Fowler v. Paul Teynor & Intermountain Mro Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20121097–CA.,20121097–CA.
• Citation: 323 P.3d 594,756 Utah Adv. Rep. 21
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Parties: William Tracy FOWLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Paul TEYNOR and Intermountain MRO Services, Inc., Defendants and Appellees.

323 P.3d 594

756 Utah Adv. Rep. 21

William Tracy FOWLER, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Paul TEYNOR and Intermountain MRO Services, Inc., Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20121097–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 20, 2014.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 2014.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 11, 2014.

April L. Hollingsworth, for Appellant.

Justin T. Toth and Emily S. Loeffler, for Appellees.

Judge JOHN A. PEARCE authored this Opinion, in which Judge JAMES Z. DAVIS and Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH concurred.¹

Opinion

PEARCE, Judge:

¶ 1 William Tracy Fowler appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Paul Teynor and Intermountain MRO Services, Inc. (IMRO). Fowler claims the district court erred in finding that principles of res judicata barred his claims against Teynor and IMRO. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Fowler worked as a mail-room supervisor at Westminster College (Westminster). In 2001, he began having back problems that necessitated several surgeries. After the last surgery in April 2004, Fowler realized that he was addicted to his prescription pain medication. He informed Westminster of his addiction and went on short-term disability to attend a rehabilitation program. His working relationship with Westminster deteriorated over the next year, and in October 2005, Westminster asked Fowler to take a drug test. Fowler agreed, and Westminster contracted with a local testing company, IMRO, to perform a urinalysis.

¶ 3 Teynor, a doctor who owns IMRO and serves as its medical review officer, reviewed the lab results from Fowler's drug test. The results showed the presence of certain prescription drugs, including the muscle relaxant carisoprodol. Teynor knew that Fowler had a prescription for carisoprodol but informed Westminster that Fowler had reported taking twice the amount prescribed. Teynor also reported to Westminster that Fowler was taking several other prescription drugs and therefore posed a safety risk. Fowler alleges that Teynor did not inform Westminster of the limitations of urinalysis in detecting the amount or effect of drugs in a person's system or that Fowler's self-reported carisoprodol use, while greater than prescribed, fell within the standard recommended daily dosage. On November 1, 2005, Westminster terminated Fowler's employment, citing as its reason the results of the drug test.

¶ 4 Fowler sued Westminster in federal court, alleging that Westminster had discriminated against him and ultimately fired him because of a disability—his addiction—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA). Shortly thereafter, Fowler initiated this state court action against Teynor and IMRO, alleging various causes of action including negligence arising from Teynor and IMRO's handling of the drug test and their reporting of results with false or incomplete information to Westminster.

¶ 5 Fowler's federal case proceeded to trial first. At the federal jury trial, Westminster defended itself by claiming that the result of the drug test, and not discrimination, was the reason it terminated Fowler. The jury specifically rejected that defense and found, as evidenced by its response on the verdict form, that “Westminster did not honestly believe and act in good faith on its stated reasons for terminating Mr. Fowler, making those reasons pretext for discrimination against Mr. Fowler based on his disability.” The jury determined that Westminster had violated the ADA when it terminated Fowler, and the jury awarded him $500,000 in compensatory damages.²

¶ 6 After trial, Westminster moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing in part that it had proved at trial that it relied in good faith on the results of the drug test in terminating Fowler. The federal court denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had found that “Westminster did not honestly believe and act in good faith on its stated reasons for terminating Fowler.” Fowler v. Westminster Coll. of Salt Lake, No. 2:09–cv–591–DN, 2012 WL 4069654, at *3 (D.Utah Sept. 17, 2012). The federal court further ruled that Fowler had presented evidence at trial “on which a reasonable jury could conclude ... that the drug test was pretext for discrimination.” Id.

¶ 7 Shortly after the judgment against Westminster in the federal case, Teynor and IMRO filed a motion for summary judgment in this case, arguing that Fowler's claims against them were barred by issue preclusion in light of the federal jury verdict and resulting judgment ³ The motion did not focus on any specific factual question that had been decided in the federal action but argued broadly that Fowler had already litigated the issue of his wrongful termination. Fowler's opposition to the motion argued that Teynor and IMRO's negligence had not been litigated in the federal case. Fowler also argued that the federal case focused on whether Westminster was liable for discrimination under the ADA and did not decide the question of who else might also be liable for his damages.

¶ 8 The district court granted Teynor and IMRO's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the issue of “the alleged wrongful termination of [Fowler's] employment with Westminster” had been litigated in the federal case and that Teynor and IMRO had established each element of issue preclusion.⁴ In its order granting summary judgment, the district court stated that the federal case had “clearly determined that the drug test was a ‘pretext for discrimination’ and [was] not the basis for [Fowler's] termination.” Fowler appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 Fowler argues that his claims against Teynor and IMRO are not barred by issue preclusion and that the district court therefore erred when it granted summary judgment. “Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ¶ 18, 258 P.3d 539. “We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness and afford no deference to the court's legal conclusions.” Id.; see also Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App 326, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 594 (stating that we review the application of issue preclusion “for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court”).

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court correctly applied the doctrine of issue preclusion to bar Fowler's suit against Teynor and IMRO ⁵ Generally speaking, issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of facts and issues that have been previously determined. Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42, ¶ 23, 285 P.3d 1157.

Issue preclusion applies only when the following four elements are satisfied: (i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).⁶

¶ 11 The district court concluded that Teynor and IMRO had established each of the four elements of issue preclusion. On appeal, Fowler does not dispute that the first element is satisfied, as Fowler was a party to both lawsuits and is the party against whom issue preclusion is being asserted. However, Fowler argues that the district court erred in concluding that Teynor and IMRO established the final three elements. Specifically, Fowler argues that the issues in his case against Teynor and IMRO are not identical to the issues that he litigated against Westminster, were not fully and fairly litigated in the first action, and were not decided by a final judgment on the merits.

I. Identity of Issues

¶ 12 Fowler first argues that the issues litigated in his suit against Westminster are not identical to those he raises in this case. Fowler contends that the prior action did not address “whether Dr. Teynor had a duty to Mr. Fowler that he breached when he incorrectly reported to Westminster that Mr. Fowler told him he had taken twice the recommended amount of [carisoprodol], nor did [it] determine whether this conduct by IMRO and/or Dr. Teynor caused him damages.”

¶ 13 Fowler is correct that the jury in the prior action did not decide whether Teynor or IMRO breached any duty they may have owed to Fowler. We conclude, however, that the federal jury verdict and judgment conclusively determined why Westminster terminated Fowler. Because Fowler does not allege damages arising from anything other than his termination, the federal jury necessarily resolved the issue of whether Teynor and IMRO's actions damaged Fowler.

¶ 14 Fowler notes that there are significant substantive differences between his claim of disability discrimination against Westminster and his negligence-based claims against Teynor and IMRO. However, the applicability of issue preclusion “does not depend on whether the claims for relief are the same.” Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983). “ ‘[W]hat is critical is whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same factual issue as that raised in the second suit.’ ” Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2000 UT App 371, ¶ 12, 16 P.3d 1251 (emphasis added) (quoting Robertson, 674 P.2d at 1230).

“[I]t is not the identity of the thing sued for, or of the cause of action, which determines the conclusiveness of a former judgment upon a subsequent action, but merely the identity of the issue involved in the two suits. If an issue presented in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies is shown to have been determined in a former one, the question is res judicata [or collateral estoppel], although the actions are based on different grounds, or tried on...