Collins v. Ciolli
| Decision Date | 14 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21 C 50193 |
| Parties | Donnie Collins (09305-087), Petitioner, v. A. Ciolli, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Petitioner Donnie Collins, a federal prisoner at USP Canaan,[1] brings this pro se habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his 2014 conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v Collins, No. 3:13-CR-44 (N.D. W.Va.). He contends that he is actually innocent of this offense under the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). (Dkt. 1.) For the following reasons, this Court denies the petition.
In 2013, in a written plea agreement, Collins pled guilty pursuant to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).[2] United States v. Collins, 583 Fed.Appx. 234, 234 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). He was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 188 months in prison. Id. Following conclusion of Collins' criminal case, direct appeal, and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), and held that, in felon-in-possession cases, the government “must prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.” Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021) (citing Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2199-2200) (emphasis omitted). Collins challenges his conviction under Rehaif. (Dkt. 1, p. 2, 6.) He also challenges, in a pleading filed in this Court after his § 2241 petition was fully briefed, computation of his sentence under Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(2). (Dkt. 20.)
At the time of Collins' guilty plea, knowledge of one's felon status was not a required element of a § 922(g)(1) offense under Fourth Circuit precedent. See United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604-07 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Therefore, Collins was not informed of this element at his plea hearing. United States v. Collins, No. 3:13 CR 44 (N.D. W.Va.) (Dkt. 57, p. 11.) Nevertheless, Collins confirmed his understanding of § 922(g)(1)'s other elements, including that the government would be required to prove: (1) he had previously been convicted of “a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year”; (2) that he knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received a firearm; and (3) that possession of that firearm affected interstate commerce. Id. at 11-12.
During the plea hearing, the Government called ATF Special Agent Donald Lockhart to present the factual basis for the guilty plea. Id. at 16-17. Lockhart testified that, based on his research of the defendant's criminal history, Collins had multiple criminal convictions from the state of Maryland that carried penalties of imprisonment for longer than one year. Id. at 18. Collins did not raise any objection to this testimony and declined to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 1819. Upon conclusion of Lockhart's testimony, Collins entered his plea of guilty. Id. at 19.
A presentence investigation report (PSR) was prepared in advance of Collins' sentencing hearing.[3] (Dkt. 17-1.) The PSR listed multiple prior criminal convictions. Id. at 10-16. Among these convictions included three controlled dangerous substance (CDS) crimes in violation of Maryland law. Id. at 12.
The first of Collins' CDS offenses was “CDS - Manufacture/Distribute/Dispense -Narcotic,” involving cocaine on May 13, 2004. Id.; see also Collins v. United States, No. 3:13 CR 44, 2016 WL 6088411, at *6 (N.D. W.Va. July 11, 2016). The second was “CDS -Manufacture/Distribute/Dispense - Narcotic,” involving heroin on June 18, 2004. (Dkt. 17-1, p. 12); Collins, 2016 WL 6088411, at *6. Collins pled guilty to both offenses on October 20, 2004, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with three years suspended, and three years of supervised probation. (Dkt. 17-1, p. 12.) His probation was revoked on June 27, 2007, and his three-year suspended sentence was reimposed. Id. The third CDS offense was for “Attempt - CDS Manufacture/Distribute - Narcotic,” involving heroin on September 6, 2006. Id. at 13; Collins, 2016 WL 6088411, at *6. Collins pled guilty to this offense on April 27, 2007, and was sentenced to one year in prison. (Dkt. 17-1, p. 13.)
The PSR calculated a total offense level of 31 with a criminal history category of VI for Collins. (Dkt. 17-1, p. 10, 16.) His three Maryland CDS convictions qualified as “serious drug offenses” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), thus making Collins subject to the ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence as a career offender. Id. at 12-14, 26. His Guidelines' sentencing range was 188 to 235 months. Id. at 26.
Collins objected to the PSR's finding that he qualified as a career offender. (Dkt. 17-1, p. 37-39.) He argued that his two Maryland CDS offenses, to which he pled guilty on October 20, 2004, constituted only one conviction for one distribution charge, thereby making him “one conviction short of qualifying as an armed career criminal.” Id. at 38. Collins did not otherwise challenge his prior Maryland convictions, nor raised any other objections to the PSR. Id. at 37-39.
The sentencing hearing was continued to allow further investigation on Collins' objection and whether his two 2004 CDS crimes constituted one conviction or two. Collins, No. 3:13 CR 33 (N.D. W.Va.) (Dkt. 45.) After hearing argument from the attorneys at the next hearing, the sentencing court ruled against Collins, finding he had the requisite number of convictions to be an armed career criminal. Collins, 2016 WL 6088411, at *3. The court adopted the findings of the PSR, and Collins did not raise any further objection to these findings. Id. He was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment. Collins, No. 3:13 CR 33 (N.D. W.Va.) (Dkt. 49.)
Collins appealed his conviction, arguing that he was improperly found to be an armed career criminal and that his sentence was unreasonable. Collins, 583 Fed.Appx. at 234. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id.
Collins then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Collins, No. 3:13 CR 33 (N.D. W.Va.) (Dkt. 68.) His § 2255 motion made three arguments: (1) he did not qualify for an ACCA-enhanced sentence; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and at sentencing; and (3) his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. Id. He later supplemented his § 2255 motion to include a claim for relief under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) ( unconstitutional the residual clause under the ACCA). Collins, No. 3:13 CR 33 (N.D.W.Va.) (Dkt. 84.)
The West Virginia federal court denied his involuntary plea claim as procedurally barred and denied his remaining claims on the merits. Collins v. United States, No. 3:13 CR 44, 2016 WL 6088411, (N.D. W.Va. July 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:13 CR 44, 2016 WL 6085895 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 18, 2016). Collins did not appeal.
Collins now seeks to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)'s savings clause to obtain federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1.) He argues the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif entitles him to relief for two reasons: (1) he is actually innocent of the felon-in-possession offense as he did not know he belonged to a category of persons prohibited from possessing a firearm; and (2) the absence of Rehaif's knowledge-of-status requirement in his indictment and guilty plea constitutes structural error and requires automatic reversal of his conviction. (Dkt. 1-1, p. 3) (Collins' Supporting Memorandum of Law); (Dkt. 14, p. 3-5) (Collins' Supplement of Facts and Law in Support of his § 2241 Petition).
Following the completion of the parties' briefing, Collins submitted “new evidence” based on “new intervening change of law” in support of his § 2241 petition. (Dkt. 20.) He claims that it was error to apply Guideline § 2K1.2(a)(2) as his base offense level because Virginia's narcotics statute, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250, is categorically overbroad and does not qualify as a controlled substance offense under this provision.[4] Id. at 1-2.
For the reasons below, Collins cannot properly invoke § 2255(e), and so his § 2241 petition cannot proceed.
“As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in the district of conviction.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2014)). Under § 2255, federal prisoners are limited to only one motion and cannot bring a second motion unless they can satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Section 2255(h) limits second or successive motions to claims of newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish actual innocence and new, retroactive rules of constitutional law that were previously unavailable. § 2255(h)(1)-(2). New rules of retroactive statutory law, however, fall outside the ambit of § 2255(h). Mangine v. Withers, 39 F.4th 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2022); Purkey v. United States, 964 F.3d 603, 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2020).
If a prisoner cannot satisfy § 2255(h)'s gatekeeping provisions, a narrow alternative path to relief may be available under § 2255(e) (the “so-called ‘savings clause'”). Santiago v Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 705 (7th Cir. 2022). Section 2255(e) allows a prisoner to seek habeas corpus relief under § 2241 in his district...
To continue reading
Request your trial