Collins v. City of El Campo
| Decision Date | 25 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-83-528-CV,13-83-528-CV |
| Citation | 684 S.W.2d 756 |
| Parties | D. Wayne COLLINS, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF EL CAMPO, Texas, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Dayle Bebee, Renea Hicks, Advocacy, Inc., Austin, for appellants.
Tom Robins, Victoria, Wilson M. Rutherford and Richard B. Collins, El Campo, for appellees.
Before UTTER, YOUNG and KENNEDY, JJ.
Three sets of plaintiffs (The City of El Campo (City), Subdivision Plaintiffs and Non-Subdivision Plaintiffs) brought suit against appellants to permanently enjoin the use of the Collins' property as a residence for four unrelated, mentally retarded men and their supervising houseparents. The City and the Non-Subdivision Plaintiffs, who own four homes in a neighboring subdivision and within close proximity to the Collins' property, claimed that the use of the residence as a "group home" violated the City's zoning ordinance. The Subdivision Plaintiffs, who own eight homes in the same subdivision, claimed that the use of the residence as a "group home" violated the subdivision's restrictive covenant as well as the City's zoning ordinance. In addition to seeking a permanent injunction, the Subdivision Plaintiffs also sought special damages and attorney's fees for their enforcement of the restrictive covenant.
After a non-jury trial, the trial court found that the use of the Collins' property was in violation of both the zoning ordinance and the restrictive covenant and granted the plaintiffs' request for permanent injunction. The trial court further awarded special damages and attorney's fees to the Subdivision Plaintiffs. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The Collinses are the owners of residential property located in the Weslayan Terrace Subdivision in El Campo, Texas. On August 15, 1982, the Collinses, as lessors, leased their property to the Advisory Board of the El Campo Area Adult Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc., for the purpose of establishing a group home for not more than four mentally retarded adults, plus one supervising couple. In September, 1982, the four unrelated, mentally retarded men, along with their two supervising houseparents, moved into the house on the Collins' property. The same four men, plus their two houseparents, have been living in the home since September, 1982. Even though the four men are free to move out of the home at their discretion, they have chosen not to do so. The evidence indicates that the living arrangement is a permanent and not a temporary one.
The establishment of the home was intended to provide a "home-like" atmosphere within the community for the "the deinstitutionalization" or "normalization" of the four mentally retarded men. The purpose of the home was to use daily living experiences to help the mentally retarded residents learn to live within a normal home-living situation. The evidence shows that the four men and their houseparents reside together in the home and function as a "single housekeeping unit". The houseparents have one bedroom, and two men share each of the other two bedrooms. The household chores, including dusting, sweeping, making their beds, washing clothes, making menus, grocery shopping and preparing meals, are shared among everyone in the home. The household members plan their activities together.
The Collins' house is a single-story brick structure with a large front yard and a fenced-in back yard. It is undisputed that the home structure was designed for use as a "single-family dwelling". Architecturally speaking, the home structure is similar to other "single-family dwelling" structures in the same neighborhood.
At the time of the alleged violation of the City's zoning ordinance, the home was situated within an area zoned by the City as an "R-1" Single-Family Residence District. Section 6 of the City of El Campo Zoning Ordinance, in pertinent part, provided:
Part II. DISTRICT USE AND AREA REGULATIONS
6-1. The regulations set forth in this section or set forth elsewhere in this ordinance when referred to in this section, are the regulations in the "R-1" Single-Family Reidence (sic) District.
Use regulations: A building or premise shall be used only for the following purposes:
A. One Family Dwelling.
Section 2-15 of the zoning ordinance defined a "single-family dwelling" as follows:
2-15. Dwelling, Single-Family: A building designed for or occupied exclusively by one (1) family. (Emphasis added.)
In their first point of error, appellants contend that the zoning ordinance should be interpreted to where the "One Family Dwelling" use regulation of Section 6-1 can be satisfied through one of two alternative ways: the dwelling must be (a) "designed for ... one (1) family" or (b) "occupied ... by one (1) family", pursuant to the definition of the term "single-family dwelling," as set forth in Section 2-15 of the zoning ordinance.
In construing a municipal ordinance, the primary duty of a court is to carry out the intentions of the municipal legislative body. Bolton v. Sparks, 362 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.1962). The same rules apply to the construction of municipal ordinances as apply to the construction of statutes. Mills v. Brown, 159 Tex. 110, 316 S.W.2d 720 (1958). In construing a statute or ordinance, a court must look to the wording of the entire statute or ordinance, not to just one word or phrase therein, in order to determine the underlying intent. Citizens' Bank of Bryan v. First State Bank, Hearne, 580 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.1979); Ex Parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1974); Jackson County Hospital District v. Jackson County Citizens for Continued Hospital Care, 669 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
If the language of the statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, as in the instant case, then the construction of the statute or ordinance which will carry out the manifest purpose of the statute or ordinance should be followed. Citizens' Bank of Bryan v. First State Bank, Hearne, 580 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.1979).
It is clear that the Collins' home meets the definition of a "One Family Dwelling" or "single-family dwelling," as defined in Section 2-15 of the zoning ordinance; however, in accordance with the manifest purpose and the clear intention of the El Campo municipal legislative body behind the enactment of the zoning ordinance, it is not the structure upon but the use of the property within a "R-1" Single-Family Residence District which is restricted. Such manifest purpose and intention are clearly evident from the language of Section 6-1 itself, which, in pertinent part, mandates the following:
Use regulations: A building or premises shall be used only for the following purpose:
A. One Family Dwelling.
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the fact that the Collins' house was "designed for ... one (1) family" does not satisfy the use restrictions of the zoning ordinance, absent the property's actual use as a "One Family Dwelling" or "single-family dwelling." Appellants' first point of error is overruled.
In their second point of error, appellants contend that the use of their property complied with the restrictions of the zoning ordinance because the house was occupied by one "family," as defined in the zoning ordinance. Section 2-18 of the zoning ordinance defined "family" as follows:
2-18. Family: One or more persons occupying a dwelling and living as a single housekeeping unit and doing their own cooking on the premises, as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding, lodging house, or hotel, as herein defined.
There is no requirement in Section 2-18 that the parties occupying a dwelling and living as a "single housekeeping unit" be related by blood or marriage.
While the home may be properly called a "group home," we hold that it is clear that the home does not qualify as a boarding house, lodging house or hotel, as defined in the zoning ordinance, and which are prohibited The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the four unrelated men, who are mentally retarded, plus their two supervising houseparents, constitute a "family," as defined in Section 2-18 of the zoning ordinance. See Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I.1981); Oliver v. Zoning Commission, 31 Conn.Sup. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (1974); Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Department, 66 Ohio St.2d 259, 421 N.E.2d 152 (1981); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn.1981); Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981); Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954); Douglas County Resources, Inc. v. Daniel, 247 Ga. 785, 280 S.E.2d 734 (1981); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967). Appellants' second point of error is sustained.
in a "R-1" Single-Family Residence District. 1
At the time of the alleged violations, a restrictive covenant was imposed upon the lots, including the Collins' property, in Weslayan Terrance Subdivision. The restrictive covenant, in pertinent part, provided:
USE OF LAND
1. Said lot shall be used for residential purposes only, and nothing shall be done thereon which may be or become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood and no part of said premises shall be used for the commercial treatment of tuberculosis or any other contagious or infectious disease ...
1. No more than one family dwelling shall be erected on one lot as per plat of said addition.
2. All necessary or desired garage, servants quarters, laundries, storage buildings and another outbuildings may be constructed subject to the other provisions of these general restrictions.
3. On all residential building lots, no structures shall be erected thereon other than one single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height and a private garage for not more than four cars, servant or guest...
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