Collins v. Oklahoma State Hosp.
| Decision Date | 25 July 1916 |
| Docket Number | 7794. |
| Citation | 184 P. 946,76 Okla. 229 |
| Parties | COLLINS v. OKLAHOMA STATE HOSPITAL et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
On Rehearing, Oct. 28, 1919.
Syllabus by the Court.
In this state it is libelous per se to write of or concerning a white person that said person is colored.
A cause of action for libel cannot be maintained against a hospital for the insane on account of the act of its officers and employés in placing a white patient in that part of the institution set apart and used for colored patients.
In construing language alleged to be libelous, the courts should give to said language the same meaning and understanding as is usually applied thereto.
Section 4956 of the Revised Laws of 1910 considered, and held, that the general words, "or other fixed representation," are used for the purpose of including other species of the same kind as the particular words there used, "writing, printing, picture, or effigy."
The letter which constitutes the second cause of action, and attached to the petition as a part thereof, examined, and the same held to be privileged.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
The word "colored," or its abbreviation "col.," as applied to persons, is synonymous with "negro."
[Ed Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Colored.]
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 3.
Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.
Action by Joseph Collins against the Oklahoma State Hospital and others for libel, etc. Demurrer to petition sustained, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Robert L. McLendon and Chas. West, both of Oklahoma City, Jos. L Hull, of Muskogee, and H. H. Hagan, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
Parker & Simons, of Enid, Burford, Robertson & Hoffman and S. P. Freeling, all of Oklahoma City, and R. E. Wood, of Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.
It is alleged in the petition in this case that Joseph Collins is a white person, and that Lee Collins, a female about 33 years of age, is his daughter by his wife, and is a white person of pure Caucasian blood; that the defendant companies are domestic corporations, and that the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company was on July 14, 1914, engaged in the business of operating for profit a hospital for the insane at Norman, Okl., and that about November 19, 1914, the Oklahoma State Hospital became the successor to the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company in said business; that on or about the 30th of July, 1914, the said Lee Collins having been previously adjudged insane and committed by the proper court to the asylum was taken by the plaintiff to the Oklahoma Sanitarium Company as an insane patient for treatment, where she was received by said company and placed in a ward used by the white people at said place; that a few days thereafter those in charge of the institution placed her in a ward set apart for negro patients, and entered upon its records opposite her name the word "colored," and thereby held her out to the world as a woman having negro blood, which condition continued until February, 1915. It is alleged by the plaintiff that by reason of this act said defendants falsely and maliciously imputed to this plaintiff either the commission of a crime against the laws of this state, or else of being of negro blood, and that, inasmuch as he and his family were respected in the community in which they resided and recognized as white people, this false imputation caused a doubt upon his social status, and caused him great humiliation, etc., for which he sought damages in the sum of $25,000.
In the second cause of action it is alleged that on or about the 22d day of January, 1915, said defendants did commit a wrongful libel by publishing a written statement made by them to Joseph Collins, this plaintiff, in the form of a letter, which is as follows:
-and that said letter was exhibited to A. A. Thurlow and other persons, and sent through the United States mail, which contained the false statement that Lee Collins was a negro, and by reason thereof the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $25,000.
The first question for us to determine is whether it is libelous within the purview of our statute for the authorities in charge of an insane institution to place a white person in that part thereof set apart for negro patients. It is charged in the petition that the officers and agents of the company placed Lee Collins in a ward set apart for negro patients, and thereby declared to the world that she was a negro woman, and that it entered upon its records opposite her name, wherever it appeared, the word "colored."
It will be noticed that there is no charge in this first cause of action in said petition contained that the word "colored," written opposite the name of Lee Collins, was ever published, and in order to constitute libel there must be a publication. Under the allegations of the petition the writing of the word "colored" opposite her name upon the records of the institution is not a publication, as it is not alleged that the same was ever seen by any one, or that said books had ever been examined by any one whatsoever, or that the word thus written had ever been seen or read by any person whomsoever. This in our judgment is necessary before an action for libel can be based thereon, so far as the writing of said word is concerned. Necessarily the person who wrote the word in the books must have seen it, but that person must have been the agent of the corporation, if the act is to be said to be the act of the corporation, and such agent was for that purpose the corporation itself. It can hardly be said to be a publication of a libel for one to show the libelous matter to himself.
This eliminates the charge in the first cause of action that the word "colored" was written opposite the name of Lee Collins, and leaves for us to determine whether it is libelous under our statute for an institution of this character to place a white person in a ward set apart for its negro patients. The question whether it is libelous per se to write of or concerning a white person that he is a negro has been before the courts of many states of this Union, and has been decided from both viewpoints. To determine this, however, we must refer to section 4956 of the Revised Laws of 1910, and by that we see that any false or malicious unprivileged publication by writing, printing, etc., which exposes any person to public hatred, contempt, etc., is libelous. In this state, where a reasonable regulation of the conduct of the races has led to the establishment of separate schools and separate coaches, and where conditions properly have erected insurmountable barriers between the races when viewed from a social and a personal standpoint, and where the habits, the disposition, and characteristics of the race denominate the colored race as inferior to the Caucasian, it is libelous per se to write of or concerning a white person that he is colored. Nothing could expose him to more obloquy or contempt, or bring him into more disrepute, than a charge of this character. Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745; Spotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71; Flood v. News, 71 S.C. 112, 50 S.E. 637; Jones v. Polk, 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577; Upton v. Times, 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970.
Is the placing of a white patient in that part of the institution used and set apart for colored patients libelous, so as to give to the patient or others a cause of action within the statutory definition of libel? What is libel in this state must be determined by the provision of the statute as defined by section 4956 of the Revised Laws of 1910. In other words, a cause of action for libel in this state is statutory, and to determine what is libelous herein we must refer to the statute, as that is controlling.
Section 4956 of the Revised Laws of 1910 is as follows:
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