Collins v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 13 January 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18292,18292
• Citation: 245 S.C. 215,139 S.E.2d 915
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: James L. COLLINS, Respondent-Appellant, v. James Monroe JOHNSON and Queen City Coach Company, Appellants.

Page 915

139 S.E.2d 915

245 S.C. 215

James L. COLLINS, Respondent-Appellant, v. James Monroe JOHNSON and Queen City Coach Company, Appellants.

No. 18292.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 13, 1965.

McEachin, Townsend & Zeigler, Florence, for appellants.

James P. Mozingo, III, D. Kenneth Baker, Darlington, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice:

In this action the plaintiff Collins seeks to recover damages for injuries to his person and property arising out of a collision between his automobile and a bus of the defendant Queen City Coach Company driven by its servant, the defendant Johnson.

Upon the trial of the case the plaintiff introduced in evidence various schedules of the defendant coach company for its buses traveling the same route as that of the bus involved in the accident. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint, which alleged no independent act of negligence on the part of the master, so as to charge the defendant coach company with negligence, recklessness, willfulness and wantonness in scheduling its stops so as to make compliance with applicable speed laws impossible. The court denied this motion to amend, and from this ruling there was no appeal. Timely motions were made by both defendants for nonsuits and directed verdicts but were refused, and the cause was submitted to the jury under a charge, not excepted to, predicating liability of the coach company, if any, solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

The jury returned a verdict as follows:

'We find for the plaintiff actual $2200.00, punitive $25,000.00 against Queen City Coach Company. J. E. Garland, Foreman.'

No objection to this verdict, nor any motion with respect thereto, was made by any of the parties before the jury was discharged. The defendant coach company thereafter moved to vacate the verdict of the jury for punitive damages against that defendant, on the ground that the liability of the coach company, being based only on the doctrine of respondeat superior, could be no greater than the liability of Johnson. Both defendants moved for judgment non obstante veredicto on the same grounds urged in support of their motions for nonsuits and directed verdicts. Additionally, the defendant coach company further moved for a reduction in the amount of punitive damages awarded, failing its other motions, upon the ground that the same was excessive.

Thereafter, the trial judge filed an order wherein he construed thr foregoing verdict as being for actual damages against both defendants in the amount of $2200, in the light of his charge with respect to actual damages, from which construction there is no appeal. The judge further construed the remainder of the verdict as being against Queen City Coach Company alone for punitive damages in the amount of $25,000, but ruled in connection therewith that said defendant had waived its right to question the defect in the verdict, since no objection to the verdict was made before the jury was discharged. His order denied all motions of the defendants, except to order a new trial nisi, should plaintiff fail to remit the sum of $10,000 from the verdict for punitive damages. Instead of remitting, the plaintiff appealed, so that the present effect of his Honor's order is to order a new trial absolute. Both defendants also appeal from the foregoing order.

We shall first consider and dispose of the appeal of the plaintiff. It is urged by the plaintiff that his Honor, in construing the verdict, should have stricken therefrom the words 'against Queen City Coach Company' as surplusage and construed the verdict as being against both defendants for actual and punitive damages. The simple answer to this contention is that had his Honor done so, such would have been tantamount to the judge himself writing a verdict against the defendant Johnson in the amount of $25,000, instead of the jury returning a verdict to such effect.

The plaintiff further asserts error in that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the verdict for punitive damages, it being contended that the verdict was not excessive, was based upon the evidence of willfulness and recklessness of the defendants, and that in reducing the verdict the trial court invaded the province of the jury and deprived the plaintiff of his right to trial by a jury. It is well settled in this state that the trial judge has a wide discretionary power to order a new trial nisi when, in his view of the evidence, the verdict of the jury is excessive in the sense that the same is unduly liberal. Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408; Johnson v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 227 S.C. 351, 88 S.E.2d 260, 55 A.L.R.2d 813. We see nothing in the record to indicate that there was here any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in reducing the amount of the punitive damage verdict and ordering a new trial, conditioned on the failure of the plaintiff to remit a portion of the punitive damage verdict.

Both defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendants, upon the ground that the only reasonable inference to be deduced from the evidence was that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or recklessness. In considering this question, it is elementary that the evidence and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom have to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

The collision which gave rise to this cause of action occurred on May 6, 1961, shortly after the 'Rebel 300' automobile race held in Darlington, South Carolina that afternoon, which race was attended by the plaintiff. Upon leaving the area of the race track, plaintiff intended to go to Camden, South Carolina, but due to the controlled direction of the heavy traffic, found himself traveling north on Highway 52 in the direction of Society Hill, and some four or five miles out of Darlington, stopped off of said highway and to the east thereof at Moody's Store, for the purpose of obtaining directions as to how to get back on a road which would take him to Camden. The said store is located at the intersection of State Road 16-36, which intersects Highway 52 on the westerly side thereof opposite Moody's Store.

Upon asking directions, plaintiff ascertained that State Road 16-36 would take him in the direction he wanted to travel. At the time, northbound traffic on Highway 52 was extremely heavy as the result of the automobile race, being almost bumper to bumper, and plaintiff had to wait a while before he could get a break in the northbound traffic so as to be able to cross Highway 52. When he did get such a break, he proceeded across said highway for the purpose of entering State Road 16-36. At the time, the bus was approaching in a southerly direction on Highway 52, and there is evidence to the effect that the impact occurred between the front end of the bus and the right side of plaintiff's automobile, the various witnesses placing the actual point of the impact on State Road 16-36 at varying distances off of Highway 52.

There was evidence to the effect that the bus was being operated on a schedule which could not possibly be kept and yet comply with the state's speed laws; that it was behind time and that it was traveling at a speed of sixty to seventy miles per hour as it approached the particular intersection in the face of very heavy traffic coming from Darlington. Highway 52, to the north of the site of the collision, is straight with the view thereof unobstructed for quite a considerable distance.

In brief, the defendants' contention is that the plaintiff should have seen the oncoming bus; that under all of the circumstances he should have seen that he could not cross the highway with safety and should have yielded the right of way to the bus. It is urged that his failure to so observe and yield the right of way amounted to negligence, recklessness, willfulness and wantonness as a matter of law and that such contributed to, or was solely the proximate cause of the collision.

While much of the evidence is in sharp conflict, there is evidence to the effect that the bus was as much as two hundred fifty yards north of the point of collision when the plaintiff started to cross the highway; that plaintiff did look and see the bus and, after observing the same, concluded that he had plenty of opportunity to cross the highway in safety before the bus arrived at the point. There was, we think, ample evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the plaintiff exercised due care in attempting to cross the highway and that but for the careless, negligent, reckless or willful conduct on the part of the defendants, plaintiff's crossing of the highway would have been completed without incident.

While we have not reviewed in detail all of the evidence, we do not think that further review thereof, or the citation of authority, is here necessary to show that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the issues of negligence and willfulness on the part of the defendant; contributory negligence and willfulness on the part of the plaintiff, and proximate cause of the collision and damage.

We now reach what we regard to be the primary issues raised by the defendants. It is contended by the...