Collier v. Judith J. Collier As Sole Dir.
Decision Date | 18 May 2010 |
Docket Number | No. COA09-786.,COA09-786. |
Citation | 693 S.E.2d 250 |
Parties | John S. COLLIER and Bryan Collier, Individually and on Behalf of the Panilla Corporation, Plaintiffs,v.Judith J. COLLIER as Sole Director and Vice President of the Panilla Corporation and Panilla Corporation, Defendants. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 9 December 2008 by Judge James C. Spencer, Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 November 2009.
Tenney & Tenney, LLP by Brian H. Tenney, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellants.
Clifton & Singer, LLP, by Benjamin F. Clifton, Jr., Raleigh, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiffs appeal order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Plaintiffs John S. Collier and Bryan Collier alleged in their 22 January 2008 verified complaint that they are shareholders in the Panilla Corporation (“Panilla”) but have lost their Certificates of Shares (“share certificates”). Plaintiffs further alleged that defendant Judith Collier wrongfully sold real property belonging to Panilla and kept the proceeds for her own personal use. Plaintiffs requested that Panilla be required to bring a claim against Judith Collier to recover the sale proceeds and that their share certificates be reissued to them. On or about 26 March 2008, defendants Judith Collier and Panilla answered plaintiffs' complaint and filed a motion to dismiss. On or about 12 September 2008, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In its 9 December 2008 order the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Ins. Agency v. Leasing Corp., 26 N.C.App. 138, 142, 215 S.E.2d 162, 164-65 (1975) (citations omitted). We therefore do not consider the findings of fact made by the trial court but will review de novo whether summary judgment was properly granted. See
Fairway Outdoor Adver. at ----, 678 S.E.2d at 769; Ins. Agency at 142, 215 S.E.2d 162, 165.
Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs argue there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were shareholders. “A genuine issue is one which can be maintained by substantial evidence.” Board of Educ. of Hickory v. Seagle, 120 N.C.App. 566, 569, 463 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1995) (citation omitted) disc. review improvidently allowed per curiam, 343 N.C. 509, 471 S.E.2d 63 (1996).
(1) The name of the issuing corporation and that it is organized under the law of North Carolina;
(2) The name of the person to whom issued; and
(3) The number and class of shares and the designation of the series, if any, the certificate represents.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 55-6-25(b) (2007). The share certificate must also “be signed (either manually or in facsimile) by two officers designated in the bylaws or by the board of directors[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 55-6-25(d) (2007). Thus, plaintiffs can only prevail by proving that share certificates were actually issued to them in compliance with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 55-6-25. Plaintiffs' only forecast of evidence that share certificates were issued is alleged in their complaint, their answers to defendants' requests for admissions, and Bryan Collier's affidavit; however, both the complaint and answers to defendants' requests for admissions simply repeat the same allegations as Bryan Collier's affidavit and assert no additional evidence that share certificates were issued to the plaintiffs.
We thus turn to Bryan Collier's affidavit which averred that he had seen share certificates issued in the names of himself, his brother John S. Collier, his half-sister, Pamela Marie Collier, his father, and his defendant stepmother. However, Bryan Collier's affidavit fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as it does not “maintain[ ] by substantial evidence” the information needed to prove that plaintiffs were shareholders. Board of Educ. of Hickory at 569, 463 S.E.2d at 280. Even assuming arguendo that eyewitness testimony alone could be sufficient to establish the existence of share certificates, here the affidavit fails to provide necessary information about the alleged certificates. The affidavit does not state the number of shares issued or that the share certificates were signed by two officers as required pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 55-6-25(b), (d). See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 55-6-25(b), (d); Board of Educ. of Hickory at 569, 463 S.E.2d at 280. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges “[t]hat on information and belief the Plaintiffs believing it to be true that Certificates of Shares were issued for Fifty (50) shares to each of the Plaintiffs[.]” However, plaintiffs fail to forecast any...
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