Collier v. Prater

• Decision Date: 11 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 49S02-8910-CV-753,49S02-8910-CV-753
• Citation: 544 N.E.2d 497
• Parties: Robert COLLIER, Appellant, v. M. PRATER and Richie Collins, City of Indianapolis, et al., Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 497

544 N.E.2d 497

Robert COLLIER, Appellant, v. M. PRATER and Richie Collins, City of Indianapolis, et al., Appellee.

No. 49S02-8910-CV-753.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 11, 1989.

Aaron E. Haith, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Marilyn A. Moores, City-County Legal Div., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

Appellant Robert Collier filed suit in Marion Municipal Court for injuries he claimed to have received when he was arrested on July 16, 1985 by two officers from the Indianapolis Police Department. He was subsequently charged with carrying a handgun without a license. I.C. 35-47-2-1. His complaint alleged that appellees Prater and Collins used excessive force in controlling and handcuffing him. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Collier had not given them proper notice as required under the tort claims act. I.C. 34-4-16.5-1 et seq. The trial court granted their motion, and in a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals, affirmed. We grant transfer and reverse.

Collier raises three issues on appeal. He argues that his notice to the appellees of his intent to sue was timely and substantially complied with the statutory requirements, that the Court of Appeals decision was erroneous since its effect was to remove a statutory obligation upon the city to investigate a potential claim against the city, and that the trial court applied an erroneous standard in granting summary judgment and wrongly based its decision on unsworn facts. Because we find that Collier's notice was in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements, we do not reach the other issues raised by him.

The tort claims statute provides that a suit against a municipality is barred unless notice of the claim is given to the governing body within 180 days of the loss. I.C. 34-4-16.5-7. It further provides that the notice must contain a number of details concerning the loss, including the names of those involved, the extent of the loss, the time and place of the loss, the circumstances that brought about the loss, the amount of damages sought and the residence of the person making the claim. I.C. 34-4-16.5-9.

In construing a forerunner of the present law, I.C. Sec. 48-8002 (Burns 1933), this Court has noted that requirements such as these are in derogation of the common law and are to be strictly construed against limitations on a claimant's right to bring suit. Sherfey v. City of Brazil (1938), 213 Ind. 493, 13 N.E.2d 568. In Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis (1970), 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225, again in construing a forerunner to the present statute, I.C. Sec. 48-8001 (Burns 1963), we noted:

The purpose of the notice statute being to advise the city of the accident so that it may promptly investigate the surrounding circumstances, we see no need to endorse a policy which renders the statute a trap for the unwary where such purpose has in fact been satisfied.

Id., 253 Ind. at 479-80, 255 N.E.2d at 229 (emphasis in original). Thus, a notice is sufficient if it substantially complies with the content requirements of the statute. What constitutes substantial compliance, while not a question of fact but one of law, is a fact-sensitive determination. In general, a notice that is filed within the 180 day period, informs the municipality of the claimant's intent to make a claim and contains sufficient information which reasonably affords the municipality an opportunity to promptly investigate the claim satisfies the purpose of the statute and will be held to substantially comply with it.

Accordingly, in Galbreath we held that a notice directed to a city's legal department was sufficient even though the statute required notice to the mayor. Id. Similarly, in Indiana State Highway Commission v. Morris (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 468, we held that the failure of the plaintiff to file a notice with the office of the attorney general as required did not bar a claim where the governmental unit being sued, the state highway commission, sent a copy of the notice to the attorney general. However, where a plaintiff, within the 180 day period, fails to file any notice of an intent to make a claim, actual knowledge of the occurrence on the part of the city, even when coupled with an investigation of the occurrence, will not suffice to prove substantial compliance. Geyer v. City of Logansport (1977), 267 Ind. 334, 370 N.E.2d 333.

The issue of what constitutes substantial compliance where the content of the notice is being challenged has not been squarely before this Court. In City of Indianapolis v. Satz (1978), 268 Ind. 581, 377 N.E.2d 623, the claimant signed an agreement releasing the city of liability and then later filed suit against others involved and then added the city as a party after the notice period had elapsed. The claimant argued that a letter he had written to the city shortly after the incident in question occurred, coupled with the release, constituted substantial compliance with the notice requirements. The claimant's letter, however, was just an ordinary complaint letter that did not state an intent to file a claim; and, because the release was not signed in the presence of representatives from the city's legal department and the claimant's letter did not give the required information concerning the occurrence causing the injury, it was held that the claimant had not substantially complied with the notice statute. Because the...