Collins v. Rocha

• Decision Date: 06 October 1970
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Frank COLLINS, Frank Gonzales, Ward Daniels, John Drake, Joseph Lanier, Hardy Bell, Glover Gant, William Blackwell, Eugene Harris; and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Pete ROCHA, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 35817.

Page 224

90 Cal.Rptr. 224

11 Cal.App.3d 1012

Frank COLLINS, Frank Gonzales, Ward Daniels, John Drake, Joseph Lanier, Hardy Bell, Glover Gant, William Blackwell, Eugene Harris; and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Pete ROCHA, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 35817.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 6, 1970.

For Opinion on Hearing, see 102 Cal.Rptr. 1, 497 P.2d 225.

Ralph S. Abascal, Edgar A. Kerry and Peter Haberfeld, Marysville, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Hutton, Foley & Anderson and Peter D. Anderson, King City, for defendant and respondent.

HERNDON, Associate Justice.

Appellants, the nine persons named in their complaint as plaintiffs, filed this action in the superior court as a class action on behalf of themselves and thirty-five other unnamed persons seeking recovery of damages for each of the forty-four members of the so-called class. The complaint purports to state four separate causes of action alleging fraud, breach of contract and violations of sections 201, 202, 970 and 972 of the Labor Code. The damages claimed totaled $3,707.90 for each of the members of the class for whom recovery was sought under the first three causes of action and $4,153.40 for each of those allegedly entitled to recover on all four causes of action.

Respondent filed a demurrer which stated several grounds as to each cause of action, including insufficiency of the alleged facts to state a cause of action or to constitute a proper class action and uncertainty in specified particulars.

The trial court sustained respondent's demurrer and ordered the action transferred to the Municipal Court, Los Angeles Judicial District. The order expressly recites the court's determination that the complaint failed to show the existence of any ascertainable class with the same community of interest and that the allegations of the complaint were uncertain in some of the particulars specified in the stated grounds of the demurrer. The appeal is from this order which, as appellants correctly point out, is an appealable order. (Daar dv. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732.)

Appellants do not challenge the correctness of the order insofar as it sustains the special demurrer but contend that the trial court erred in its determination that the requirements essential to sustain a class action were not met and in transferring the case to the Municipal Court. We have concluded that the trial court's fdetermination is in conformity with the law and that the order must be affirmed.

In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732, the Supreme Court, after referring to section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stated the applicable law as follows:

'That section provides in relevant part: '* * * and when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.' The section is based upon the equitable doctrine of virtual representation which "rests upon considerations of necessity and paramount convenience, and was anopted to prevent a failure of justice."' (Bernhard v. Wall (1921) 184 Cal. 612, 629, 194 P. 1040, quoting from 15 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 629; see Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 833, 837, 198 P.2d 514; California Gas. Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 844, 850, 330 P.2d 778; Chance v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 291, 23 Cal.Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849; see also Chafee, Some Problems of Equity (1950), 200-205; 11 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 308-309; 6 Stan.L.Rev. 120, 121-122.)

'Although the statute appears to speak in the alternative, it uniformly has been held that wo requirements must be met in order to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class (Chance v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d 275, 290, 23 Cal.Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849: Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn., supra, 32 Cal.2d 833, 842-843, 198 P.2d 514; Barber v. California Emp. Stab. Comm. (1954) 130 Cal.App.2d 7, 14, 278 P.2d 762); and (2) there must be a well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented (Chance v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d 275, 286, 23 Cal.Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849; California Gas. Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., supra, 50 Cal.2d 844, 850, 330 P.2d 778; Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn., supra, 32 Cal.2d 833, 837, 841, 198 P.2d 514; Noroian v. Bennett (1919) 179 Cal. 806, 808-810, 179 P. 158; see also, Hansberry v. Lee (1940) 311 U.S. 32, 44-46, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 132 A.L.R. 741; Fallon v. Superior Court (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 48, 50-51, 90 P.2d 858.) See generally, 1 Chadbourn, Grossman & (Van Alstyne, Cal. Pleading (1961) Class Actions, § 613 et seq.; 2 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (1954) Representative or Class Suits, § 99 et seq.)' (67 Cal.2d pages 703-704, 63 Cal.Rptr. page 731, 433 P.2d page 739.)

It is immediately apparent from a reading of the complaint in the case at bench that the 'considerations of necessity and paramount convenience' (which, as stated in Daar, underlie the doctrine of virtual representation and section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure) do not operate to qualify this as a class action. Debatable as the issue appears to be, it may be assumed for present purposes that the nine named plaintiffs and the thirty-five other unnamed persons might qualify as an ascertainable class. However, it affirmatively appears that there does not exist that 'well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.'

The instant complaint alleges that the nine named plaintiffs are farm workers residing in Los Angeles County. It contains no allegations to indicate either the identity or the places of residence of the other thirty-five persons purportedly represented. It is alleged that the defendant is 'a farm labor contractor whose principle [sic] place of business is in the County of Monterey, State of California.'

According to the complaint, the named plaintiffs 'went to the Farm Labor Service office of the Department of Employment, State of California, * * * for the purpose of obtaining farm work. Plaintiffs were told by representatives of the Farm Labor Service that employment opportunities existed with defendant Pete Rocha.' It is further alleged that an officer of the Farm Labor Service made certain representations to plaintiffs concerning the nature and terms of employment that would be made available to them by defendant in Monterey County. The complaint does not directly allege the authority of said officer to act as defendant's agent.

The complaint further alleges that certain of the representations thus made were false and that plaintiffs justifiably relied upon them and were thereby induced to travel to Monterey County to become employees of the defendant. It is alleged that some of the workers who were thus induced to travel to Monterey County were discharged without cause within three hours and that the remainder were discharged within three days. It is alleged that some of the workers were not paid for their services and that defendant was liable to them in varying amounts for unremunerated services.

Disregarding the fact that the complaint fails to allege that all members of the class of workers purportedly represented were...