Collin County School Trustees v. Stiff
Citation | 190 S.W. 216 |
Decision Date | 11 November 1916 |
Docket Number | (No. 7773.) |
Parties | COLLIN COUNTY SCHOOL TRUSTEES et al. v. STIFF et al. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Appeal from District Court, Collin County; M. H. Garnett, Judge.
Information by J. H. Stiff and others against the Collin County School Trustees and others, to enjoin a redistricting of school districts in Collin county. From judgment enjoining action by respondents pendente lite, they appeal. Affirmed.
G. R. Smith, of McKinney, for appellants. R. C. Merritt and W. R. Abernathy, both of McKinney, for appellees.
This is a proceeding by the county attorney of Collin county in behalf of the state on information by and at the instigation of the trustees of 48 common school districts in Collin county and of certain taxpayers and patrons of the schools in said districts, to enjoin the county school trustees from concluding a proposed and threatened redistricting of such school districts by disestablishing, consolidating, and rearranging the existing districts. Upon hearing in chambers the trial judge enjoined the respondents as prayed pendente lite. From such action this appeal is perfected.
Any necessary statement of the pleadings or of the facts deducible from the evidence will be appended to our discussion of the several assignments of error.
Appellants' first assignment is that the court erred in not sustaining their general demurrer to appellees' petition. The first proposition thereunder is that the petition omits necessary parties. This proposition is bottomed upon the fact, appearing from the petition, that only 48 of the 137 districts joined in the suit. The contention is that all were necessary parties. It is, as contended, the well-settled rule that all parties, plaintiffs or defendants, necessary to the final disposition of the main issue in a suit should be joined therein. When it appears that such parties have been omitted, it "will require either a dismissal of the suit or a stay of proceedings until such party can be brought in." Townes' Texas Pleading, 288. The inquiry then is, Were the other common school districts necessary parties to this proceeding? Appellants maintain they were under authority of Minear et al. v. McVea et al., 185 S. W. 1048. We are persuaded, however, that that case is without application in this proceeding. The purpose sought in the case cited was to enjoin the collection of certain taxes. Those taxes were levied in order to create a sinking and interest fund, as well as to supplement the state school fund to defray the expense of a school for a common school district created prior to the levy of the tax and the commencement of the suit. The ground upon which the collection of the tax was sought to be enjoined was that the common school district had not been created and established in the manner provided by law. The suit was against the county judge and the county commissioners, who at that time were clothed with authority to create common school districts, while now that authority rests with the county school trustees. General Laws, 34 Leg. c. 36. It was held that since the purpose was the destruction of the common school district and since it was a body corporate, the trustees were necessary parties. The purpose of the present case is not to destroy the common school districts not parties to the suit, but to prevent the destruction of those districts which instituted the suit, and incidentally to maintain the status quo of those which were not parties. Had the other districts been parties they could only have done that which appellees sought to do. In that case they are protected fully by the action of the district judge. If, on the other hand, they desired to support the proposed action of the county school trustees, they were not necessary parties, since those districts which opposed the proposed change would nevertheless be entitled to maintain the suit under the allegations of their petition.
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