Collins v. Dunbar

• Decision Date: 03 November 1932
• Parties: COLLINS v. DUNBAR. POLAND v. DUNBAR (two cases).
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

162 A. 897

COLLINS

v. DUNBAR.

POLAND

v. DUNBAR (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 3, 1932.

On Motion and Exceptions from Superior Court, Oxford County.

Separate actions by Helen Collins, Constance M. Poland, and Frances Poland, against Anne Dunbar, which were tried together. Verdicts for plaintiffs. On defendant's motion for new trial, and exceptions.

Motion overruled in each, case; exceptions overruled in cases of Helen Collins and Constance M. Poland; exception to charge sustained in case of Frances Poland; and new trial granted only on issue of damages.

See also 157 A. 381.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, and THAXTER, JJ.

Arthur J. Henry, Peter MacDonald, and George A. Hutchins, both of Rumford, for plaintiffs.

Fred H. Lancaster, of Lewiston, for defendant.

THAXTER, J.

These three cases were tried together. The plaintiff in each was a guest of the defendant, who owned a Hudson sedan, which she was driving on the road between Skowhegan and Bangor. In attempting to make a turn, she drove the car off the road into a bank along the border, and the plaintiffs suffered injuries. After a verdict for each of them, the cases are before us on the defendant's motion for new trials and on exceptions.

The motions must be overruled. The evidence presented a question for the jury both as to the negligence of the defendant and the due care of the passengers. It is not seriously argued by the defendant that the damages awarded are excessive, and there is no basis for granting a new trial on this ground.

The first exception is to the admission of certain testimony. A Mr. Lohnes after the accident took the statement of Frances Poland. Questions were asked different witnesses about his coming to the house. Over objection, they testified to his name, and one of them stated that she thought he was an officer. Defendant's counsel claims that the purport of the whole testimony indicated to the jury that he was a representative of an insurance company, and that its admission was prejudicial. The evidence does not justify any such assumption, and was properly admitted.

Another exception is to the refusal of the presiding justice to direct a mistrial. On the 3d day of the trial, certain newspaper articles appeared which commented on the fact that there had been verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs in a previous trial, and contained, according to the defendant's contention, inaccurate recitals of the evidence being taken out in the trial then under way. The presiding justice examined the jurors in regard to the newspaper articles. Four of them had read them, one of whom said that he read the articles to review the evidence. Each of the jurors, however, claimed that he was in no way influenced by what he had read. The court gave an appropriate warning to the jurors that they must not read newspaper accounts of the trial, and impressed on them the importance of keeping their minds absolutely open on the questions at issue. The court refused...