Collier v. Harris

• Decision Date: 05 August 2015
• Docket Number: G048735
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Julie COLLIER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Patrick HARRIS, as Executor, Etc., Defendant and Appellant.

240 Cal.App.4th 41

192 Cal.Rptr.3d 31

Julie COLLIER, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Patrick HARRIS, as Executor, Etc., Defendant and Appellant.

G048735

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Filed August 5, 2015

As Modified September 1, 2015

Petition Denied December 9, 2015

Sall Spencer Callas & Krueger, Robert K. Sall and Michael A. Sall, for Defendant and Appellant.

Ostendorf Tate Barnett and Wayne P. Tate, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

ARONSON, J.

Defendant and appellant Chris Korpi¹ and plaintiff and respondent Julie Collier were active supporters of competing candidates in a local school board election. To educate voters about the candidates he supported, Korpi registered Collier's name and the name of an advocacy group she formed as domain names, and then redirected all Internet users who visited those Web sites to the Web sites for the candidates he supported. Collier filed this action against Korpi, alleging he registered the domain names and illegally used them to mislead the public into thinking she supported his candidates.

Korpi moved to strike Collier's complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 ),² which requires a plaintiff to present evidence establishing a probability of prevailing on the alleged claims if the defendant first shows the conduct on which the claims are based arose from constitutionally-protected free speech or petition activities. The trial court denied Korpi's motion because it found he failed to show Collier's claims arose from free speech activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Although the court acknowledged political commentary is the quintessential form of free speech, it concluded Korpi's conduct in registering the domain names and redirecting Internet traffic did not further Korpi's free speech rights. We disagree.

To be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the conduct on which the challenged claims are based does not have to constitute free speech. Rather, the conduct need only help to advance or assist a person in the exercise of his or her free speech rights. Registering the domain names and redirecting Internet users to the other Web sites assisted Korpi in exercising his free speech rights because those acts provided him with additional forums to reach the public with information about the school board candidates. The statute required nothing more.

Regardless of whether Korpi's conduct advanced or assisted him in exercising his free speech rights, Collier contends the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect Korpi's criminal impersonation of another to deceive the public. Ordinarily, courts do not consider the alleged impropriety of the defendant's conduct until the second stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis, where the court must determine whether the plaintiff presented evidence establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits. The propriety of the defendant's conduct, however, may be considered in the first stage if the defendant concedes or the evidence conclusively establishes the defendant's conduct was criminal as a matter of law. It is not enough that the defendant's conduct violated a civil statute; the defendant's conduct must be criminal to deprive the defendant of the broad protection the anti-SLAPP statute provides for free speech and petition activities. As explained below, Korpi does not concede his conduct was criminal and Collier failed to offer evidence establishing Korpi's conduct was criminal as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Korpi's motion without determining whether Collier's evidence established the requisite probability she would prevail on her claims. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to determine whether Collier met her burden on the anti-SLAPP statute's second prong. Our conclusion on the first prong that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to Korpi's conduct should not be construed as approval of his conduct. The authorities discussed below compel that conclusion. Korpi's conduct still may subject him to liability if Collier can meet her burden on the second stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Korpi was an education activist involved in the politics of the Capistrano Unified School District (District). Although he did not hold a leadership position, he volunteered his time with Capistrano Unified Children First (Children First), a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving the quality of education in the District. Korpi was a vocal supporter of certain candidates during a recall election in 2010 and the regular election in 2012 for seats on the District's board of trustees (Board). The candidates Korpi supported include Gary Pritchard and Carol McCormick.

Collier is a credentialed teacher and parent of two children who attend school in the District. Based on her experience with the District, she formed Parents Advocate League as a resource for parents who believe their local schools are not meeting their children's academic needs. Collier also was a vocal supporter of certain candidates running for the District's Board during the 2012 election. She and Korpi held opposing views on education and she supported candidates attempting to unseat the candidates Korpi supported.

Korpi thought Collier might run for a seat on the District's Board in the upcoming November 2012 election.³ Accordingly, in June 2012, he registered the domain names "www.juliecollier.com" and "www.parentsadvocateleague.com."⁴ He intended to use the domain names to create Web sites that would discuss Collier's qualifications, her relationship with Parents Advocate League, and why he believed voters should not elect Collier. Korpi registered the domain names with GoDaddy.com through an existing, private account he had with Domains by Proxy, LLC. Consequently, Korpi's identity as the registrant was not publicly available. Collier's attorney discovered Korpi was the registrant after writing directly to Domains by Proxy and explaining someone used one of its accounts to register Collier's name as a domain name.

In September 2012, after learning Collier was not running for a seat on the District's Board, Korpi decided to use the domain names to support his candidates in the election. Instead of creating Web sites using the domain names, Korpi used the names to redirect Internet traffic to Pritchard's campaign Web site and Children First's Web site. Whenever a person typed in or clicked on a link to the domain names "www.juliecollier.com" or "www.parentsadvocateleague.com," the person was instantly redirected to Pritchard's campaign Web site or Children First's Web site. Korpi did this to increase the latter's Web site traffic, and to ensure people conducting searches using Collier's name or Parents Advocate League's name would be directed to Web sites containing information about the candidates Korpi supported.

Collier first learned about the domain names and redirection to the other Web sites in mid-October 2012. She promptly hired an attorney to discover who was using the domain names in this manner and to stop the person from doing so. Also in mid-October, a local news reporter contacted Korpi to inquire whether he was using the domain names and causing the redirections. Korpi terminated the redirections and cancelled the domain name registrations after his conversation with the reporter.

In early November 2012, Collier filed this action against Korpi, alleging he registered the domain names and used them to mislead the public into thinking Collier supported Korpi's candidates. The operative second amended complaint alleges causes of action for invasion of privacy, false impersonation ( Pen.Code, § 528.5 ), and illegal use of a domain name ( Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17525, subd. (a) ). Korpi responded by filing a special motion to strike each of Collier's causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion because it concluded Collier's claims did not arise from First Amendment activity. According to the court, Collier's "Complaint is not that [Korpi] commented on anyone's qualifications for public office or expressed an opinion contrary to her own—it is that he obtained domain names and used them to make it appear that his ‘commentary’ came from [Collier ]. That conduct does not arise from conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech." Korpi timely appealed.

II DISCUSSION

A. Governing Anti-SLAPP Principles

"A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party's exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. [Citation.] The Legislature enacted ... section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights." ( Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055–1056, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713 ; see Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 133, 142, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 ( Tamkin ).) Under section 425.16, "[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." ( § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

"To determine whether a lawsuit or cause of action should be disposed of as a SLAPP suit, section 425.16 establishes a two-part test. Under the first part, the party bringing the anti-SLAPP motion has the initial burden of showing that the lawsuit, or a cause of action in the lawsuit, arises from an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or petition—i.e., that it arises from a protected activity. [Citation.] Once the...