTEXT

With certain exceptions not applicable in this case,...