Collins v. Collins

• Decision Date: 03 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. COA15–481.,COA15–481.
• Citation: 778 S.E.2d 854,243 N.C.App. 696
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Mary J.S. COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. Randy Ray COLLINS, Defendant.

243 N.C.App. 696

778 S.E.2d 854

Mary J.S. COLLINS, Plaintiff,

v.Randy Ray COLLINS, Defendant.

No. COA15–481.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 3, 2015.

Walker & Bullard, P.A., Gibsonville, by Daniel S. Bullard, for plaintiff-appellee.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, Raleigh, by Tobias S. Hampson and K. Edward Greene, for defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Randy Ray Collins ("Defendant") appeals from the trial court's orders awarding post-separation support, alimony, an alimony arrearage, and attorney fees in favor of Mary J.S. Collins ("Plaintiff"). We affirm the order on post-separation support. We reverse and remand the orders on alimony, alimony arrearage, and attorney fees.

I. Background

Plaintiff and Defendant married in 1987 and separated on 6 March 2010. Two children were born of the marriage. On 11 October 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint for post-separation support, alimony, and equitable distribution.

The trial court heard Plaintiff's claim for post-separation support on 25 January 2011 and entered an order on 6 October 2011. The court concluded Plaintiff was a dependent spouse, Defendant was a supporting spouse, and awarded Plaintiff post-separation support in the amount of $2,800.00 per month for thirty months, or until the order was terminated or modified.

The trial court heard Plaintiff's equitable distribution claim in June, July and August 2012 and entered an order on equitable distribution over a year later on 10 September 2013. The court found Plaintiff was entitled to a distributive award in the amount of $119,463.62, and Defendant was entitled to a distributive award of $62,725.93. Included in the property awarded to Defendant was his interest and personal liability in various real estate companies.

The trial court heard Plaintiff's claim for alimony in August and September 2012. Over two years later, on 20 October 2014, the court entered orders awarding alimony to Plaintiff and setting the amount of alimony arrearage Defendant owed. Defendant was ordered to pay alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $4,175.00 per month until the death of either party, or until Plaintiff remarries or cohabitates.

On 31 December 2014, the trial court entered an order allowing Plaintiff to recover her attorney fees of $8,000.00 from Defendant. Defendant appeals from the trial court's orders awarding post-separation support, alimony, alimony arrearage, and attorney fees.

II. Issues

Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) determining Defendant is a supporting spouse and Plaintiff is a dependent spouse entitled to post-separation support; (2) ordering Defendant to pay alimony without determining Plaintiff's income and entering findings of fact, which do not support the conclusions of law to hold Plaintiff is entitled to alimony; (3) determining the amount of Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff; (4) making the alimony award permanent, without providing any reason for the extended duration or manner of payment of the award; and, (5) awarding alimony arrearages and attorney fees.

III. Standard of Review

"[W]hen the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether ... competent evidence ... support[s] the trial court's findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts." Oakley v. Oakley, 165 N.C.App. 859, 861, 599 S.E.2d 925, 927 (2004) (citation omitted). If the court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal, even if there is contrary evidence. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 291, 442 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1994).

Whether a spouse is entitled to an award of alimony or post-separation support is a question of law. Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 379, 193 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1972). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d 888, 894 (2004). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court]." In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citation omitted).

The trial court's determination of the amount of alimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 453, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982). The trial court's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where it "is manifestly unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision[.]" Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 353 N.C. 188, 199, 540 S.E.2d 324, 331 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. Missing Portions of Transcript

One result of the two-year delay in length of time, which elapsed between the hearing and entry of the alimony order, is the recordings of the court proceedings became unavailable.

Defendant's counsel was only able to procure recordings of the 13 August, 14 August and 20 August 2012 proceedings. These transcripts contain only Plaintiff's evidence.

The issues Defendant has raised on appeal pertain to questions of law and whether the trial court's findings of fact support the conclusions, and not the sufficiency of the findings of fact. The parties' briefs and the record before us are sufficient to permit review of Defendant's issues on appeal. These facts show yet another consequence in long delays between dates of hearings and entry of orders.

V. Entitlement to Post–Separation Support

Defendant argues the trial court erred in determining Defendant is a supporting spouse and Plaintiff is a dependent spouse entitled to post-separation support. We disagree.

An award of post-separation support is governed by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–16.2A :

(b) In ordering postseparation support, the court shall base its award on the financial needs of the parties, considering the parties' accustomed standard of living, the present employment income and other recurring earnings of each party from any source, their income-earning abilities, the separate and marital debt service obligations, those expenses reasonably necessary to support each of the parties, and each party's respective legal obligations to support any other persons.

(c) Except when subsection (d) of this section applies, a dependent spouse is entitled to an award of postseparation support if, based on consideration of the factors specified in subsection (b) of this section, the court finds that the resources of the dependent spouse are not adequate to meet his or her reasonable needs and the supporting spouse has the ability to pay.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–16.2A(b) (2013) (emphasis supplied). Subsection (d) of the statute pertains to marital misconduct. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–16.2A(d) (2013).

A dependent spouse is defined as one "who is actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–16.1A(2) (2013). "Actually substantially dependent requires that the party seeking alimony would be actually unable to maintain the accustomed standard of living [established before separation] from his or her own means." Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C.App. 722, 726, 436 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A spouse is "substantially in need of maintenance" if the dependent spouse will be unable to meet future needs even if current needs are met. Id. at 181–82, 261 S.E.2d at 855. The legal principles, which govern alimony awards, "are equally applicable to awards of post-separation support." Crocker v. Crocker, 190 N.C.App. 165, 168, 660 S.E.2d 212, 214 (2008).

An objective determination of the parties' "accustomed standard of living" is central to the trial court's determination on alimony and post-separation support. Id. at 169, 660 S.E.2d at 214. Our Supreme Court has explained the phrase "accustomed standard of living of the parties,"

contemplates the economic standard established by the marital partnership for the family unit during the years the marital contract was intact. It anticipates that alimony, to the extent that it can possibly do so, shall sustain that standard of living for the dependent spouse to which the parties together became accustomed.

Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 181, 261 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1980).

The trial court heard Plaintiff's claim for post-separation support on 25 January 2011, less than a year after the parties separated. The order was not entered until 6 October 2011. The court found Defendant's gross income in 2010 was approximately $156,000.00. His net income was $95,869.00, which equals $7,989.00 per month, but the court found this figure is "lower than actual because it does not consider deductions and exemptions." The court found Defendant earned a gross income of $147,069.00 in 2009 and a gross income of $115,000.00 in 2007. The court did not make any findings of Defendant's income in 2008.

The court found Plaintiff earned a net monthly income of approximately $1,900.00 per month from employment at a retirement center and a restaurant in 2010. The court determined "[t]hat under the circumstances existing at the date of separation, the Defendant was a supporting spouse and the Plaintiff was a dependent spouse. This is also currently the case."

The court found:

9. The Plaintiff's current reasonabl[e] monthly needs to live in the lifestyle to which she had become accustomed leading up to the date of separation is approximately $4,000.00 per month. The Defendant's current monthly needs are approximately $4,300.00 per month, not including his payments toward the college education of the parties' emancipated daughter.

The court awarded post-separation support to Plaintiff in the amount of $2,800.00 per month for a period of thirty months, effective November 2010, the month following the filing of her claim for post-separation support.

Defendant argues the order awarding post-separation support is reversible because it fails to: (1) find the parties'...