Collins v. Christenberry, 6925SC525
| Decision Date | 19 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 6925SC525,6925SC525 |
| Citation | 6 N.C.App. 504,170 S.E.2d 515 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Phillip Dean COLLINS v. Charles Walker CHRISTENBERRY. |
Byrd, Byrd & Ervin, by Robert B. Byrd and John W. Ervin, Jr., Morganton, for plaintiff appellee.
Smathers & Ferrell, by James C. Smathers, Hickory and Larry W. Pitts, Newton, for defendant appellant.
On this appeal defendant concedes his own negligence but contends nonsuit should have been allowed on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. We do not agree.
It is elementary that nonsuit on the ground of plaintiff's contributory negligence is proper only if plaintiff's evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, so clearly establishes his own negligence as one of the proximate causes of his injury that no other reasonable inference may be drawn therefrom. Anderson v. Carter, 272 N.C. 426, 158 S.E.2d 607; Black v. Wilkinson, 269 N.C. 689, 153 S.E.2d 333; Pruett v. Inman, 252 N.C. 520, 114 S.E.2d 360. Considering the plaintiff's evidence in the present case in the light most favorable to him, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that it does not so clearly establish negligence on his part as one of the proximate causes of his injury that no other reasonable inference may be drawn, and accordingly we hold the trial court was without error in overruling defendant's motion for nonsuit.
It was plaintiff's duty to assist his fellow officers in attempting to stop and apprehend the defendant. In performing that duty he was unavoidably subjected to great personal danger. The duty of a police officer frequently involves danger; such is the nature of his job. Therefore, we are not here concerned with any question as to whether plaintiff acted so as to avoid all risk of personal injury; if he performed his duty, he necessarily incurred some risk. While we agree with the statement contained in defendant's brief that there was 'extreme danger involved in two vehicles touching or bumping each other at a speed of 100 miles per hour,' this extreme danger was primarily of defendant's creation. Given plaintiff's obligation to attempt to stop the defendant, the setting up of a 'running roadblock' may have been the safest method which he could pursue. The only question is whether in performing his duty he exercised such care for his own safety as a prudent man would have exercised in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances. As stated in 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 375, p. 708, the true rule is that 'the standard of care which the law requires is the same for drivers of police vehicles as for drivers of ordinary vehicles, the standard being such care as a prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances.' In the present case it was for the jury to determine whether plaintiff exercised such care as a prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances. Certainly plaintiff's evidence does not so clearly establish his own negligence that no other reasonable inference may be drawn therefrom.
Defendant, however, contends that in setting up the 'running roadblock,' plaintiff violated the provisions of G.S. § 20--151 and was therefore guilty of negligence Per se. G.S. § 20--151 in pertinent part provides:
'The driver of a vehicle about to be overtaken and passed by another vehicle approaching from the rear shall * * * give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on suitable and audiable signal being given by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. * * *'
In support of his contention, defendant points to G.S. § 20--145, which provides that statutory speed limitations 'shall not apply to vehicles when operated with due regard for safety under the direction of the police in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law,' and contends that since there is no similar express statutory exemption from the requirements of G.S. § 20--151, this latter statute was applicable to the plaintiff under the circumstances of this case. We do not agree, however, with defendant's basic assumption that the Legislature, by including the express exemption for police vehicles when operated with due regard for safety in G.S. § 20--145, thereby evidenced an intent that there be no exemption under any circumstances from other sections of the Motor Vehicle Act for police vehicles while being similarly operated. Adoption of defendant's assumption is required neither by reason nor authority and would unnecessarily hinder the State Highway Patrol...
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