Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment

• Decision Date: 21 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 991068-CA.,991068-CA.
• Citation: 2000 UT App 371,16 P.3d 1251
• Parties: John COLLINS and June Collins, Petitioners and Appellants, v. SANDY CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; and Sandy City Corporation, a municipal corporation, Respondents and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

16 P.3d 1251

2000 UT App 371

John COLLINS and June Collins, Petitioners and Appellants, v. SANDY CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; and Sandy City Corporation, a municipal corporation, Respondents and Appellees.

No. 991068-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

December 21, 2000.

Franklin L. Slaugh, Sandy, for Appellants.

Steven C. Osborn, Sandy, for Appellees.

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ.

OPINION

BILLINGS, Judge:

¶ 1 John and June Collins (Collins) appeal from summary judgment in favor of the Sandy City Board of Adjustment (Board). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The Collins own certain real properties located in R-1-8 residential zones in Sandy City.¹ The Collins claim they used the properties as short-term rentals (rentals of less than thirty days) until March 26, 1996 when Sandy City ordered them to cease such use. Sandy City claimed their use was in violation of a zoning ordinance which the City claimed prohibited short-term rentals.

¶ 3 The Collins appealed the cease and desist order to the Board. The Board upheld the City's interpretation of the ordinance. The Collins appealed the decision of the Board to the third district court, which affirmed the Board's decision.

¶ 4 The Collins did not appeal the district court's decision. Rather, they chose to await the outcome of Brown et al. v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct.App.1998), which involved the same issue of whether the Sandy City Land Development Code prohibited short-term rentals in R-1-8 and R-1-10 residential zones as the Board and district court had concluded. See id. at 212. In Brown, this court held that "short-term leases of residential properties are not prohibited by the zoning ordinance," and thus invalidated the City's interpretation of the ordinance.² Id. In response to Brown, Sandy City placed a moratorium on all short-term rentals, effective March 27, 1998, see Sandy City, Utah, Ordinance No. 98-19, and thereafter, on September 1, 1998, amended the ordinance specifically prohibiting short-term leases. See Sandy City, Utah, Ordinance No. 98-35.

¶ 5 On October 27, 1998, the Collins filed an application with the Board seeking nonconforming use status on their properties. The Board denied the application because the Collins did not establish that they were using the properties as short-term rentals on March 27, 1998, the effective date of the moratorium.

¶ 6 The Collins appealed the Board's decision to the trial court. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered summary judgment for the Board on all properties. The trial court held that the Collins' claim was barred on the grounds of res judicata because the Collins failed to appeal the 1996 trial court decision. Additionally, the trial court found that the properties did not qualify for nonconforming use status because the Collins had failed to produce evidence to show that they were using their properties as short-term rentals on March 27, 1998, and that the Collins had failed to produce evidence to show that their use of the properties was in conformity with the applicable zoning ordinances. The Collins appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness." Baczuk v. Salt Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2000 UT App 225,¶ 5, 8 P.3d 1037 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The doctrine of res judicata comprises two different branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Issue preclusion is before us in this appeal. Issue preclusion, often referred to as collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of issues already determined in a previous action. See id. at 250. Issue preclusion applies if four requirements are met:

First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a party.

Id. "If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there can be no issue preclusion." Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).

¶ 9 The Collins concede that three of the four requirements of issue preclusion are met but argue that the issues in the 1996 case and this case are not identical. The Collins argue that in the 1996 action the issue was whether the current Sandy City ordinances prohibited leases of dwellings for terms of less than thirty days. In this action, they argue that the issue presented is whether they are entitled to a nonconforming use status because of their use prior to the 1998 ordinance.

¶ 10 The Board responds that the central issue in the 1996 action was whether short-term rentals were lawful. The Board asserts that the legality of short-term rentals is also central to the Collins' claim for nonconforming use status because to qualify for a nonconforming use the applicant must show that the use was legally established and continued before the enactment or effective date of the restrictive legislation. See Sandy City, Utah, Rev. Dev.Code § 15-24-2.

¶ 11 In support of its position, the Board cites Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). In Robertson, the issue was whether a finding of undue influence in the execution of a will collaterally estopped relitigation of the issue of undue influence as to a trust. See id. at 1230-31. The defendant argued that collateral estoppel was not applicable because the issue tried and resolved in the first case, the validity of a will, was different than that in the second, the validity of a trust. See id. at 1230.

¶ 12 The court stated that "[w]hat is critical is whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same factual issue as that raised in the second suit." Id. (citing Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978)). The court held that relitigation of the issue of undue influence was collaterally estopped because the validity or invalidity of the will was a legal conclusion based on the factual finding of undue influence. See id.

¶ 13 The court reasoned that:

"[I]t is not the identity of the thing sued for, or of the cause of action, which determines the conclusiveness of a former judgment upon a subsequent action, but merely the identity of the issue involved in the two suits. If an issue presented in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies is shown to have been determined in a former one, the question is res judicata [or collateral estoppel], although the actions are based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or are instituted for different purposes and seek different relief."

Id. (quoting Pickeral v. Federal Land Bank, 177 Va. 743, 15 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1941)) (alterations in original).

¶ 14 We conclude Robertson defeats the Collins' claim that because the actions are based on different legal grounds—legality of short-term rentals versus noncomforming use—they are not identical issues. Because the central issue in the 1996 action was the legality of the short-term rentals under the ordinance, and in this suit we must determine that the pre 1996 use was lawful in order to establish a valid nonconforming use, the same issue is involved.

¶ 15 The Collins next argue that, regardless of whether the issues in the 1996 suit and this suit are identical, because of an intervening change in the law, they should not be barred under the principles of res judicata.

¶ 16 The Collins cite dicta from Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that in addition to the four requirements of issue preclusion, the court must further inquire as to "whether the controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the prior judgment." Id. at 1032. This statement of dicta has never been cited in subsequent Utah case law. Nonetheless, we agree that it is the general rule that a subsequent change in the operative facts or the controlling law has generally relieved a party from the application of res judicata. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162, 65 S.Ct. 573, 576, 89 L.Ed. 812 (1945); Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1993); Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1962); Wagner v. Baron, 64 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla.1953); Statler v. Catalano, 293 Ill. App.3d 483, 229 Ill.Dec. 274, 691 N.E.2d 384, 386-87 (1997); Blevins v. Johnson, 344 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky.1961); Farrow v. Brown, 873 S.W.2d 918, 920-21 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994); State v. J.P. Lamb Land Co., 401 N.W.2d 713, 718 (N.D.1987); Marino v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex.1990).

¶ 17 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 65 S.Ct. 573, 89 L.Ed. 812 (1945), the Supreme Court stated that "it is . . . the general rule that res judicata is no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation." Id. at 162, 65 S.Ct. at 576.

¶ 18 An illustrative case is Statler v. Catalano, 293 Ill.App.3d 483, 229 Ill.Dec. 274, 691 N.E.2d 384 (1997). Statler dealt with a dispute over the rights to the surface waters of a lake. See id., 691 N.E.2d at 385. The court determined that, under the prevailing case law, the plaintiffs only had a right to use a portion of the lake rather than the whole. See id. Seven years later, the plaintiffs filed suit again seeking a declaration of their right to use the entire lake. See id. The defendant moved to dismiss under the doctrine of res judicata. See id. The trial court denied the...