Collier v. State

• Decision Date: 17 July 1902
• Citation: 42 S.E. 226,115 Ga. 803
• Parties: COLLIER v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

42 S.E. 226

115 Ga. 803

COLLIER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 17, 1902

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The plaintiff in error did not have a fair and impartial trial in the manner contemplated by law, which is guarantied to him by the constitution of this state; and, whether the verdict was or was not supported by the evidence, it must for this reason be set aside. The trial judge erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

Error from superior court, Whitfield county; A. W. Fite, Judge.

Bill Collier was convicted of crime, and brings error. Reversed.

See 41 S.E. 261.

W. C Martin and W. M. Jones, for plaintiff in error.

Sam. P Maddox, Sol. Gen., and Boykin Wright, Atty. Gen., for the State.

LITTLE J.

Collier the plaintiff in error, was indicted, at a special term of Whitfield superior court, for the offense of rape, and was tried and convicted at the same term. He made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.

This motion contains a number of grounds. These, it is not necessary that we should consider and pass on seriatim, for the reason that we have arrived at the conclusion that, for the reasons hereafter given, the accused did not have a fair and impartial trial as guarantied to him by the constitution and laws of this state, and that, without regard to the evidence which was produced on the trial, the verdict must be set aside, and a new trial granted. We therefore confine ourselves to a consideration of those grounds of the motion which present the reasons why the trial which resulted in his conviction cannot be sanctioned by the law. These are two. One of them specifies that during the trial, and while the person said to have been assaulted was testifying in rebuttal to the evidence introduced by the defendant, she became very much excited, and began upbraiding the defendant, and the husband of the witness took hold of a chair in a threatening manner as if to strike the defendant with it, but was seized by an officer, and forced to take his seat. At this point the crowd in the courthouse became very much excited,--got upon the seats,--looking and moving towards where the defendant was sitting. They were commanded by the trial judge to be seated, and this command was, after a little while, obeyed. Subsequently, counsel for the accused moved the court to declare a mistrial on account of this demonstration, and error is assigned on the judge's refusal so to do. Another ground of the motion states, as a reason why a new trial should be granted, that, while the jury was in its room considering the case, a large number of men collected in the courtroom and courthouse yard, swearing, and using threatening language towards the jury, such as: "If the jury does not hang him, we will;" and "We will give the jury until ten o'clock to convict him; and if they don't, we will take him out and hang him."

The first of these grounds was allowed, and approved by the presiding judge. As to the last, the judge stated that he knew nothing of the facts therein stated, but at the hearing of the motion a number of affidavits, on the part of both the state and the accused, were introduced, and read in evidence. Some of these referred to the demonstration which occurred in the courtroom during the trial, and others to the demonstrations which occurred in the courthouse building, and in the yard of the courthouse, during the time the jury had the case under consideration. It is not necessary that the contents of all these affidavits should be set forth. As to the demonstration which occurred in the courtroom during the trial (as to the meaning of which the affiants differ), and as explanatory of its nature, we have selected, and here present, the substance of two,--one made by Mr. McCamy, of counsel for the defendant, the other by Mr. Maddox, the solicitor general, who had charge of the case for the state. In the affidavit of the former the following statement is made: "Deponent was present in court when the lady alleged to have been outraged was put upon the stand in rebuttal of the testimony introduced by the defendant. During the time she was thus on the stand, she grew very much excited, denouncing the defendant very fiercely, turning to him, saying, 'You know you are guilty.' At this time a large portion of the audience, perhaps 200 in number became very much excited, and, as it seemed to deponent, all, or nearly so, came pouring over the benches in a very excited manner, and, it seemed to the deponent, to where the defendant was, and seemed their intention was to then and there lynch the defendant. The judge commanded the crowd to sit down, and rose to his feet and commanded the sheriff to keep order. But if the crowd was reprimanded for their conduct, deponent does not remember. And if the judge said anything to the jury about the demonstration at the time, or any other time, deponent did not hear it." The solicitor general gives his understanding of the matter in the following language: "During the progress of the trial, the husband of Mrs. Georgia McPherson, who is alleged to have been raped, was sitting very near deponent. When Mrs. McPherson became excited, and was denouncing the defendant, using the language which appears in the brief of evidence and in the motion for a new trial, the crowd in the courthouse did not make any demonstration while she was testifying, and until she ceased to testify; and when her husband caught hold of a chair, and was seized by the officer, and made to take his seat, was when the crowd arose, got upon the benches, and made the demonstration complained of. In the opinion of deponent, the demonstration was not against the defendant, and would not have been made but for the conduct of the husband of the state's witness, and it is the opinion of deponent that it was curiosity on the part of the crowd to see what was going on between the officer and the witness, and not a demonstration towards the defendant. When the judge arose, and commanded the crowd two or three times to take their seats, they immediately did so, and as soon as the officers succeeded in seating the husband of the witness. It is the opinion of deponent that if the husband of witness had remained in his seat, and had not made the demonstration towards defendant that he did, and if the officer had not taken hold of him, that there would have been no demonstration from the crowd." Each of the statements of the two gentlemen named is, of course, to be accepted as giving the facts as each respectively understood them; and, so treating them, it is obliged to be conceded that a demonstration on the...