Collins v. Brazill

• Decision Date: 25 April 1884
• Citation: 19 N.W. 338,63 Iowa 432
• Parties: COLLINS ET AL. v. BRAZILL
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

19 N.W. 338

63 Iowa 432

COLLINS ET AL. v. BRAZILL

Supreme Court of Iowa, Dubuque

April 25, 1884

Appeal from Polk Circuit Court.

THIS was a proceeding in the court below for the probate of the will of Lizzie Collins. The cause was tried to a jury, and a verdict had for the defendant, which, upon motion of plaintiff, was set aside. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

REVERSED.

Nourse & Kauffman and Williamson & Kavanaugh, for appellant.

Parsons & Runnells, for appellees.

OPINION

BECK, J.

I.

The testator, a young lady of about twenty-one years of age during her last illness, or shortly before her death executed a will, leaving all her property to defendant. The probate of the will was resisted by plaintiffs, a brother and sister of the testator, on the grounds, as we understand the record, of undue influence exerted to induce her to execute the will, and that she did not at the time possess capacity to dispose of her property, on account of the impairment of her mind by reason of her sickness. The plaintiffs demanded a jury, under Code, section 2340, to whom the issues were tried. A verdict was returned for defendant which in effect sustained the will. Thereupon the plaintiffs moved the court to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, on the ground, among others, that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. The court sustained the motion on the ground "that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence," and further holding that "in this special proceeding it is to be treated like a verdict upon issues in chancery, and not like a verdict in an ordinary action at law."

II. We are of the opinion that the court erred in this ruling. To our minds the evidence gives abundant and satisfactory support to the verdict. Indeed, had the finding of the jury been the other way, in our judgment it would have been the duty of the court to set it aside as being in conflict with the evidence, and a refusal to do so would have been an error which we would have corrected. There is not to be found in the record a particle of evidence tending to support the claim that undue influence was exercised inducing the execution of the will. It is true that defendant is a priest of the Catholic church, and that the testator was of that faith, and that she sent for him for the purpose of consulting him in relation to her business affairs, and that he did advise her to make a will, but without a suggestion as to the manner of the disposition of her property. It does not appear that he knew what disposition she made of it by her will until after her death. Another priest attended her to give spiritual direction and consolation, and to administer the last rites of the church; and whatever conversation defendant had with him was such as was consistent with his duty as a priest and a friend, and, surely, had no influence in shaping the testator's conclusion as to the manner of the disposition of her property.

III. The evidence utterly fails to show that the testator, at the time she executed the will, was not possessed of a disposing mind. She was in a feeble condition from a complication of diseases, and at times, when suffering, or when under the influence of opiates or other remedies, appeared to have a confusion of ideas and to wander in her mind; but, when aroused, which was easily done, her mind was clear, and she plainly...