Collins v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 24 May 2013
• Docket Number: NO. 2011-CA-002105-MR,2011-CA-002105-MR
• Parties: JOHN COLLINS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

JOHN COLLINS APPELLANT

v.COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

NO. 2011-CA-002105-MR

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

RENDERED: MAY 24, 2013

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN JUDGE

ACTION NO. 07-CR-00804

OPINION

AFFIRMING

BEFORE: MAZE, STUMBO AND VANMETER, JUDGES.

MAZE, JUDGE: Appellant, John Wayne Collins, appeals the Clay Circuit Court's denial of his RCr 11.42 motion following his 2010 conviction and sentence for the murder of Stevie Collins and the kidnapping and murder of Christa Wilson. Finding no error on the part of the trial court in its denial of Appellant's motions, we affirm.

Background

The facts surrounding the genesis of this case were best stated by our Supreme Court in Appellant's 2010 direct appeal. Hence, we quote, in relevant part, its recitation of these facts:

On October 10, 2004, Appellant and his girlfriend, Christa Wilson, were visiting Appellant's father, Harold Wayne Collins, and then-stepmother, April Sizemore Collins. Another friend, Natasha Saylor, was also present. Everyone was on the porch of the home, visiting and drinking, when Stevie Collins pulled into the driveway, exited his vehicle and approached the porch. Stevie Collins extended an invitation for them to accompany him to church, and Appellant's father invited Stevie into the house. Appellant's father then shot Stevie in the face, whereupon Stevie fell to the floor and began pleading for his life. Appellant told his father that they could not let Stevie leave there. Appellant's father agreed and instructed Appellant to finish the job. Appellant retrieved his own gun and shot Stevie seven or eight times more, killing Stevie. . . . After the shooting, the group left in three different vehicles and met up again at a relative's house in Henry County . . . .

Meanwhile, police were dispatched to the murder scene. Kentucky State Police Detective, John Yates, one of the investigating officers, testified that one 9mm round was discovered on the front porch and eight SKS rounds were found in the yard on either side of the porch. Later, when Appellant's father was arrested, a 9mm handgun was retrieved from his vehicle. Ammunition fitting the description of the ammunition retrieved from Stevie Collins's body was found in Appellant's vehicle. However, lab results on the weapons were inconclusive.

Although Appellant's girlfriend, Christa Wilson, Appellant's stepmother, April Sizemore Collins, and Natasha Saylor all repeatedly denied any knowledge of Stevie Collins's murder during the initial police investigation, both Natasha and April testified at trial to asubstantially similar version of events, consistent with the factual summary set out hereinabove. Both also testified that they initially lied to the police because they had been threatened not to speak of Stevie Collins's shooting. April had been threatened by her then-husband, [Harold Collins], while Natasha had been threatened by both Appellant and [Harold Collins].

Forty days after Stevie Collins was murdered, the body of Christa Wilson was found face down in a creek. She died from a gunshot wound to the head. Christa had last been seen with Appellant. Paint that was discovered on a rock near Christa's body appeared to have been the result of a vehicle scraping the rock, and Appellant's vehicle appeared to have been damaged in the rear bumper area.

Collins v. Commonwealth, 2008-SC-000107-MR, 2010 WL 2471839 (Ky. 2010).

At the beginning of trial, the Commonwealth made a twenty-minute opening statement in which it recounted for the jury the following:

[During their initial investigation,] police officers did not arrest Harold Collins or John Wayne Collins at that time for this murder. However, they began to ask questions and they immediately knew, because the detective had had the conversation with Harold Collins there and Harold Collins immediately asked for his lawyer . . . and we immediately had reason to know these were the ones involved but no arrests were made . . . .

Later, during Detective Yates's testimony, the Commonwealth asked him what events occurred during his initial investigation of the murder. Detective Yates recalled, among other events, that he encountered Harold Collins at his home and briefly spoke to him. The following testimony ensued:

Det. Yates: [Harold Collins] advised me that he had been out visiting and had returned to his residence and had seen the police and the ambulance and not knowing what was goingon had pulled into his son's residence . . . . Later in the evening, Harold Collins came to his own residence . . . .

Commonwealth: And in fact you - did he tell you that if you wanted to talk to him or his son any more you would have to talk to his lawyer first?

Det. Yates: Yes, sir, that's what he advised me.

Appellant's trial counsel did not object to this exchange. Prior to trial, Harold Collins, who was tried separately, had invoked his right to silence and was unavailable to testify at Appellant's trial.

Following these statements, the aforementioned testimony and the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the murders of Stevie Collins and Christa Wilson. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Appellant appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction. See Collins, supra. Appellant then filed a pro se motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging in an unverified petition that several errors were made by his trial counsel. The trial court appointed counsel for Appellant who filed a supplemental motion asserting several more allegations of ineffective assistance, some of which are raised on appeal and addressed below. After review, the trial court denied Appellant's motion without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The trial court reasoned that the Commonwealth's mention of Harold Collins's statement to Detective Yates, and Detective Yates's testimony to the same, was brief and extremely unlikely to have affected the outcome of the trial given the amount ofother evidence against the Appellant. The trial court further concluded that both of Appellant's attorneys "demonstrated considerable ability." This appeal of the trial court's ruling follows.

Standard of Review

The circuit court's findings regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact and are reviewed de novo. Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008) (citing Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1997)). The reviewing court may set aside the trial court's fact determinations if they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing CR 52.01).

Analysis

"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Id. at 687. The defendant bears the burden of identifying specific acts or omissions alleged to constitute deficient performance. Id. at 690. To prove prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Generally, a reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.

In determining the necessity of a hearing on allegations made in an RCr 11.42 motion, a trial court must find whether there are material issues alleged which cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by examination of the record. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (citing to Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994), and Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967)). "The trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the record refuting them." Id. at 452-53 (citing to Drake v. Commonwealth, 439 F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir. 1971)). Furthermore, where the trial court has denied an RCr 11.42 motion without a hearing, a reviewing court's review is confined to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction. See Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619 (Ky. 2000) (citing to Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967)).

In the present case, Appellant alleges several grounds for his RCr 11.42 motion. His first claims surround the various statements by Harold Collins whom Appellant alleges invoked his right to silence and to counsel and whose statements the prosecution referenced in its opening statement and in testimony from Detective Yates. Appellant argues that his counsel's failure to object to mention of Harold Collins's statements, to object to the testimony regarding that statement and to file motions in limine seeking exclusion of the statement constituted defective performance and prejudiced his defense. Appellant also contends that his trial counsel failed to object to the use of hearsay testimony, and further opened the door to such evidence and was therefore ineffective.

Again, to judge whether trial counsel was ineffective, we must first look to whether Appell...