Collins v. Patch

• Decision Date: 09 May 1892
• Citation: 31 N.E. 295,156 Mass. 317
• Parties: COLLINS v. PATCH et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

156 Mass. 317

31 N.E. 295

COLLINS v. PATCH et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 9, 1892

COUNSEL

M.F. Farrell, for petitioner.

Geo. W Parke, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The only question in this case is whether the certificate properly described the lot of land on which the lien is claimed. When Collupy entered into the contract with the respondent Clara E. Patch to build for her a double dwelling house she had contracted with another person to remove a barn to the rear portion of her lot, and build it into a dwelling house; and subsequently, when the petitioner made his contract with Collupy to furnish labor and materials in the erection of the double house, the barn had been placed on the rear of the lot, and the work of building it into a dwelling house was going on. Afterwards the respondent Patch conveyed an undivided half of a portion of the lot which did not include the part on which the barn stood, but did include that on which was the double house. The petitioner's certificate described the lot as it was when the contract was made between him and Collupy, under which his lien arose, and as it is described in his petition. Under the statute he has a lien on the building and the lot of land on which it stands. As soon as his contract was made he acquired a right to have a lien, not only on the building but on the lot on which, by the terms of his contract, the building was to be erected. That was the whole of the lot, on a part of which the barn stood. There had then been no division of it, and there was nothing to indicate that a division was contemplated, much less to show how a division would be made. The right to a lien attached to every part of the lot, as well that on which the barn was as that occupied by the double house. Each of the buildings was attached to the realty, and the land and buildings went together as real estate. In this case we have no occasion to consider questions in relation to apportionment between claimants of liens for work on different buildings on the same lot; but a lien for work on either of the buildings extended to the whole lot as it was when the contract was made, including everything which belonged to the real estate. Quimby v Durgin, 148 Mass. 104, 19 N.E. 14; Wall v. Robinson, 115 Mass. 429; Batchelder v. Rand, 117 Mass. 176. The conveyance of a portion of the premises after the contract with the petitioner was...