Collins v. Mills

• Decision Date: 10 July 1944
• Docket Number: 14885.
• Citation: 30 S.E.2d 866,198 Ga. 18
• Parties: COLLINS, Tax Collector, et al. v. MILLS et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 S.E.2d 866

198 Ga. 18

COLLINS, Tax Collector, et al. v. MILLS et al.

No. 14885.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 10, 1944

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In 1912, the Constitution was amended so as to provide that the General Assembly shall 'have power to exempt from taxation, farm products, including baled cotton, grown in this State and remaining in the hands of the producer, but not longer than for the next year after their production.' In the following year, the General Assembly passed an act for the express purpose of putting this amendment into effect.

(a) The petition in this case, asserting exemption of described lumber as a farm product, did not allege sufficient facts to show that the lumber was a farm product within the meaning of the foregoing amendment.

2. Personal property is ordinarily taxed in the county where the owner resides, and in order for it to acquire a situs for taxation in some other county under the Code, § 92-6208, it must be connected with some business enterprise that is situated more or less permanently in a different county as distinguished from an enterprise whose location is merely transitory or temporary.

(a) The petition did not allege sufficient facts to show that any part of the lumber was not taxable in Cobb County, in which the tax execution was issued; and since none of it was shown to be exempt from taxation as claimed, the petition did not state a cause of action for any relief. The court erred in overruling the general demurrer of the defendants.

Mills Lumber Company, a partnership, having its office in Cobb County, Georgia, and all of its members residing in Cobb County, filed an equitable petition against John D. Collins as tax receiver, J. F. Hicks, as sheriff, and other officers of that county, seeking an injunction and other relief to prevent enforcement of an execution for taxes claimed by the defendants for the year 1943, on certain lumber owned by the plaintiff on January 1, 1943, situated in Cobb, Cherokee Dawson, Lumpkin, and Paulding Counties. The defendants filed to the petition a general demurrer, which was overruled, and they excepted.

It appears that the plaintiff made a tax return in Cobb County for the year 1943, but did not include any of this lumber. The tax assessors, after notice and hearing, assessed 'lumber in county,' and 'lumber out of county,' at stated valuations. Before instituting the action, the plaintiff paid into court the amount of the taxes which it admitted to be due, leaving a balance of $289.50 which the defendants claim as taxes upon the lumber. The plaintiff contends: (1) That the lumber was a farm product remaining in the hands of the producer for not longer than one year next after its production, and was thus exempt from taxation for the year 1943; and (2) that, even if it was not exempt as claimed, only the part of it that was situated in Cobb County on the effective tax date could be taxed in that county.

The petition alleged: That, on January 1, 1943, the effective tax date for the year 1943, the petitioner was the owner of the lumber in question, all of which had been acquired in the following manner: During or before the year 1942, the petitioner purchased standing saw timber growing on land in Cobb, Cherokee Dawson, Lumpkin, and Paulding Counties. Said purchases were evidenced by deeds from prior owners, executed and delivered to the petitioner, whereby the various property owners for a valuable consideration conveyed to the petitioner the saw timber growing on the land in the respective counties, which land was particularly described in each conveyance. Said deeds also granted to the petitioner the privilege of entering upon said land and of cutting saw timber and removing same from the premises. Said timber deeds also granted to the petitioner sawmill rights and privileges, including road, water, and the right of ingress and egress to and from the land for the life of the respective deeds.

During the year 1942 and within less than twelve months before the effective tax date for the year 1943, the petitioner, after having purchased said standing saw timber, cut said timber from the land, had it sawed on the premises described in the respective deeds, and caused the sawed timber to be stacked on the same land where it had been grown and cultivated. In every case, a sawmill was erected on each tract of land for the purpose of cutting and sawing the timber growing on each respective tract, and each such mill was erected, managed, and operated by foremen, managers, and employees having and exercising in each respective county the exclusive authority to cut and saw timber and stack same on the premises and leave same stacked on the premises within the territorial limits of the respective counties where said timber had been produced. In this manner, all timber so stacked on the premises in each county was cut, stacked, held, and owned as property belonging to the petitioner in each respective county on January 1, 1943. All of the lumber, so stacked on the premises in the various counties where purchased as standing timber, remained on the same premises where purchased and sawed and stacked, and was located on the same premises on the effective tax date for the year 1943. None of the lumber described in this petition except that assessed as 'lumber in county' had at any time before the assessment been located or present within the territorial limits of Cobb County.

The item described as 'lumber out of county' is the same lumber purchased as standing timber, sawed and stacked, owned and kept, in Cherokee, Dawson, Lumpkin, and Paulding Counties in the manner described in this petition, and no other lumber or property is included in said item. The item designated as 'lumber in county' was lumber grown in this State, and the same lumber purchased, sawed, stacked, owned, and kept in Cobb County, in the manner described in this petition, and no other lumber is included in said item.

All of said lumber, stacked and located on January 1, 1943, in counties other than the county of Cobb, was sawed from timber cut and sawed and stacked at sawmills erected and operated in the counties where the timber was grown, and accordingly was property employed in the conduct of a business or the manufactured product of a business enterprise conducted upon realty located in the respective counties other than the county of Cobb. For this additional reason, none of said property located in other counties was and is subject to tax in Cobb County, Georgia.

The petition also alleged in general terms that all the lumber described was a 'farm product--remaining in the hands of the producer,' and as such was exempt from taxation for the year 1943, under the provisions of the Constitution, Code, § 2-5002, Const.Art. 7, § 2, par. 2, and of the statute enacted in pursuance thereof, § 92-201.

It was further alleged that the execution had been levied on described property of the petitioner; that the property was being advertised for sale; and that the sheriff, unless enjoined, would sell the same to satisfy such execution. The petition prayed, among other things, for an injunction and general relief.

Geo. D. Anderson, Blair & Carmichael, and H. C. Schrseder, all of Marietta, for plaintiffs in error.

W. S. Northcutt, of Atlanta, for defendants in error.

BELL, Chief Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).

1. In 1912, the Constitution was amended so as to provide that the General Assembly shall 'have power to exempt from taxation, farm products, including baled cotton, grown in this State and remaining in the hands of the producer, but not longer than for the year next after their production.' Ga.L.1912, p. 36; Code, § 2-5002; Const. art. 7, § 2, par. 2. In 1913, the General Assembly passed an act for the express purpose of putting 'in force' the amendment of 1912, and the descriptive words were the same as in the constitutional amendment. Ga.L. 1913, p. 122. Therefore, the real question is the meaning of the words as they appear in the Constitution.

A provision of the Constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption. Accordingly, the amendment of 1912 means now precisely what it meant at that time. Padelford v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438(5); South Carolina v. U.S. , 199 U.S. 437, 26 S.Ct. 110, 50 L.Ed. 261, 4 Ann.Cas. 737; 11 Am.Jur. 694, § 61. Compare Carter v. Marble Products Inc., 171 Ga. 49, 154 S.E. 891.

The business of farming, however, may change both as to method and as to things produced, and changes in the latter respect may from time to time add new crops to the catalogue of farm products. In such case, the exemption would apply to the new products, as well as to the old, and would do so even though the new products may have been entirely unknown, and hence not specifically within the minds of the people at the time such constitutional provision was adopted. This would involve only an application of the same Constitution to new conditions arising by natural processes, and would not mean that the Constitution itself had been changed. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591, 15 S.Ct. 900, 909, 39 L.Ed. 1092; U. S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368. Nor can the Constitution be changed by any legislative definition, or other provision, in a mere statute. Thus, if lumber was not a farm product in 1912, it is not a farm product now, unless it has become such through actual change in the scope of farming.

Several statutes have been enacted in the meantime, as follows: The Co-operative Marketing Act of 1921, in which it was declared that 'agricultural products' shall include, among other things, 'forestry products.' Ga.L.1921, p. 139 C...