Collins v. Collins
| Decision Date | 14 May 1943 |
| Citation | 13 So.2d 445,153 Fla. 10 |
| Parties | COLLINS v. COLLINS. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 8, 1943.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Bayard B. Shields judge.
Warren & Rothstein and A. H. Rothstein, all of Jacksonville, for appellant.
Knight & Knight and Albion W. Knight, all of Jacksonville, for appellee.
The husband prevailed in his suit for divorce and brought an appeal to test the propriety of that part of the final decree ordering him to pay his quondam wife five dollars each month as alimony and two thousand dollars in cash. These provisions coincided with the recommendations of the special master.
Considering the matter of alimony in the light of decisions of this court establishing the rule that it should be determined by the necessities of the one and the abilities of the other, we cannot conclude that the chancellor was at fault in adopting the master's recommendation that this token-award be made; nor have we found that the latter erred in weighing the testimony on this issue.
The requirement that the plaintiff disgorge two thousand dollars was the result of the master's study of contributions of service by the wife to the matrimonial enterprise and of money to the joint bank accounts. Throughout the marriage appellee performed all the cooking and household work including laundering, without help except the occasional services of a charwoman. When the appellant and appellee were married they immediately moved into a home owned and occupied by her parents. About four years later the mother died and after another year passed the father died also. A short time before his death the father deeded the property to appellee upon her promise that she would maintain a room there for the use of her brothers. At the time the home was encumbered by a mortgage which was subsequently paid. The house consisted of three stories. The first, an apartment, was rented at approximately fifty dollars a month; the second and third were occupied by the appellant, the appellee and the members of their families. Thus, during the entire marriage appellant was never put to any expense for house rent. According to the testimony which the master elected to believe the appellant for nearly four years received the income from the apartment, approximating twenty-five hundred dollars. Eventually the appellee collected this rent, but it was used by her to defray the expenses of the home.
When the mortgage, held by a building and loan association, was discharged the appellee received a rebate approximating fifteen hundred dollars and of this she gave five hundred dollars to her husband to be deposited in their joint savings account. Also, while their marriage relationship still existed she sold two shares of stock from which she realized two hundred and thirty dollars and that was likewise deposited. From a fair construction of the evidence it developed that the husband had paid about sixteen hundred dollars on the building and loan mortgage, had invested approximately five hundred dollars on alterations to the house and that the wife had withdrawn two hundred dollars from the joint checking account. At the conclusion of their marriage there remained in the joint checking and savings accounts about thirty-two hundred dollars, all of which the husband appropriated.
It will be seen that the master allowed the appellee twelve hundred and seventy dollars more than she had actually placed in the joint funds but the facts and the circumstances of the case seem thoroughly to justify the conclusion that she was entitled to the additional amount when her contributions are considered and, particularly, when we remember that for more than a decade appellant was relieved of the cost of shelter because he and his wife occupied property for most of that time owned by her, and that for a period of six years the money paid for rental of the first floor of her separate property was either collected by him or used by her for the upkeep of their household.
It is, of course impossible to determine with particularity the debits which should be charged to, and the credits which should be allowed, the husband; however, it seems to us, after a review of all of the testimony relevant to this phase of the case that no injustice was done the appellant by allowing the appellee the sum of two...
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...... Collins v. Collins, 153 Fla. 10, 13 So.2d 445; Jacobs v. Jacobs, Fla.1951, 50 So.2d 169; Kahn v. Kahn, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 367. We have been ......
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...... Collins v. Collins, 153 Fla. 10, 13 So.2d 445. Alimony is not allowed as a vehicle for which to obtain repayment of monies advanced to the husband or ......
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Welsh v. Welsh
...... and the financial ability of the husband to supply the. necessity. Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629, 21. So.2d 145; Collins v. Collins, 153 Fla. 10, 13 So.2d. 445. In a suit for temporary alimony we held that if it. should [160 Fla. 385] be made to appear that the ......
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Bowler v. Bowler
...... . . The special. equities referred to are apparently of the character of those. referred to by this court in Collins v. Collins, 153. Fla. 10, 13 So.2d 445; Markland v. Markland, 155. Fla. 629, 21 So.2d 145. . . Although the case,. as determined by the ......