Collins v. Metzger

• Decision Date: 07 February 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 16-751-LPS
• Parties: SOLOMON COLLINS, Petitioner, v. DANA METZGER, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

SOLOMON COLLINS, Petitioner, v. DANA METZGER, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 16-751-LPS

United States District Court, D. Delaware

February 7, 2022

Janet Bateman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Delaware Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Petitioner.

Andrew J. Vella, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STARK U.S. District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Solomon Collins' ("Petitioner") original pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and his Amended § 2254 Petition (hereinafter referred to as "Petition"). (D.I. 2; D.I. 18) The State filed an Answer in opposition, to which Petitioner filed a Reply. (D.I. 27; D.I. 37) For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Petition.

II. BACKGROUND

As summarized by the Delaware Supreme Court on Petitioner's post-conviction appeal, the facts leading up to his arrest and conviction, as well as the result of Petitioner's criminal proceedings, are set forth below:

On October 8, 2009, Tommear Tinnin was shot to death while sitting in the back seat of a parked car with his two cousins and another young relative. The assailant fled the scene and passed two bystanders, Violet Gibson and Shakira Romeo. Gibson and Romeo met with Detective Conner after the incident. They both identified [Petitioner] as the shooter from a photo array. Detective Conner made an audio recording of his interview with Gibson. He did not record his interview with Romeo. Instead, he took notes on his notepad and directly on the photo array he presented to Romeo during the interview.

At trial, the testimony of Gibson and Romeo was inconsistent with their prior statements to Detective Conner. The State used 11 Del. C. § 3507 to introduce their out-of-court statements through Detective Conner during his testimony. The State also played the audio recording of Gibson identifying [Petitioner] as the shooter, and introduced into evidence the photo array Detective Conner had written on reflecting Romeo's identification. During his testimony, Detective Conner clarified that Gibson had identified [Petitioner] as the shooter because the recording identified the suspects by number rather than name. Further, he testified that Romeo identified [Petitioner] as the shooter and that he wrote notes regarding her statements onto the photo array during the interview.

After an eight day trial, a jury found [Petitioner] guilty of Murder First Degree, three counts of Reckless Endangering First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. On July 15, 2011, the Superior Court sentenced [Petitioner] to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, and additional time for the remaining counts.

[The Delaware Supreme Court] affirmed [Petitioner's] conviction on direct appeal in 2012. In 2013, [Petitioner] filed a motion for postconviction relief ["Rule 61 motion"] alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied the motion and held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, because admission of the § 3507 statements of both Romeo and Gibson had been proper. [Petitioner] appealed the Superior Court's rulings on the admission of each witness' § 3507 statement. During the appeal, the State learned that there was a discrepancy between the photo array that Romeo had used to identify [Petitioner], which the State admitted at trial ("State's Exhibit 84"), and the copy that the State had sent to [Petitioner's] attorney during discovery. The word "shooter" was written on State's Exhibit 84, but [Petitioner's] copy did not have the word "shooter" on it. At the parties' joint request, [the Delaware Supreme Court] remanded the case to the Superior Court for a hearing to explore the nature of the discrepancy between the photos and retained jurisdiction. [The Delaware Supreme Court] declined to address [Petitioner's] second argument at that time, which pertains to Gibson's § 3507 statement, at the time we issued the remand order.

On remand, the Superior Court held a hearing to address the discrepancy. The State offered the testimony of Detective Conner, the trial prosecutors, and the trial defense attorney. The Superior Court found that (1) Detective Conner added the word "shooter" to the original photo array shown to Romeo after the discovery copy was made for [Petitioner]; (2) the alteration made to the original photo was not done in bad faith or in response to the § 3507 issue that arose at trial; (3) Romeo identified [Petitioner] as the shooter during her interview with Detective Conner; and (4) exclusive of the photo array, the trial prosecutors and defense counsel were aware during the pendency of the case that Romeo had identified [Petitioner] as the shooter and expected her to testify consistent with that identification at trial.

Based on these findings, the Superior Court held that [Petitioner's] ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed. The court found that the issue of when Detective Conner wrote the word "shooter" on the photo array was immaterial because Romeo's statement still would have been introduced as a § 3507 statement at trial. Therefore, even if trial counsel had noticed the discrepancy and raised the issue, the outcome would have been the same. Further, the Superior Court held that [Petitioner] could not show he was prejudiced by the discrepancy because Romeo's identification of [Petitioner] as the shooter was never withheld from trial counsel. Therefore, trial counsel was aware of Romeo's pretrial identification of [Petitioner] as the shooter and could have expected testimony consistent with that identification at trial.

Collins v. State, 138 A.3d 475 (Table), 2016 WL 2585782, at *2-3 (Del. May 2, 2016). On appeal after remand, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Petitioner's Rule 61 motion. Collins, 2016 WL 2585782, at *4-5.

Petitioner initially filed a pro se habeas Petition, as well as a motion to appoint counsel. (D.I. 1; D.I. 4) The Federal Public Defender's Office ("FPD") filed a motion to join in Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel (D.I. 6), which the Court granted (D.I. 10). Petitioner, now represented by the FPD, filed an Amended Petition. (D.I. 18) The State filed an Answer, to which Petitioner filed a Reply. (D.I. 27; D.I. 37)

III. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boervkel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The AEDPA states, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted die remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; see also Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, in a procedural manner permitting the court to consider the claims on their merits. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005); see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989).

A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although treated as technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989).

Federal courts may not consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court does not review the claims. See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner "must show not merely that the errors at. . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional...