Collins v. Goord, 05 Civ. 7484(JGK).
| Citation | 581 F.Supp.2d 563 |
| Decision Date | 22 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 05 Civ. 7484(JGK).,05 Civ. 7484(JGK). |
| Parties | Sri Clyde COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. Glenn S. GOORD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Sri Clyde Collins, Rochester, NY, pro se.
Efthimios Parasidis, Donald Nowve, Office of New York State Attorney General, New York, NY, for defendants.
The plaintiff, Sri Clyde Collins, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New York State Department of Correctional Services Commissioner Glenn S. Goord ("Goord"), Fishkill Correctional Facility ("Fishkill") Superintendent William Mazzuca ("Mazzuca"), Fishkill Law Library Administrator Carlton Good ("Good"), Fishkill Law Library Supervisor Colleen Manning ("Manning"), and Fishkill Law Library Supervisor Gene McConnell ("McConnell"). The plaintiff is a former inmate who was incarcerated at Fishkill between March 22, 2005 and August 25, 2005. His Amended Complaint alleged claims for denial of access to the courts, deprivation of property without due process, and retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. On the defendants' motion to dismiss, which was then converted into a motion for summary judgment for the purpose of determining exhaustion, Chief Judge Mukasey dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims except for one of the plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claims and the retaliation claim. See Collins v. Goord, 438 F.Supp.2d 399 (S.D.N.Y.2006). The defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the plaintiff's claims.
The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying the matter that it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Summary judgment is appropriate if it appears that the nonmoving party cannot prove an element that is essential to the non-moving party's case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. T.R.M. Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994). If the moving party meets its initial burden of showing a lack of a material issue of fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The non-moving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993); see also Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir.1998); Singh v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., No. 03 Civ. 5238, 2005 WL 1354038, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005).
Where, as here, a pro se litigant is involved, although the same standards for dismissal apply, a court should give the pro se litigant special latitude in responding to a summary judgment motion. See McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir.1999) () (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). In particular, the pro se party must be given express notice of the consequences of failing to respond appropriately to a motion for summary judgment. See McPherson, 174 F.3d at 281; Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir.1999); Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir.1996); Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir.1994); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988). Express notice of the consequences of a failure to respond was provided to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did file a timely response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, including a declaration by the plaintiff in response to the motion.
The factual allegations in this case are detailed in the prior opinion by Chief Judge Mukasey, Collins, 438 F.Supp.2d at 403-08. Familiarity with that opinion is assumed, and details are recounted here as necessary to decide the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
The events giving rise to the plaintiff's claims began in early 2005, while he was an inmate at Gowanda Correctional Facility ("Gowanda"). On February 22, 2005, the plaintiff was twice observed allegedly committing various prison rule violations by two different corrections officers. (Defs.' Ex. B.) On February 24, the plaintiff was served with two Inmate Misbehavior Reports for the incidents. The plaintiff appeared at a disciplinary hearing from February 27 to March 6 to face the charges against him. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 25; Collins Dep. 26.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found the plaintiff guilty of all of the charges. The hearing resulted in disciplinary sanctions against the plaintiff, including six months of confinement in a Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 1; Collins Dep. 23.) On April 26, the hearing was reviewed and the findings of guilt affirmed on administrative appeal. The plaintiff served the first seventeen days of SHU confinement at Gowanda and then was transferred to Fishkill on March 22. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 29; Collins Dep. 34-35.) The plaintiff remained in SHU the entire time of his confinement at Fishkill until August 25, when he was transferred to Oneida Correctional Facility ("Oneida") by way of Ulster Correctional Facility ("Ulster"). (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 3, 29; Collins Dep. 22-24.) The plaintiff was released from Oneida on June 2, 2006.
On March 18, 2005, while still incarcerated at Gowanda, the plaintiff filed an Article 78 petition in Erie County Supreme Court. The Article 78 petition sought expungement of the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon the plaintiff pursuant to the disciplinary hearing held at Gowanda. The main allegations in the petition are that the respondents violated N.Y. Corrections Law § 138[5] and due process because they failed to provide him with new and contemporaneous copies of the prison rules and regulations books and did not post the rules and regulations in a conspicuous location. (Defs.' Ex. D.)
On April 13, 2005, Justice Townsend issued an Order to Show Cause ("OTSC") to compel Gowanda officials to explain why the penalties arising from the plaintiff's disciplinary conviction should not be expunged from his records. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 4.) The OTSC directed the plaintiff to effect "service of a signed and executed copy of this Order to Show Cause, the petition and any supporting papers . . . upon the named respondents" and upon the State Attorney General on or before April 29, 2005. The plaintiff was required to file proof of service at least eight days before the return date. The OTSC was returnable on June 3, 2005 before Justice Drury in Erie County Supreme Court. The OTSC specified that the matter would be decided "on all papers submitted to the Court prior to said return date." (Defs.' Ex. D.)
While at Fishkill, the plaintiff wrote a letter dated April 18, 2005 ("April 18 letter"), addressed to "Law Library—Fishkill Correctional Facility," requesting advance funds to make six photocopies of the OTSC and other supporting papers, which contained twenty-five pages, to serve upon the respondents. (Pl.'s Ex. A-1; Pl.'s Ex. C-6.) The April 18 letter appears to respond to a memorandum from the Fishkill Law Library, dated April 17, denying an earlier request from the plaintiff for an advance for photocopies.1 The subject line...
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Part 1: complete case summaries in alphabetical order.
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